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Foreword

Athanasios Efstathiou and Konstantinos Stefou

Rhetoric & Science started in April 2019 as a follow-up activity of the International Conference ‘Mapping the Rhetoric of Science Writing in Antiquity and Beyond’ held at the History Department of the Ionian University in March 2019, yet its first issue, due to the Coronavirus crisis, eventually sees the light of day in the autumn of 2021.

The main impetus for its foundation came from Laurent Pernot’s inspiring comment, who in his 2000 work *La Rhétorique dans l’Antiquité* observed that Ancient Rhetoric was still a largely unexplored field of research, in the sense that some critical questions awaited answers.

One of these questions is the following: are we entitled to speak of a rhetoric of ancient scientific discourse? At the intellectual core of this journal lies the seminal 1997 paper ‘Towards a Rhetoric of Ancient Scientific Discourse’ by Philip van der Eijk, who dealt with some formal characteristics of Greek medical and philosophical texts, having established a very specific definitional framework right from the outset. *Rhetoric & Science* draws on that framework, making use of the term ‘rhetoric’ with reference to formal techniques and procedures geared towards producing oral or written texts with the ultimate aim of achieving certain communicative purposes, and of the term ‘science’ to refer to the study and understanding not *stricto sensu* of the natural world, but, more generally, of the nature of things. Within this framework, under the heading ‘scientific’ can be subsumed not only texts on medicine, mathematics, geography, astronomy, optics, harmonics and whatever else one might regard as representative of ‘ancient science’, but also philosophical treatises, historiographical texts, or even non-scientific works containing sections designed to communicate scientific knowledge.

Yet, *Rhetoric & Science* does not confine itself to investigating the formal traits and the rhetorical, authorial or communicative structures and strategies of ancient scientific-technical texts. Rather, it also sheds light on the ancient orators’ approach to and use of scientific-technical knowledge, achievements, practices or terminology for their own purposes, as well as foregrounding the moments when they launch into a kind of scientific thinking or reflection, but the most important question that it seeks to answer is ‘to what extent (if at all) are ancient science writers required to be rhetorically cultivated, and ancient orators to be scientifically cultured?’

Rhetoric & Science, thus, aims to cover all aspects of the interaction between rhetoric and science in Greek and Roman Antiquity and Byzantium; yet it welcomes contributions also from scholars working on similar issues in modern science and rhetoric as well as on the reception of ancient rhetorical theory and science writing.

Ionian University

The Rhetoric of Wounding

Eleni Volonaki

Abstract

The behavioural pattern of violence is widely used in forensic oratory to portray one's opponent negatively, to undermine his credibility and diminish his argumentation case. Accusations of violence related to charges of wounding (*trauma*), injury (*aikeia*) and homicide (*phonos*) constitute part of the rhetorical strategy of persuasion, contrasting extreme modes of *ēthos* between litigants and arousing hostile emotions, such as anger, disgust, contempt and shame. This chapter approaches the rhetoric of violence, which entails in all its forms a typical Athenian comic element, through the rhetorical technique of *deinōsis*, aiming at underlining motivation and unacceptable civic behaviour both in private and public life. Moreover, it approaches the correlation between rhetoric and medical terminology (science) to appeal for justice in forensic trials as a mode of therapy.

1. Introduction: violence, emotions and *ēthos*

In forensic oratory accusations of violence, i.e. assault, wounding, and any kind of inappropriate physical behaviour, including damage of one's property, or threat against the members of a man's *oikos*, are common rhetorical *topoi* used for the negative portrayal of one's opponent in court. As will be shown, these arguments are mostly employed in the narrative sections of speeches aiming at creating very lively and persuasive stories for trials of premeditated homicide or wounding (*trauma ek pronoias*) and injury (*aikeia*), as an integral part of the speaker's rhetorical strategy.

Character assassination is essential for *ēthos* argumentation in court, in order to present an opponent as being guilty of the alleged crime based on his 'bad', 'disgraceful' and 'violent' character. Moral character is connected with the trustworthiness or the credibility of the speaker,¹ and, therefore, persuasion is achieved by the reliability of the character as he is depicted throughout the speech rather than by a preconceived idea of the speaker's character. To this end, accusations of physical attacks could be manipulated to portray an immoral character in order to arouse hostile emotions in the judges, on the precondition that the slight used was presented as unjust and undeserved.² In this context, the detailed presentation of the wounding as causing pain to the victim to a such an extent that it might even result in his death can be used to attribute motivation for the assumed illegal conduct, to make a persuasive case for the immorality of the criminal's character, and also to arouse the judges' emotions of anger, shame and revenge. It is widely accepted that the audience's emotions, such as pity, anger and resentment, are purposely manipulated for purposes of persuasion both in private and public trials. Thus, the rhetoric of

¹ See Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.3–4, 1356a, on *ēthos* as moral character.

² Aristotle (*Rh.* 1378a31–33) defines anger as painful desire for revenge caused by a perceived undeserved slight against oneself or one's own.

wounding can be included among rhetorical techniques of arousing hostile emotions against one's opponent by constructing an unfavourable portrayal of him and by victimising the speaker for having unjustly suffered pain and humiliation.³

Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a14–15) classifies three modes of proof (*pisteis*), firstly the arousal of the audience's emotions (*pathos*), secondly the presentation of one's character and personality (*ēthos*) and finally rational argumentation (*eikos*). Aristotle (*Rh.* 2, 1378a–1388b) recognises the following emotions for his purposes of persuasion: love, anger, fear, hatred, shame, pity, envy, benevolence or kindness (*charis*), and indignation. Moreover, the judgements of the audience can be influenced accordingly and differently with reference to the arousal of emotions; for example, they can be made feel either friendly or hostile.⁴ In the context of character argumentation (*ēthos*), pity and anger are employed as the fundamental emotions for defendants and offenders respectively.⁵ Ancient rhetoricians emphasised the importance of anger in the attacks against one's opponent.⁶ The methods and strategies of characterisation (*ēthos*) are closely connected with emotional appeals of enmity and disgust against enemies of the city and friendship or *epieikeia* for benefactors of the city.⁷ There is no explicit word to denote the emotion of 'disgust', but, as Fisher points out, speakers in Athenian courts used to arouse anger or hatred against the 'horrible' and 'disgusting' opponent; thus, 'disgust' was indirectly involved in the arguments from *pathos* appealing for the punishment of the accused.⁸ The emotion of disgust can be traced in the vocabulary used to depict the bad character of one's opponent, but also in the intention to 'dehumanise' his victims.⁹

The present paper examines the rhetoric of wounding as a strategy of persuasion employed mainly in the narrative sections of forensic speeches, usually in a detailed, lively depiction of the event and its aftermath, in order to create an unsympathetic persona and to invoke hostile emotions, such as anger, shame and possibly disgust. To this end, the language and vocabulary as well as the narration of the wounding itself will be taken into consideration to explore the rhetoric of violence in both private and public cases. As exemplary cases, scenes of wounding from forensic speeches of Lysias, Demosthenes and Apollodorus will be analysed in terms of circumstances (time and place) and rhetorical strategy. The approach to these scenes will be based, particularly, upon the rhetorical technique of *deinōsis*, 'the emotional *amplification*

³ Modern scholars have argued that the audience's emotions (such as pity, anger, resentment) are manipulated both in private and in public trials, see Fisher (2003) 181–215; Konstan and Rutter (2003); Sanders (2012) 359–87; Rubinstein (2013) 136–65; Lateiner and Spatharas (2017).

⁴ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2, 1358a13–18. As Konstan (2007) 411–25 (particularly, 413) mentions: "Gorgias in his *Praise of Helen* (*Ἐλένης ἐγκώμιον* 8 and 14) attests the extraordinary power of words to arouse emotions".

⁵ For the pair pity-anger, see Konstan (2007) 420ff.

⁶ *Rh.* 1378a19–29; [*Rh. Al.*] 1440a26–1440b3, 1442a10–15.

⁷ For the methodology on character construction in Athenian legal cases, see Adamidis (2017) ch.

4.

⁸ For examples of appeals against the opponent's disgust, see Fisher (2017) 103–24; here, 105–106, and on the relevant vocabulary used to denote disgust, 106–109.

⁹ For the theories concerning the emotion of disgust in ancient and modern sources, see Lateiner and Spatharas (2017) 1–42.

which aims to “appal”;¹⁰ *deinōsis* is also described as ‘the inflaming of the audience’s emotions in order to bring them to take sides against the opposing party’.¹¹ Thus, *deinōsis* is used in physically aggressive scenes of forensic narratives in order to exaggerate acts of violence, blackening, in this way, the opponent’s character and encouraging emotions of anger and repulse.

All the cases that will be explored, in this chapter, involve injury from *trauma ek pronoias* or assault. The legal term *trauma* itself as used in trials of *trauma ek pronoias* reveals a ‘therapeutic’ intention on behalf of the orators to restore and cure *trauma* on a forensic and legal level, in the same way medicine intends to do in real time, or at least to present it that they do so. Medical terminology is rhetorically employed by orators in graphic details to emphasise the need for therapy and therefore the demand to enforce justice through punishment and conviction. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the ways in which rhetoric and science are interrelated to appeal for justice as the ultimate form of therapy in court.

2. Lysias *Against Simon* (3) and *On a premeditated wounding* (4)

Lysias’ speeches *Against Simon* (3) and *On a premeditated wounding* (4) involve trials of ‘wounding with premeditation’ (*trauma ek pronoias*), meaning that there was the intention of wounding which might result in killing and as such it could also be taken as ‘attempted murder’. *Trauma ek pronoias* was an offence similar to *phonos ek pronoias* and therefore modern scholars suggest that the same procedural rules applied to both crimes and the cases were heard by the Areopagus; according to this view, *trauma* is regarded a subspecies of homicide.¹² The legal classification of *trauma ek pronoias* in the realm of homicide cases may also be reflected in the rhetoric of wounding, which aims at establishing the offender’s intention to hit as violently as possible, implying that he may have wanted his victim dead in the first place. With reference to the criteria of distinguishing *trauma ek pronoias* (‘premeditated wounding’) from *trauma* (‘assault’), Todd suggests that the possession of a weapon or an object used for wounding could constitute evidence for premeditation.¹³

The case of Lysias’ *Against Simon* (3) involves the quarrel between the speaker and Simon, because they were both in love with a young man from Plataea named Theodotus.¹⁴ Their dispute included many fights and instances of brutal behaviour, according to the story as narrated by Lysias. The speaker’s name is not known to us and he is the defendant in this case, since Simon has prosecuted him on the charge of

¹⁰ Lausberg (1998) §257.3; cf. §438. According to Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.18.4), *deinōsis* is a rhetorical *topos* common to all kinds of rhetoric, ‘for all men employ extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending’. (trans. Kennedy [2007])

¹¹ *Ibid.* §438.

¹² Carey (1989) 109; Todd (2007) 281–84. Further on the legal procedure and the question whether it was a *dikē* or a *graphē* or whether these two co-existed for intended wounding, see a brief account of the scholars’ views in Kremmydas (2020) 211–29, on this issue particularly: 225–26, nn. 29 and 30; for the procedural features and the penalty in this case, see Kremmydas (2020) 226, nn. 31 and 32.

¹³ Todd (2000) 42. For a study about *trauma ek pronoias*, see also Phillips (2007) 74–105; Phillips argues that the physical element in cases of *trauma ek pronoias* is the use of a weapon, the mental element is the full intention of wounding (premeditation) and he finally supports the view that the procedure was a *graphē* and not a *dikē*. For the view that both *graphē* and *dikē* could be used for *trauma ek pronoias*, see Hansen (1983) 307–20.

¹⁴ More details about the case, cf. Carey (1989) 87–88, Todd (2000) 42–44; Todd (2007) 275–86.

intentional wounding (3.28: λέγει δ' ὡς ἡμεῖς ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν τούτου ὄστρακον ἔχοντες, καὶ ὡς ἠπειλοῦν αὐτῷ ἐγὼ ἀποκτενεῖν, καὶ ὡς τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ πρόνοια), in particular the accusation of premeditation is established upon the use of a piece of broken pottery by which the speaker allegedly threatened to kill Simon.

The orator's strategy is to present the speaker, the defendant, as a wealthy citizen (3.47), a politically active member of the elite (3.9), and also a respectful and old man who did not want to have his personal life exposed in public to court out of shame. On the other hand, the prosecutor, Simon, is represented as an arrogant lawbreaker (3.5), and a poorer man, even though the speaker implies that he must have lied about his wealth (3.21–26). The contrast between the two characters lies in their behaviour and actions, since the speaker is supposed to be the calm and reserved wise man, whereas Simon appears to be the violent and irritable person; thus, the impression created, at least for the reader, is that the speaker used kindness to win the boy, but Simon used force and failed at the end.¹⁵

The narrative offers an extensive and lively account of different and subsequent stages of the quarrel between the two litigants. Repeated acts of violence are attributed to Simon to prove his ruthless character and add plausibility to the speaker's case, thereby arousing emotions of resentment for the accuser and compassion for the defendant.

At first, Simon invaded the speaker's house in his first attempt to recover the boy. Such an action was itself unacceptable and inappropriate, but it obtains a more dramatic and serious tone by Simon's disturbance of the female members and the orphans of the *oikos* (3.6–7):

[6] πυθόμενος γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μαιράκιον ἦν παρ' ἐμοί, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐμὴν **νύκτωρ μεθύων, ἐκκόψας τὰς θύρας** εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν, ἔνδον οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν, αἱ οὕτω κοσμίως βεβιώκασιν ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ὀρώμεναι αἰσχύνεσθαι.[7] οὗτος τοίνυν εἰς τοῦτο ἦλθεν **ὑβρεως** ὥστ' οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν ἀπελθεῖν, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἡγούμενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν οἱ παραγενόμενοι καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντες, ἐπὶ παῖδας κόρας καὶ ὀρφανὰς εἰσιόντα, **ἐξήλασαν βία**. καὶ τοσοῦτου ἐδέησεν αὐτῷ μεταμελῆσαι τῶν **ὑβρισμένων**, ὥστε ἐξευρῶν οὗ ἐδειπνοῦμεν ἀτοπώτατον πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀπιστότατον ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴ τις εἰδείη τὴν τούτου **μανίαν**.

He found out that the young man was staying with me, and came to my house drunk one night. He knocked down the doors and made his way into the women's rooms, where my sister and my nieces were—women who have been brought up so respectably that they are ashamed to be seen even by relatives. Simon, however, reached such a level of arrogance (*hubris*) that he refused to

¹⁵ Much emphasis has been placed upon Lysias' characterisation techniques in this speech and not much of a discussion has been raised concerning the reliability of the case and the narrative. Carey (1989) 90–91, 95–96 has disputed the reliability of the speaker's case and tends to the view that both litigants share the same degree of responsibility and involvement in the offence of intended wounding. Kremmydas (2020) 215–23 has presented a new method of exploring the reliability in both this speech, Lysias 3, and Demosthenes 54, since they are similar in terms of narratives and characterisation, and he employs a criteria-based content analysis to conclude that in both speeches the degree of reliability proves to be very high.

leave, until the men who were present, together with those who had accompanied him, realized that by entering the rooms of young orphaned girls he was behaving unacceptably, and threw him out by force. Far from apologizing for this outrageous conduct, he found out where I was having dinner and did something that was extraordinary and (unless you know his criminal insanity) unbelievable.¹⁶

Simon's intrusion is depicted in detail and exaggeration so that the speaker constructs from the beginning of the narrative the portrayal of a disrespectful, unrestrained and arrogant man. Simon's drunkenness adds a reason for his sudden and violent entrance in the speaker's house, during the night, by knocking down the doors and witnessing his sister and nieces; he caused such an embarrassment (*δεινὰ ποιεῖν*) to the female members of the *oikos* that he had to be forced out of the house by passers-by, neighbours and even his own associates.¹⁷ The women's decency (*κοσμίως βεβιώκασιν*) is emphatically contrasted to his own *hubris*, arousing thereby the hostility of the judges, which is further stressed with the reference to his *μανίαν*, implying not only Simon's irrational behaviour but even his criminal insanity, since he immediately rushed to the place where the speaker was dining (3.8). The term can also be taken as a medical term denoting unstable state of mind that needs to be cured through punishment. As soon as the speaker came out of the house, Simon immediately started to hit him, and then he threw stones at him (*εὐθύς με τύπτειν ἐπεχείρησεν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὸν ἡμυνάμην, ἐκστάς ἔβαλλέ με λίθοις*); the stones could be taken to show intention of wounding and therefore an attempt against the speaker's own life.

The rhetoric of wounding in this scene entails a comic element, which is purposely used to add plausibility and precision in the portrayal of an irrationally violent character; the humorous description of how Simon missed the speaker but accidentally hit his own companion Aristocritus with a stone, splitting his forehead (*καὶ ἐμοῦ μὲν ἀμαρτάνει, Ἀριστοκρίτου δέ, ὃς παρ' ἐμὲ ἦλθε μετ' αὐτοῦ, βαλὼν λίθῳ συντρίβει τὸ μέτωπον*),¹⁸ adds plausibility, vividness and precision to the narrative, but also emphasises Simon's viciousness and criminality. Nevertheless, Simon's ridiculous miss of the speaker and accidental injury of his own friend contain a comic element and minimise, as Carey argues,¹⁹ the seriousness of the incident. Hence, the speaker subsequently explains that he did not seek revenge for Simon's illegal and arrogant behaviour, but instead preferred to leave Athens and take the boy along in order to avoid further trouble and embarrassment (3.10–11). He will, however, return to this incident in his refutation of intended wounding, outside the doors of Simon's house (3.29), in order to indicate that such an action cannot take place in the daylight, in the presence of many people, even though Simon had behaved in an appalling manner during the night and while drunk.

¹⁶ The translation of passages from the speech derives from Todd (2000).

¹⁷ For the rhetorical strategy in the scene of intrusion, see Carey (1989) 97.

¹⁸ For the view that intended wounding involved the physical injury of forehead, face, hands, or feet (Lys. 6.15), see Todd (2007) 316.

¹⁹ For the use of comic element in the narrative and its effects, see Carey (1989) 89.

Immediately after their return to Athens, the second incident took place (3.11–14); the speaker and the boy went to Lysimachus' house, which was close to the house Simon is said to have rented. Simon had called on some friends to act as look out on the roof so that they could seize the boy when he came out; they were eating and drinking while waiting (3.12). Drunkenness and the seizure are rhetorically stressed to describe unstable and violent behaviour, but also Simon's plan and intention to use force in order to get the young man. An attack was made just as the speaker and the boy came out the house of Lysimachus (3.12: μεθύοντες ἐκπηδῶσιν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς); Simon together with three other persons, Theophilus, Protarchus and Autocles, started dragging the young boy off toward Simon's house (3.12: εἴλκον τὸ μειράκιον); the boy managed, however, to escape by throwing off his cloak (3.12: ὁ δὲ ῥίνας τὸ ἱμάτιον ὄχρητο φεύγων). The young boy's reaction seems clever but also entails a humorous tone, showing again in a comic manner Simon's failure to get him. At the end of this fight, the speaker tried to avoid them out of shame and left the boy there (3.13); his behaviour, which may be taken to show fear and weakness, still adds to the plausibility of the case concerning Simon's brutality and violence. The speaker presents the whole scene as an act of conspiracy on Simon's part to steal the young man away from him. According to the speaker, Simon must have claimed that a fight occurred, but the speaker affirms with the evidence of witnesses that nobody on either side had his head cut open or suffered any other injury (3.14: οὔτε κατεάγη τὴν κεφαλὴν οὔτε ἄλλο κακὸν οὐδὲν ἔλαβεν).

The third fight of the narrative involves many instances of violence and wounding of all the persons present (3.15–20). The young man ran into a fuller's shop, where Simon and his friends followed and started dragging him off by force but the boy began yelling, shouting and calling out for witnesses (3.15); the participles βοῶντα καὶ κεκραγῶτα καὶ μαρτυρόμενον emphasise the violence used against him by Simon's associates, adding vividness to the scene. The *hyperbolē* of the boy's reaction entails a comic tone, reflecting the noise of fight scenes from everyday life. Many people got angry and intervened in the fight and Simon beat up Monon the fuller and several others who tried to protect Theodotus (3.16). The speaker, while trying to defend the young man, fell a victim himself and was beaten up by them (3.17: ἀφήμενοι δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου ἔτυπτον ἐμέ). Afterwards, a big fight started (3.18: μάχης δὲ γενομένης), the young man was defending himself and was throwing things at them (3.18: τοῦ μειρακίου βάλλοντος αὐτοῦς καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμυνομένου), they were throwing things at the speaker and his associates and were still hitting the young man as they were drunk (3.18: καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς βαλλόντων, ἔτι δὲ τυπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης), and at the end in this noise they all got their heads split (3.18: ἐν τούτῳ τῷ θορύβῳ συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες). This passage consists of successive genitives absolute and lacks details concerning the objects used to be thrown at each other, whereas the speaker intentionally gives the impression of a whole crowd getting involved.²⁰ The intentional vagueness aims at strengthening the charge of wounding and distracts from the actual cause of injury. The fight reaches its climax at the final phrase συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες, implying a large number of injuries, a *hyperbolē* that also includes a comic tone of ridicule, adding

²⁰ For the syntax in this passage and its rhetorical effect, see *ibid.* 100–101.

implausibility to the accusation of intended wounding. To the same effect, drunkenness is again employed to arouse emotions of disgust and resentment for Simon and his friends. Moreover, it is interesting that only the speaker and the young man were supposedly hitting in defence, while Simon and his friends are implied to be the assailants in this fight.

In his recapitulation of proofs concerning Simon's arrogant behaviour, the speaker says that Simon beat up both him and the boy, was going around and singing, battered down the doors, and entered by night into the presence of freeborn women (3.23: ὑβρίζων δὲ καὶ τύπτων ἅμ' ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς καὶ κωμάζων καὶ τὰς θύρας ἐκβάλλων καὶ νύκτωρ εἰσιὼν ἐπὶ γυναικας ἐλευθέρας). Subsequently, the speaker will underline the fact that Simon and his friends were dragging the boy by force and, when he attempted to take the boy without touching them at all, they were hitting him (3.37: καταλαβόντες τὸ μειράκιον ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ ἤγον βία, ἐντυχὼν δ' ἐγὼ τούτων μὲν οὐχ ἠπτόμην, τοῦ μειρακίου δ' ἐπελαμβανόμεν· οὗτοι δὲ ἐκεῖνόν τε ἤγον βία καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτυπτον). Violence against the young boy and injury of the speaker are intentionally interwoven to make a persuasive case for the victimisation of the speaker, even though he did not actually suffer from any kind of intentional wounding. It is striking that toward the end of the speech, the speaker will explicitly state that his head had been split open by Simon (3.40: ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑβρισμένος ὑπὸ Σίμωνος καὶ καταγεῖς τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), but, nevertheless, he still did not wish to bring the issue to court and risk exile.

On balance, in Lysias' speech *Against Simon*, the rhetoric of wounding includes the narration of vague accusations of hitting, throwing objects (or stones), drunkenness and intrusion into citizens' houses, embarrassment of women and orphans, criminal insanity, and fights involving crowds of people in a rather comic tone of ridicule so that the opponent's case is undermined. Intentional wounding is not clearly depicted but the exaggerated narration of many people fighting with each other, using force and beating their heads up strengthens the portrayal of forceful, arrogant and repeatedly brutal behaviour arousing resentment, hostility and even disgust deriving from the shame caused by Simon. The language vaguely depicts wounding with premeditation and violence: hitting (τύπτειν), dragging with force (ἤγον βία), throwing stones (ἔβαλλέ με λίθοις), splitting the head open (καταγεῖς τὴν κεφαλὴν), breaking down doors (τὰς θύρας ἐκβάλλων), *hubris* in connection with wounding (ὑβρίζων δὲ καὶ τύπτων), intrusion into a citizen's *oikos* and embarrassment of its female members (νύκτωρ εἰσιὼν ἐπὶ γυναικας ἐλευθέρας), and hitting in drunkenness (τυπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης). In all the battles the behavioural pattern of violence is repeated to make a persuasive case for wounding and arouse contempt, resentment and possibly disgust, due to the repeated attempts to get the boy, the plans shared by many of Simon's associates and their drunkenness. The speaker's excuse that he did not take any of these cases to court out of shame effectively attributes shame to all of Simon's actions and turns him into a ruthless and brutal man chasing a young boy.

Lysias 4, *On a premeditated wounding* is also a speech about wounding with intent and presents many significant resemblances²¹ with Lysias 3, to such an extent that

²¹ For legal and circumstantial parallels between the two speeches, see Todd (2007) 347–48.

most scholars regard it as a rhetorical exercise written by a student of rhetoric, based on Lysias' speech *Against Simon*.²² Lysias 4 also involves a love quarrel but the object of the dispute here is a slave woman and the question is whether she belongs to the opponent or, as the speaker claims, jointly to both parties.²³ The speech, however, does not offer details about the fight but rather constitutes an account of the charge, the issue of premeditation and the challenge made by the speaker to torture the slave in order to give evidence about who gave the first strike. According to the speaker, the prosecutor accuses him of violent intrusion into his house during the night (4.5: βία εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν εἰσῆλθον), of drunkenness while seeking the company of slaves and flute girls (4.7: νῦν δὲ ὁμολογούμεθα πρὸς παῖδας καὶ ἀλητριίδας καὶ μετ' οἴνου ἐλθόντες), and of an attack with a piece of broken pottery (4.6: ὀστράκῳ φησὶ πληγῆναι). The story seems to be as follows: the speaker was invited to the prosecutor's house, where the slave woman must have resided, they got into a fight, the speaker acting in defence hit the prosecutor with a piece of broken pottery, the prosecutor was in a terrible situation, since he was allegedly injured so badly that he was placed on a litter and was exposed to common view.²⁴ The speaker cannot deny that he attacked the prosecutor with a piece of broken pottery, but he does not accept the accusation that he went to the prosecutor's house with the intention to kill him; the argument is that he must have found the *ostrakon* somewhere there in the house, since it would have been unlikely that he brought it with him. Consequently, the prosecutor brings a *graphē traumatos* against the speaker aiming at having him removed far away from his property and the woman by his exile (4.20).²⁵

In order to distract from the actual use of violence or wounding, the strategy of the speaker is to define premeditation based on circumstantial evidence and use arguments from probability in order to prove that he himself cannot be charged with intentional wounding. He then suggests that someone can be killed only by a knife and surely not if punched by a fist (4.6), to undermine any possibility of premeditation on his part against the prosecutor. As persuasive as this contrast between a knife and a fist may be, this argument from probability still does not refute the charge of intentional wounding. The speaker rejects any sort of premeditation by the use of a knife or any other sort of weapon, except for a piece of broken pottery or a fist, in order to prove his innocence.²⁶ In support of his case, the speaker attempts to portray his opponent as a man easily involved in fights, and, particularly, he depicts the prosecutor as lovesick, too quick with his fists, and prone to drunken violence (4.8: ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου παρωξυμμένος ὀξύχειρ λίαν καὶ πάροινός ἐστιν).

²² On the shape and structure of the speech in connection with its authenticity, and particularly for the lack of proem and narrative and the view that it must have been written as a rhetorical exercise by a post-Classical author, see *ibid.* 349–51.

²³ For a full account and an individual treatment of the speech concerning matters of law and rhetoric, see Spatharas (2006) 87–104.

²⁴ For the reconstruction of the story, see *ibid.* 90–91.

²⁵ For a full analysis of the legal argumentation with reference to the procedure used and the offence of *trauma*, see *ibid.* 101–106.

²⁶ It is striking that the piece of broken pottery is used as proof of premeditation by Simon in his charge against the speaker in Lysias' *Against Simon* (3.28), but the speaker himself does not refer to any specific object in his description of all the battles between him and Simon, where he implies that he was the victim of intentional wounding; the emphasis is placed rather on the splitting open of his head than on the weapon of wounding.

Similarly to speech 3, the orator employs the comic element to dramatise with exaggeration the opponent's persona and in this manner to persuade the judges of the speaker's case; thus, he narrates that after their fight, the prosecutor was not ashamed to call a black eye a 'wound' and to be carried on a litter pretending that he was in a terrible condition (4.9: ὁ δ' εἰς τοῦτο βαρυδαιμονίας ἦκει, ὥστε οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τραύματ' ὀνομάζων τὰ ὑπόπια καὶ ἐν κλίνῃ περιφερόμενος καὶ δεινῶς προσποιούμενος). The terminology used to describe the medical condition of the prosecutor reflects the emergency of the situation, and consequently the necessity for a recovery, both physical and mental, by the enforcement of justice through punishment. The use of comic element with *hyperbolē* adds plausibility to the prosecutor's pretence and lies rather than reflecting reality.²⁷ The judges would easily believe that the prosecutor could not have told the truth, since arrogant behaviour and violence from drunkenness have been ascribed to him. The characterisation of the prosecutor as a shameless, aggressive, obsessive and intemperate man arouses hostile emotions of contempt, resentment and disgust.

The litigants were involved in an *antidosis* case, concerning the exchange of their property, which suggests that they were both wealthy, but most probably personal enemies, since the prosecutor must have accepted the challenge to exchange his property with the speaker, involving the movable elements.²⁸ Nevertheless, they must have reached a reconciliation agreement, since, as the speaker argues, they jointly owned the slave woman, and this relationship caused their dispute over her. The speaker devotes the rest of the arguments (*pisteis*: 4.10–17) to rhetoric about his challenge for the torture of the slave, in order to reveal the truth and give evidence about their fight and the alleged injuries on each part.²⁹ The argumentation emphasises the fact that the prosecutor declined to have the slave woman tortured for evidence, which is taken to imply that he was guilty of not allowing the truth to be revealed.³⁰ It is to be noted that the status of the woman and her relationship to both men is an issue that requires a careful reading of the speech, since it appears that the woman stayed in the prosecutor's house, and so she may have had greater affection for him rather than the defendant; moreover, she most probably was a free woman rather than a slave, as this is implied to have been the prosecutor's position concerning the challenge for torture.³¹

In sum, Lysias 4 was most probably a *synēgoria* speech, and as such it does not include a narrative. Therefore, it does not provide details about scenes of wounding or violence; what can be implied from the proof section involves dramatic characterisation (*ēthopoiia*). In this context, the rhetoric of wounding entails elements of arrogance, violence, drunkenness, excessive sexual behaviour, aggressiveness, obsession, all underlined by a comic tone of *hyperbolē* and *deinōsis*.

²⁷ For the commonplace of exposing one's injured body to secure witnesses, also employed in Aristophanic and New Comedy, see Spatharas (2006) 102 with n. 48.

²⁸ Further on their challenge for exchange of properties, see Todd (2007) 351–53. Also, for a full discussion of the exchange of their properties and their reconciliation, see Spatharas (2006) 88–90.

²⁹ For the rhetoric of torture of slaves and relevant arguments from probability, particularly in Antiphon's speeches, see Gagarin (1996) 1–18, and more generally see Mirhady (1996) 119–31.

³⁰ For the reconstruction of the sequence of events narrated in the speech, see Todd (2007) 348–49.

³¹ For the weakness of the speaker's case, the contradictory arguments and the illogical points, see Spatharas (2006) 91–101.

3. Demosthenes *Against Conon for battery* (54)

Demosthenes 54, *Against Conon*, concerns a trial for battery (*dikē aikeias*) brought by Ariston, a young man, against Conon, a man in his fifties.³² The debate started two years before the trial, when Conon's sons, who had camped near Ariston on garrison duty and were constantly drunk (54.3: ἔπινον ἐκάστοθ' οὗτοι τὴν ἡμέραν), attacked Ariston's slaves and assaulted Ariston himself.

The behaviour of Conon's sons while on garrison duty is described as being very impertinent and arrogant. With the pretence that Ariston's slaves had annoyed them with the smoke coming up from their cooking and their insulting words, Conon's sons started beating them, emptied their chamberpots over them and urinated on them, leaving out no kind of disgraceful and outrageous act (54.4: φήσαντες γὰρ καπνίζειν αὐτοὺς ὄσοποιουμένους τοὺς παῖδας ἢ κακῶς λέγειν, ὅ τι τύχοιεν, ἔτυπτον καὶ τὰς ἀμίδας κατεσκεδάωννον καὶ προσεούρουον, καὶ ἀσελγείας καὶ ὕβρεως οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἀπέλειπον).³³ At first, Ariston did not react, but when Conon's sons continued to mock (54.4: ὡς δ' ἐχλεύαζον ἡμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐπαύοντο), Ariston and all of his men together reported the whole story to the general.

Demosthenes portrays his client as a moderate and respectful young man, who tolerated Conon's sons' disgraceful and violent behaviour and did not provoke any more fighting; however, when they continued their abuse, Ariston appears as a lawful citizen who uses legal means to deal with this horrible situation. To strengthen the case for brutality and excessive violence, the speaker emphatically indicates that his report to the general did not stop Conon and his sons from abusing and reproaching him and all the men in his camp, insulting them and finally throwing some punches at Ariston himself (54.5: πληγὰς ἐνέτειναν ἐμοί); the noise was so extreme that the general and the taxiarchs came and intervened, 'preventing Ariston and his men from suffering some irreparable injury, or indeed inflicting it in response to the drunken violence of these people' (54.5: οἵπερ ἐκόλυσαν μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἀνήκεστον παθεῖν μηδ' αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι παροινουμένους ὑπὸ τουτωνί).

The story in the camp is used as a precedent to prejudice the judges against the violent character of Conon and his sons. Interestingly, drunkenness plays the major role in their outrageous behaviour and extreme acts of disgrace and humiliation, such as urinating on people; violence is here interconnected with vulgarity and continuous abuse. The comic element in the description of extreme acts of shame is aimed at underlining Conon's dramatic characterisation. In effect, emotions of disgust, resentment and hostility are stirred up against Conon and his sons. It is difficult to believe that Ariston did not himself provoke a counter-fight at all but only suffered such a humiliation. Nevertheless, Demosthenes effectively portrays him as a moderate, law-abiding citizen and as a respectful young man toward a senior.

Ariston did not take any action then at the camp or until one evening some time afterwards, when Ariston and his friend Phanostratus were walking in the agora and encountered one of Conon's sons, Ctesias. Ctesias was drunk and shouted out at them (54.7: κατιδὼν δ' ἡμᾶς καὶ κραυγᾶσας, καὶ διαλεχθεῖς τι πρὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως ὡς ἂν

³² On assault and *dikē aikeias*, cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 52.2. See, also MacDowell (1978) 124–25; Todd (1993) 269–70; Lanni (2006) 92–93. On the legal procedure and the personalities of the speech, see Carey and Reid (1985) 69–74; Usher (1999) 245–47; Bers (2003) 66–67; Carey (2012²) 78.

³³ The translation of passages from the speech derives from Carey (2012²).

μεθύων); drunkenness appears to be his steady habit, which leads him to excessive violence. Ariston and Phanostratus continued with their walk, but Ctesias went and called Conon and Conon's friends, who were also drinking nearby (54.7: ἔπινον δ' ἄρ' ἐνταῦθα). This group of drunken people, among whom was Conon, met Ariston and Phanostratus on their way back and set upon them. While Phanostratus was held by one of them, Conon, his son Ctesias and another attacked Ariston, stripped him of his cloak, dumped him in the mud, and beat and jumped on him, using abusive language. Ariston nearly died from his injuries.³⁴ The speech *Against Conon* is a remarkable example of skilled *ēthopoia*, where Demosthenes portrays Conon as a brutal and arrogant person, drinking and abusing both verbally and physically out of rage. Drunkenness is emphatically stressed before the incident that took place in the agora after the attack at the camp, not only as a circumstantial condition but as a consistent element of their life style (54.7). The actual scene of Ariston's wounding reaches a dramatic climax of shameful and shocking behaviour (54.8):

Κόνων δ' οὐτοσὶ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρομένους υἱὸς ἐμοὶ προσπεσόντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξέδυσαν, εἴθ' ὑποσκελίσαντες καὶ ῥάξαντες εἰς τὸν βόρβορον οὕτω διέθηκαν ἐναλλόμενοι καὶ ὑβρίζοντες, ὥστε τὸ μὲν χεῖλος διακόψαι, τοὺς δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς συγκλεῖσαι· οὕτω δὲ κακῶς ἔχοντα κατέλιπον, ὥστε μήτ' ἀναστῆναι μήτε φθέγγασθαι δύνασθαι. κείμενος δ' αὐτῶν ἤκουον πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ λεγόντων.

Conon, here, and his son and the son of Andromenes attacked me and to begin with stripped me and then tripped me up and knocked me down into the mud, and they reduced me to such a state, by jumping on me and outrageously assaulting me, that they split my lip and closed up my eyes. They left me in such a poor condition that I could neither stand up nor speak. And as I lay there I heard them saying many dreadful things.

The description presents an extremely violent attack which is stressed to such an extent to show that Ariston may have well died. As Carey suggests,³⁵ presumably two of them held Ariston, while a third one stripped him. The picture of a naked man who is beaten up and thrown down into the mud emphasises that he was defenceless and fell a victim, one alone attacked by three at least. Moreover, the act of jumping on Ariston and assaulting him implies not only that they intended to humiliate him, but that they took advantage of his nakedness and vulnerability to kill him. The result was that Ariston was beaten up so heavily that his lips and eyes were injured and he could not even move, whereas they in contrast continued to abuse and shout at him. The extreme form of violence is meant to reveal premeditation and arrogance (*hubris*), but on the other hand the description adds a dramatic element to the whole scene, where Ariston was almost killed.³⁶ The orator draws on comic motifs and scenes for the metaphor encountered at 54.9, where Conon imitated the victorious cocks and 'flapped his elbows against his sides by way of wings' (54.9: ἦδε γὰρ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας μιμούμενος τοὺς νενικηκότας, οἱ δὲ κροτεῖν τοῖς ἀγκῶσιν αὐτὸν ἤξιουν

³⁴ For a rhetorical analysis of the case, cf. Carey and Reid (1985) 70–74.

³⁵ See *ibid.* 83.

³⁶ For the use of drunkenness and nakedness in a comic context of characterisation, see *ibid.* 83–84.

ἀντὶ πτερύγων τὰς πλευράς); cock-fighting, here, adds a dramatic tone and stresses emphatically Conon's *hubris*. The women's reaction with shouting (54.9: κραυγὴ καὶ βοή τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῶν θεραπαινίδων) for Ariston's wounding, when he was returned to his house, aims to paint a picture of a really repulsively injured person, arousing the judges' sympathy for Ariston, but simultaneously disgust and contempt for Conon. Ariston was then taken to the doctor, who confirmed that his condition was so serious that he needed medical care. Again, the detailed report of his condition in medical terms adds plausibility to wounding with premeditation and to the victimisation of Ariston, thus presenting Conon and his sons as even more brutal and vicious. Moreover, the precision in the use of medical terminology and the empathic description of how Ariston was almost killed make the need for punishment and revenge imperative.

The narrative says that Ariston suffered from swelling round his eyes and mouth, and cuts and bruises elsewhere on his body that might have caused an illness related to the lungs or the ribs (54.11–12). The rhetorical strategy, here, is to offer an account of wounding that is consistent with contemporary medical experience. The more detailed the medical account is the more brutal the injuries appear and the more repulsive is the picture for the judges, who are thus invited to feel disgust, hostility and contempt for Conon. In the fights between Ariston and Conon with his friends and sons, the prevailing elements are drunkenness, assault with violence (e.g. jumping on others), humiliation and shouting, which are all interconnected with a dramatic element of Conon's persona. Wounded litigants often use their injuries as visual proof against their aggressors. Demosthenes, here, describes the injuries in such graphic detail to prove that Conon was capable of using excessive violence, and even kill his opponent, whereas Ariston did not actively or intentionally participate in any fight, but fell a victim of humiliation, acting from self-defence.

4. [Dem.] Apollodorus *Against Evergus and Mnesiboulus* (47)

The speech *Against Evergus and Mnesiboulus* ([Dem.] 47) was composed by Apollodorus for a trierarch, who is the prosecutor at a trial for false witnessing deriving from an original trial for assault (*dikē aikeias*), in which he was the accused.³⁷ The contested testimony involves a challenge to interrogate a slave woman under torture (*proklēsis eis basanon*), regarding who struck the first blow in a fight that broke out between the unnamed speaker, a trierarch, and Theophemus, an ex-trierarch. The original suit was a *dikē aikeias* initiated by Theophemus against the speaker, where the latter was convicted to pay a large penalty.

The speech consists for the most part of narrative sections. The first narrative (47.18–46) involves the events before the *dikē aikeias* and the dispute between the speaker and Theophemus over the return of the naval equipment in order for the speaker to proceed with his trierarchy.³⁸ A number of unsuccessful attempts on behalf of the speaker to get Theophemus to hand over the equipment of the ship (47.25–33) indicates the speaker's frustration and also Theophemus' disrespect toward the decrees and the laws of the city. At first, the speaker found out where Theophemus

³⁷ For the case, legal procedure, challenge and the argumentation, see Scafuro (2011) 290–98. For the case, the people involved and the speech, see also Fisher (2020) 186–88.

³⁸ For a rhetorical analysis of the first narrative section, see Fisher (2020) 191–95.

lived (47.34–35) and went to his house in order to collect the naval equipment. He did not find Theophemus there, met a woman slave –the one who was later challenged to be tortured for evidence– and asked her to call Theophemus. When Theophemus returned home, the speaker demanded the ship’s inventory by showing the relevant decree of the *Boulē* (47.35–36). Theophemus refused, threatened and ridiculed the speaker (47.36: ἠπείλει καὶ ἐλοιδορεῖτο), and the speaker ordered his attendant to summon witnesses (47.36). The speaker requested Theophemus either to make a claim before the magistrates that he was not liable for the equipment or to hand it over; he then said to Theophemus that if he did not comply, the speaker would seize security in accordance with the laws and decrees (47.37). Since Theophemus did not agree to do anything, the speaker seized the slave girl, but Theophemus stopped him, then the speaker entered the house, knowing well that Theophemus was not married and so his presence would not embarrass any female members (47.38: καὶ ἐπεπύσμην αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐκ εἶη γεγαμηκῶς). At that moment Theophemus, according to the speaker, struck him with his fist (47.38: παῖει πύξ ὁ Θεόφημος τὸ στόμα), and the speaker called for witnesses and defended himself (47.38: καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμαρτυράμενος τοὺς παρόντας ἡμυνάμην).

It is obvious that Apollodorus portrays the speaker as a reserved, law-abiding citizen, respectful of one’s *oikos*, acting in accordance with the decrees and the laws, and as a man who does not provoke others with violence but simply acts in defence. Nevertheless, it is not clearly explained how he defended himself, and whether his intrusion into Theophemus’ house was made in a calm manner, as is implied, or involved a physical fight. Apollodorus’ strategy to arouse the judges’ hostile emotions against Theophemus is best reflected in the description of the speaker’s condition, when he appeared before the *Boulē* to report the events. He showed his wounds and explained what he had suffered from Theophemus while attempting to get the equipment back, and the *Boulē* got so angry with what they saw that they regarded Theophemus’ action a *hubris* not against the speaker but the *Boulē* itself, the Athenian *dēmos* and the law prescribing the recovery of the equipment (47.41: ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν τὰς τε πληγὰς ἔδειξα καὶ ἃ πεπονθὼς ἦν εἶπον, καὶ ὅτι εἰσπράττων τῇ πόλει τὰ σκεύη. ἀγανακτήσασα δ’ ἡ βουλὴ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐγὼ ἐπεπόνθειν, καὶ ἰδοῦσά με ὡς διεκείμενη, καὶ ἡγησαμένη ὑβρίσθαι οὐκ ἐμέ, ἀλλ’ ἐαυτὴν καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν ψηφισάμενον καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν ἀναγκάσαντα εἰσπράττειν τὰ σκεύη). The public exposure of the speaker’s wounds arouses hostility, resentment and contempt against Theophemus for his arrogant and offensive behaviour toward the whole of the city.

The second narrative section describes the aftermath of the trial for assault, in particular it informs the judges in detail about the invasions of the speaker’s house made by Theophemus and his relatives, Evergus and Mnesiboulus, the men accused in the second trial for false testimony (47.49–73).³⁹ This narrative describes the sufferings of the speaker and as such it creates emotional appeals to the judges; to that effect, a variety of rhetorical techniques and devices are used to make the story more attractive, such as direct speech, graphic language, and dramatic scenes. Apart from the fact that this section of narrative is the most fascinating in terms of intrigue and action, it is also very significant since it aims to add to the *ēthos* argumentation and

³⁹ For an analysis of ‘the raids and their consequences’, see *ibid.* 195–202.

portray Theophemus, Evergus and Mnesiboulus as violent, cruel, scheming and devious. Such a representation of their characters would enhance the speaker's case for false testimony and arouse hostility against his opponents.

For the purposes of exploring the rhetoric of wounding, this discussion will focus on the repeated acts of cruel violence, theft, criminality and greed. These acts took place at the time when the speaker had undertaken a second trierarchy, after coming to a mutual agreement with Theophemus to delay the payment of the large fine imposed on the speaker at the *dikē aikeias* (47.49–51). When the speaker called Theophemus to go to the bank and receive the money, he is said instead to have seized fifty sheep, slaves and some objects (47.52–53); at the same time, Evergus and Mnesiboulus intruded into the speaker's house, while he was absent, and seized all the furniture, even though the speaker's wife was trying to prevent them from taking her dowry and asking them to go to the bank and receive their payment (47.53–58). The depiction of the speaker's wife, an Athenian woman, who desperately struggled to keep her only possession, which was her dowry, enhances the shameless behaviour of the accused, showing disrespect to social institutions and civic rights. Thus, the accused are exposed in both private and public life as men who broke the law and abused private and public ideals. The most violent and brutal episode involves the seizure of a small cup from an old nurse who was defending herself but was beaten almost to death (47.58–59):

[58] ταῦτα δὲ λεγούσης τῆς γυναικὸς οὐχ ὅπως ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιθῆς τὸ κυμβίον λαβούσης παρακείμενον αὐτῇ, ἐξ οὗ ἔπινεν, καὶ ἐνθεμένης εἰς τὸν κόλπον, ἵνα μὴ οὗτοι λάβοιεν, ἐπειδὴ εἶδεν ἔνδον ὄντας αὐτούς, κατιδόντες αὐτὴν οὕτω διέθεσαν ἀφαιρούμενοι τὸ κυμβίον Θεόφημος καὶ Εὐεργὸς ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί, [59] ὥστε ὄφαιμοι μὲν οἱ βραχίονες καὶ οἱ καρποὶ τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῆς ἐγένοντο ἀποστρεφομένης τῷ χεῖρι καὶ ἐλκομένης ὑπὸ τούτων ἀφαιρουμένων τὸ κυμβίον, ἀμυχὰς δ' ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ εἶχεν ἀγχομένη, πελιὸν δὲ τὸ στήθος. εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἦλθον πονηρίας ὥστε, ἕως ἀφείλοντο τὸ κυμβίον ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο ἄγχοντες καὶ τύπτοντες τὴν γραῦν.

In spite of my wife's words, not only did they not stop their rampage but when the nurse took hold of the small cup that was set before her from which she had been drinking and when she put it in her bosom to prevent the men from seizing it since she saw they were inside the house, then the men – Theophemus and Evergus his brother – caught sight of her and treated her so brutally as they were wrenching the small cup away from her [59] that her arms and wrists were all bloodied from having her hands twisted and pulled this way and that by them as they wrenched the cup away, and she had bruises on her throat from being strangled by them, and her chest was black and blue. Indeed, their meanness was such that they didn't stop throttling and striking the old woman until they had yanked the cup free from her bosom.⁴⁰

This constitutes a very dramatic scene of brutality and disrespect, adding plausibility to the villainy and criminality of the accused. Their cruelty and viciousness is

⁴⁰ The translation of this passage is from Scafuro (2011).

underlined by the fact that they would not stop beating her until they had taken the small cup out of her bosom. This negative portrayal of the opponents is further strengthened by Theophemus' refusal to find a doctor for curing the old nurse, resulting thus in the old woman's death (47.67).

If we look at the details of this scene the contrasts in terms of age, gender and the object of the fight underline Theophemus' cruelty and inhumanity, but also add a comic undertone to the struggle. The blood on her arms and wrists confirms a forceful fight against the old nurse. The detailed account that both hands of the nurse were twisted and pulled underlines her victimisation and thus magnifies the offence of the defendants; moreover, in practical terms, since the nurse was not in the *kurieia* of the speaker, she ought to be respected and not touched at all as a stranger to the family. The whole struggle, however, was for a small cup and this makes their crime even more horrendous. This is an attempted attack with forceful strangling, bruises and blood which might cause the death of the woman and reflects rage and enmity; apart from the fact that the scene may be exaggerated in order to lay responsibility on the opponents for the murder of the old woman, the description of brutality may also reflect the prejudice against freedwomen. It is striking, of course, that it takes such an effort to pull a small cup from an old woman that they need to strike and strangle the woman and make her bleed; it is likely a dramatic exaggeration so that the speaker will invite the disgust and resentment of the judges against Theophemus and his false witnesses. The emotional appeals to the judges are divided in the two narratives of two different trials, involving thus different groups of people. In the second narrative, hostility is stimulated together with disgust and resentment requiring an immediate recovery, which could only be secured by the punishment of the accused.⁴¹

5. Conclusions

The rhetoric of wounding includes a variety of rhetorical *topoi*, commonly used for character assassination: a repeated behavioural pattern of violence, drunkenness, rage and verbal abuse, cruel beating of the head, the face and the rest of the body, cuts and bleeding, stripping one's clothes off, nakedness and assault, intrusion and invasion of one's house and property, disrespect and humiliation of female members of the *oikos*, young and old, in the absence of their *kurios*. The language is mostly visual and includes verbs and nouns of beating, arrogance and various forms of humiliation (e.g. stripping off one's clothes); stones, pieces of pottery, fists and physical attack cause the wounding of specific parts of the body, such forehead, head, hands and wrists, neck. Medical terms concerning the injury of specific parts of the body, the intervention of doctors in order to offer means of healing and the legal term of *trauma* implying the necessity of therapy are all rhetorically manipulated to persuade the judges of the guilt of the accused and the serious nature of the offence in question. Rhetoric and science are interrelated for the purposes of the specific case and emphasise the importance of healing and therapy in a forensic context, where punishment and revenge are required. The scenes of wounding are either narrated in physical detail or contain vague descriptions of assault to add to the dramatic characterisation. The object of dispute varies from love rivalry over a young boy or a

⁴¹ Further on the emotions of the jury in the two narratives, see Fisher (2020) 200–202.

woman slave and personal enmity to the seizure of a small cup. Intention is the motivation connected with private or political rivalry. Litigants and opponents are contrasted on account of their age, origin and wealth, manners, behaviour, respect for the law and the city's interests, motivation and financial greed. Lifestyle and social status dictate civilised or uncivilised behaviour. Emotional appeals are closely associated with the victimisation of the speaker and the hostility toward the offender. Fights and attacks are always an essential part of wounding scenes, which raises the question of who actually struck the first blow, who was the aggressor and who acted in defence.

In the cases of *trauma ek pronoias*, the rhetorical strategy lies in the plausibility of premeditation or its absence and to that end argumentation exploits excessive and outrageous violent behaviour. The cases of *trauma ek pronoias* we have discussed are related to disputes over love affairs, the one with a young boy demanded by two citizens and the second with a slave or free woman owned by two men. In the context of claiming their object of love, the aggressors are motivated by erotic passion, drunkenness, brutality and viciousness. Shame becomes an issue of significance since the specific affairs may cause embarrassment not only for the victims but even for the judges to listen to these stories. To justify their public dignity the injured parties exaggerate the attempts of wounding and scenes of criminality to undermine their opponents' case and add a comic tone in the description of injuries. Thus, the humorous depictions of repeated attempts of wounding in a situation of drunkenness and obsession, by throwing stones against the wrong persons or the representation of serious injuries by parading on a litter displaying publicly a terrible condition are drawn from comic exaggeration and dramatic characterisation. The cases of *trauma ek pronoias* involve the death penalty and this may explain the absence of graphic details about the injuries and the preference for vague expressions of violence and aggression.

In the two cases of assault, the one of *dikē aikeias* against Conon, and the other originally starting with a *dikē aikeias* against the speaker by Theophemus and resulting in a *dikē pseudomarturiōn* by the speaker against Theophemus' false witnesses and close relatives, the offence of battery is depicted in a more graphic detail concerning the physical abuse and the terrible condition of the victim's body suffering cruelty leading almost to death. The emotional appeals for hostility in the form of resentment and disgust become more effective with the details of physical reproach, humiliation, continuous mockery, shouting, abuse and vulgarity. The depiction of bruises, swollen parts of the face, coloured signs of strangulation and disarticulation and blackened chest from beating and struggle enhances the liveliness and precision of the story, thus adding plausibility to criminality and dramatic characterisation. It is interesting that in these two cases, the victims are restrained in their defence and ask for witnesses, while referring the case to the authorities (i.e. generals, *Boulē*, etc.).

All cases of wounding and violence employ similar patterns of rhetorical strategy and persuasion. Comic or dramatic elements are characteristic for *deinōsis* in order to amplify and exaggerate the offenders' abusive and outrageous behaviour. Ridicule in the episodes of the victims' humiliation makes the horrible acts and conditions more easily presentable to the judges while arousing emotions of contempt and disgrace.

All scenes of violence display the same rhetorical technique with the use of specific patterns for credibility, such as the repeated and continuous beating, shouting and mockery, continuous drunkenness, insanity and impulsion out of rage, passion or revenge, and finally noise with the gathering of a crowd of people, friends, neighbours, or passers-by, who end up being involved in the fights and themselves becoming victims of attack.

Time and place are also essential to scenes of wounding and violence. Normally, all the incidents of attacks and battle occur during the night and the places are either the marketplace (*agora*) or the houses of the people in dispute, so combining the private with the public realm of Athenian life. Consequently, violence appears to affect the whole of the city as well as its constituent institution, the Athenian *oikos*. Thus, justice in court appears to function in a therapeutic manner for legal cases of *trauma*, injuries with or without premeditation occurring in fights between citizens in an analogous way to how medicine in modern times has the purpose of offering therapy and cure for diseases and sicknesses.

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Doctors and Drugs in the Attic Orators

Mike Edwards

Abstract

The medical profession has been admired for time immemorial, and for a similar period human beings have relied on whatever drugs have been available to treat ailments. Equally, however, doctors and drugs are suspected when their treatments are not efficacious, and inevitably doctors and their medicines have been the subject of controversy in legal settings. In this essay, I shall examine passages in the corpus of the Attic orators (fifth to fourth centuries BC) which mention doctors and drugs, and consider how speakers exploit them rhetorically.

During the fighting at Troy, Patroklos meets the wounded Eurypylos. No medical help is at hand because of the two doctors in the Greek army one, Podaleirios, is lying wounded in his tent and the other, Machaon, is fighting the Trojans. Patroklos therefore takes Eurypylos back to his tent and himself performs surgery:

ἔνθά μιν ἑκτανύσας ἐκ μηροῦ τάμνε μαχαίρη
ὄζυ βέλος περιπευκές, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δ' αἷμα κελαινὸν
νίζ' ὕδατι λιαρῶ, ἐπὶ δὲ ρίζαν βάλε πικρὴν
χερσὶ διατρίψας ὀδυνήφατον, ἧ οἱ ἀπάσας
ἔσχ' ὀδύνας· τὸ μὲν ἔλκος ἐτέρσετο, παύσατο δ' αἷμα.

Patroklos laid him there and with a knife cut the sharp tearing arrow out of his thigh, and washed the black blood running from it with warm water, and, pounding it up in his hands, laid on a bitter root to make pain disappear, one which stayed all kinds of pain. And the wound dried, and the flow of blood stopped (Homer, *Iliad* 11.844–8).¹

Of course, not all doctors are heroic like Podaleirios and Machaon.² Indeed, as Caroline Petit observes, 'L'aura de l'art médical, savamment construite par les médecins au cours de l'histoire, n'aura pas brillé avec un succès constant ... la médecine est volontiers pratiquée par des charlatans'.³ Nor are all drugs efficacious:

παρὰ δὲ τούτου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰόλην Δηιάνειρα πυθομένη, καὶ δεῖσασα μὴ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἀγαπήσῃ, νομίσασα ταῖς ἀληθείαις φίλτρον εἶναι τὸ ρυὲν αἷμα Νέσσου, τούτῳ τὸν χιτῶνα ἔχρισεν. ἐνδὺς δὲ Ἡρακλῆς ἔθυσεν. ὡς δὲ θερμανθέντος τοῦ χιτῶνος ὁ τῆς ὕδρας ἰὸς τὸν χρωῖτα ἔσηπε, τὸν μὲν Λίχαν τῶν ποδῶν ἀράμενος

¹ Trans. Lattimore (1951).

² I hasten to add that, as I write this piece, the world is suffering from the Covid-19 pandemic, and no one will doubt the heroism of doctors, and the caring professions in general, in these difficult times.

³ Petit (2018) 2.

κατηκόντισεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκρωτηρίουτῆς ἸΒοιωτίας, τὸν δὲ χιτῶνα ἀπέσπα
προσπεφυκότα τῷ σώματι: συναπεσπῶντο δὲ καὶ αἱ σάρκες αὐτοῦ.

from him (Lichas) Deianira learned about Iole, and fearing that Hercules might love that damsel more than herself, she supposed that the spilt blood of Nessus was in truth a love-charm, and with it she smeared the tunic. So Hercules put it on and proceeded to offer sacrifice. But no sooner was the tunic warmed than the poison of the hydra began to corrode his skin; and on that he lifted Lichas by the feet, hurled him down from the headland, and tore off the tunic, which clung to his body, so that his flesh was torn away with it (Apollodorus 2.7.7).⁴

A similar ambivalence towards the medical profession and its treatments may be observed in the corpus of the Attic orators, which abounds with doctors and drugs both good and bad. My purpose here is to look at some passages in the orators where medicine is a factor either for or against the speaker/litigant, and how the orators exploit doctors and drugs rhetorically.⁵

The surviving speeches of Antiphon are all concerned in different ways with homicide, and not surprisingly medicine is often associated in them with murder. Two of the three courtroom speeches originate in the drinking of a potion that had fatal consequences. In Antiphon 1, *Against the Stepmother*, the unnamed speaker is prosecuting his stepmother for the homicide of his father.⁶ In his version (§§14–20), the stepmother persuaded the mistress of her husband's friend Philoneos to give the two men what she described as a love potion, the mistress being very ready to do so in order to stop Philoneos placing her in a brothel. The potion, however, was in fact poisonous and both men died, Philoneos instantly because his mistress gave him a larger draught of the potion, the speaker's father twenty days later, which gave him time to charge his son with securing vengeance for him (§30). The stepson accuses his stepmother of repeatedly attempting to kill his father,⁷ and in a vivid metaphor likens her to Clytemnestra (§17).⁸ The focal point of the case is the love philtre, which is simply referred to as a φάρμακον (§§9, 17, 18, 19, 26). We therefore have no idea what kind of drug was used, whether it might indeed have been an aphrodisiac like Spanish Fly, which taken in too large a measure could prove fatal, or whether it was simply a poison.⁹ The speaker, prosecuting the case several years after the event, perhaps unsurprisingly makes nothing of the nature of the drug, which would be of extreme importance in a modern court of law, but concentrates instead on painting a

⁴ Trans. Frazer (1921).

⁵ I note that doctors were among the professionals (*dēmosieuoentes*) to whom some states paid retainers, but they are not my concern in this essay; see the study of Cohn-Haft 1956.

⁶ There is no consensus as to what the specific charge was. MacDowell (1963) 62–63 argued that the case is one of planning (*bouleusis*) of intentional homicide, which would have been tried at the Palladion; but for Gagarin (1997) 104 (cf. Maidment [1941] 11–12) the case was intentional homicide and was tried before the Areopagus. The latter view has found more favour recently and was forcefully restated by Eidinow (2016) 35–36, but Plastow (2020) 7–8 reverts to the view that the trial was held in the Palladion. For the provision concerning drugs in the homicide law cf. Demosthenes 23.24.

⁷ At 1.3 he uses the adverb πολλάκις ('often'), though he only in fact mentions one other occasion at 1.9.

⁸ For the dramatic tenor of the narrative in this speech, see Apostolakis (2007); Edwards (2017).

⁹ See further on the possibilities Heitsch (1984) 123–25. φάρμακα, a word which also encompasses spells, could be both healing and harmful, as well as natural or supernatural; see Eidinow (2016) 12.

vivid picture of a husband-murderess using the standard woman's weapon, poison.¹⁰ On the other hand, the unnamed speaker of Antiphon 6, *On the Choreutes*, adopts a far more straightforward, legalistic approach in defending himself against a charge of planning (*bouleusis*) an unintentional homicide.¹¹ The speaker was the *choregus* of a boys' chorus for the Thargelia, and one of the boys was given a potion to drink, perhaps because he had a sore throat,¹² which proved fatal. The speaker argues that he had done everything that was expected of him as *choregus* and was not even present when the potion was administered, and the prosecution had been bribed by his political enemies to bring the case. Again, there is no discussion of what the potion contained, but the *choregus* simply refers, like the speaker of speech 1, to the φάρμακον (§§15, 17 bis, 21, 22). However, he can still gain a rhetorical advantage from the word when, at §21, he claims that the prosecutor, Philocrates, had told the court of the Thesmothetae that he had killed the boy 'by forcing him to drink a drug' (φάρμακον ἀναγκάσας πιεῖν).¹³ With Gagarin, this may reflect that Philocrates used this word when making his verbal report to the court, when he was not making a sworn accusation, or the speaker may be misrepresenting what he said.¹⁴ The former would be understandable, with Philocrates in shock making his first accusation before investigating what had actually happened, but either way the speaker can easily refute this claim (or so *he* claims) with 'more than fifty' witnesses (§22).

Another area of the law where women and drugs are portrayed as playing a sinister role is in inheritance cases. In Isaeus 6, *On the Estate of Philoctemon*, the speaker, who may have been called Aristomenes,¹⁵ delivered a supporting speech on behalf of Chaerestratus in which he alleged that his two rival claimants to the estate of Euctemon were not legitimate sons of Euctemon by a woman called Callippe, but were in fact the sons of a prostitute named Alce by the freedman Dion. As Aristomenes tells the story, Euctemon, who lived until he was ninety-six, became infatuated in his old age with Alce, whom he set up, on her retirement from the profession, as manager of his apartment block in Ceramicus. Dion had conveniently committed a crime and left Athens, which left Euctemon free access to Alce, and he regularly visited her until

ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παντελῶς διητᾶτο ἐκεῖ καὶ οὕτω διετέθη εἴθ' ὑπὸ φαρμάκων εἴθ' ὑπὸ νόσου εἴθ' ὑπ' ἄλλου τινός, ὥστε ἐπέισθη ὑπ' αὐτῆς τὸν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ παιδῶν εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματι.

in the end he lived there completely, and he was reduced to such a state either by drugs or disease or something else that she persuaded him to introduce the older of the two boys to the members of his phratry under his own name (Isaeus 6.21).¹⁶

¹⁰ For an excellent examination of accusations of women using poisoning, see Eidinow (2016).

¹¹ See Gagarin (1997) 223–24.

¹² As Gagarin (1997) 221.

¹³ My italics, following the translation of Gagarin (1998).

¹⁴ See Gagarin (1997) 235; cf. ten Berge (1948) 197.

¹⁵ See Davies (1971) 564.

¹⁶ Trans. Edwards (2007).

The phrase ‘either by drugs or disease’ reflects the text of the Solonian law on inheritance with respect to wills, which is quoted at ps.-Dem. 46.14, though as Scafuro notes,¹⁷ this seems to be an abridged text. Apollodorus, the speaker here, goes on to paraphrase the provisions of the law at §16:

σκέψασθε δὲ καὶ διότι οὐδ’ ἂν ἄπαις τις ἦ, κύριός ἐστι τὰ αὐτοῦ διαθέσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ φρονῆ· νοσοῦντα δὲ ἢ φαρμακῶντα ἢ γυναικὶ πειθόμενον ἢ ὑπὸ γήρωσ ἢ ὑπὸ μανιῶν ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τινὸς καταληφθέντα ἄκυρον κελεύουσιν εἶναι οἱ νόμοι.

Consider, too, that even if a man is childless, he has no right to dispose of his own property unless he is of sound mind, but if he is ill or taking drugs or under the influence of a woman or constrained by old age or by madness or some need, the laws say he does not have the right.¹⁸

A number of other passages in Isaeus also paraphrase the law to a greater or lesser degree.¹⁹ Drugs do not feature everywhere in versions of the law,²⁰ and where they do, they are not always accompanied by women.²¹ But given the propensity of ageing men to fall in love with much younger women, the law protected families from the undue influence of a woman when a man had no sons, and one method a woman might be accused of using to exert her influence, apart from the obvious sexual one, was drugs. In another infamous case, the sick Phrastor is allegedly cajoled (ψυχαγωγούμενος) in his illness by the attentions of Neaera and her daughter Phano, who bring him medicines, so that he will adopt Phano’s son as his own (ps.-Dem. 59.55–61). It should be noted that the translation of §55 by Bers,²² ‘exploiting his need to be cared for’, reflects a text containing the words τῇ θεραπείᾳ. These are found in three of the four main Demosthenes manuscripts (SFY, but not A) and were included in the old Oxford Text of Rennie and in his edition of the speech by Carey (translating ‘by the attentions of’), but are omitted from the new Oxford Text of Dilts and in his edition of the speech by Kapparis.²³ As Kapparis notes,²⁴ *θεραπεία* is ‘the *vox propria* for medical treatment’ (cf. LSJ s.v. II), but we can assume that, even without this phrase, medical care is indicated by the following words τὰ πρόσφορα (§56), as well as by the general sense of the passage.²⁵ The phrase καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν θεραπείας (§58), translated by Bers as ‘by his need to be taken care of by the women’ and included in the texts of Rennie, Carey and Dilts but also deleted by Kapparis,

¹⁷ Scafuro (2011) 280 n. 30.

¹⁸ Trans. Scafuro (2011).

¹⁹ Cf. 1.11, 2.1, 13, 3.1, 4.14, 16, 6.9, 28, 9.11, 13, 37, 10.2.

²⁰ They are also absent from the versions given by Hyperides (3.17) and ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 35.2. The latter highlights madness, old age and the influence of a woman; see Rhodes (1981) 443–4.

²¹ Cf. Isae. 9.37, εἰ γὰρ τοῦτον ἐποιήσατο ὑὸν οὗ τῷ πατρὶ πολεμιώτατος ἦν, πῶς οὐ δόξει τοῖς ἀκούσασι παρανοεῖν ἢ ὑπὸ φαρμάκων διεφθάρθαι; (‘for if he adopted this man as his son, whose father was his most bitter enemy, how will those who hear about it not conclude that he was out of his mind or destroyed by drugs?’; trans. Edwards [2007]).

²² Bers (2003).

²³ Rennie (1931); Carey (1992); Dilts (2009); Kapparis (1999).

²⁴ Kapparis (1999) 284.

²⁵ The entry in Montanari s.v. πρόσφορος is preferable here to that of LSJ.

reinforces this, if genuine.²⁶ Finally, women are again involved in caring for, or rather in this case not caring for a sick man in Isocrates' *Aegineticus*, the only speech in the oratorical corpus delivered at a trial outside Athens. The unnamed speaker tells the story of how he looked after the deceased Thrasylochus during his final illness, whereas his female opponent had done nothing (19.24–33). Even Thrasylochus' mother and sister 'did more harm than good' when they visited him, since they too were ill.²⁷ With the help of a slave, the speaker nursed (ἐνοσήλευον) the irascible old man, who was suffering from an abscess (ὄς ἔμπυος μὲν ἦν), and while once more the speaker does not indicate precisely what kind of disease (he uses the nouns νόσος and νόσημα) caused this or what drugs he administered to the patient, he several times uses the noun θεραπεία (§§25 of the mother and sister, 28, 29 bis, 33) and its verbal form (§§24, 26), indicating that he was providing medical care.

We move on to doctors, who are not mentioned in any of the three surviving courtroom speeches of Antiphon, but do feature in two of his three *Tetralogies*, in particular the *Third Tetralogy*. In this imaginary case,²⁸ an old man is drinking with a young man and a fight ensues, during which the old man is severely injured (4α6):

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄκων ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα, ἄξιος ἂν ἦν συγγνώμης τυχεῖν τινός· ὕβρει δὲ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ παροινῶν εἰς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην, τύπτων τε καὶ πνίγων ἕως τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεστέρησεν αὐτόν, ὡς μὲν ἀποκτείνας τοῦ φόνου τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις ἔνοχος ἐστίν.

If he had killed the man unintentionally, he would deserve some leniency, but since he killed an old man in drunken arrogance (*hybris*) and without self-control (*akolasia*), hitting and choking him till he could no longer breathe, he is liable for punishment for murder.²⁹

The old man receives treatment from a doctor, but later dies. His relatives then prosecute the young man for homicide, but he pleads provocation and that he was acting in self-defence. One of his main arguments is that the old man died because the doctor who treated him was incompetent (4β4):

νῦν δὲ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον μοχθηρῷ ἰατρῷ ἐπιτρεφθεὶς διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἰατροῦ μοχθηρίαν καὶ οὐ διὰ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπέθανε. προλεγόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν, εἰ ταύτην τὴν θεραπείαν θεραπεύσοιτο, ὅτι ἰάσιμος ὢν διαφθαρήσοιτο, δι' ὑμᾶς τοὺς συμβούλους διαφθαρεὶς ἐμοὶ ἀνόσιον ἔγκλημα προσέβαλεν.

But as it was, he was entrusted to the care of a bad doctor and died many days later not from the blows but because of the doctor's incompetence. Other doctors warned him that although he could be cured, he would die if he

²⁶ See Kapparis (1995) 23, (1999) 88.

²⁷ αἱ πλέον θάτερον ἐποίησαν (§25, trans. Mirhady [2000]).

²⁸ The *Tetralogies* are practice exercises in argumentation. Their authenticity has frequently been disputed; see Gagarin (1997) 8–9, who defends their authenticity (rightly, in my view).

²⁹ Trans. Gagarin (1998).

followed that course of treatment. But you his advisers caused his death, which has led to this unholy charge against me.³⁰

The prosecution responded in their second speech that a doctor could not be prosecuted for homicide as a result of a patient dying under his care (4γ5),³¹ but this does not deter the defendant from restating his accusation at 4δ3 and 4δ8. It is noteworthy that the prosecutor makes no attempt to describe what the old man's injuries were or to defend the competence of the doctor, but simply states matter-of-factly that even if the old man died at his hands, which he did not, he is not the murderer because of the law absolving doctors.

We should also note that there were other doctors involved in the care of the old man, whose advice was ignored. Another team of doctors, or apparently so, is found in Demosthenes 54, *Against Conon*. In this speech, the young Ariston prosecutes Conon in a private suit for battery (δίκη αικείας), after an assault in which he was badly beaten and stripped of his cloak (§§8–9):³²

ὡς δ' ἀνεμείχθημεν, εἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἀγνώς τις, Φανοστράτῳ προσπίπτει καὶ κατεῖχεν ἐκεῖνον, Κόνων δ' οὐτοσί καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρομένους υἱὸς ἐμοὶ προσπεσόντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξέδυσαν, εἶθ' ὑποσκελίσαντες καὶ ῥάξαντες εἰς τὸν βόρβορον οὕτω διέθηκαν ἐναλλόμενοι καὶ ὑβρίζοντες, ὥστε τὸ μὲν χεῖλος διακόψαι, τοὺς δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς συγκλεῖσαι· οὕτω δὲ κακῶς ἔχοντα κατέλιπον, ὥστε μήτ' ἀναστῆναι μήτε φθέγξασθαι δύνασθαι. κείμενος δ' αὐτῶν ἤκουον πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ λεγόντων. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ βλασφημίαν ἔχει τινὰ καὶ ὀνομάζειν ὀκνήσαμ' ἂν ἐν ὑμῖν ἔνια, ὃ δὲ τῆς ὕβρεως ἐστὶ τῆς τούτου σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον τοῦ πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμ' ὑπὸ τούτου γεγενῆσθαι, τοῦθ' ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· ἦδε γὰρ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας μιμούμενος τοὺς νενικηκότας, οἱ δὲ κροτεῖν τοῖς ἀγκῶσιν αὐτὸν ἠξίουσαν ἀντὶ πτερόγων τὰς πλευράς.

In the mêlée, one of them, a man I didn't know, rushed Phanostratus and pinned him down, and Conon here and his son and the son of Andromenes fell on me. First they pulled off my cloak, then tripped me and threw me down in the mud, jumped on me and hit me so hard they split my lip and made my eyes swell shut. They left me in such a state that I could not get up or speak. And as I lay there, I heard them saying many shocking things. Generally it was filthy stuff, and I hesitate to repeat some of it before you, but I will tell you something that is evidence of Conon's insolence and indicates that the whole business came

³⁰ Trans. Gagarin (1998).

³¹ Gagarin notes (1997) 169 that the only other reference to such a law is found at Plato, *Laws* 865b. Saunders (1991) 219 claims that “doctors whose patients die as a result of treatment are not polluted at all”, but *vice versa* the only evidence he can cite for this is the present passage of Antiphon. Another Platonic law (933d) was to the effect that a doctor who deliberately poisoned somebody without intending to harm them fatally was to be executed; see Saunders (1991) 318–19.

³² Though the charge is battery (αικεία), Ariston repeatedly uses the word ὕβρις and its cognates, and his portrayal of the seriousness of the assault and its effects would well suit a γραφή ὕβρεως. He is therefore careful to explain at the start of his speech why he chose, on advice, to prosecute by the lesser charge. See on this Carey and Reid (1985) 70, 74–6.

about his instigation. You see, he sang out, imitating victorious fighting cocks, and his cronies urged him to flap his elbows against his sides, like wings.³³

The consequences were almost fatal (§§11–12):

Τότε μὲν τοίνυν παραχρῆμ' ὑπὸ τῶν πληγῶν ἄς ἔλαβον καὶ τῆς ὕβρεως οὕτω διετέθη, ὡς ἀκούετε καὶ μεμαρτύρηται παρὰ πάντων ὑμῖν τῶν εὐθὺς ἰδόντων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν οἰδημάτων τῶν ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τῶν ἐλκῶν οὐδὲν ἔφη φοβεῖσθαι λίαν ὁ ἰατρός, πυρετοὶ δὲ παρηκολούθουν μοι συνεχεῖς καὶ ἀλγήματα, ὄλου μὲν τοῦ σώματος πάνυ σφοδρὰ καὶ δεινά, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν πλευρῶν καὶ τοῦ ἥτρου, καὶ τῶν σιτίων ἀπεκεκλείμην. καὶ ὡς μὲν ὁ ἰατρός ἔφη, εἰ μὴ κάθαρσις αἵματος αὐτομάτη μοι πάνυ πολλὴ συνέβη περιωδύνῳ ὄντι καὶ ἀπορουμένῳ ἤδη, κὰν ἔμπυος γενόμενος διεφθάρην· νῦν δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσωσεν τὸ αἷμ' ἀποχωρήσαν.

My condition then as the immediate consequence of the blows and abuse I suffered was as you hear, and all those who saw it right after have given you their testimony. Afterwards the doctor said he was not too worried by the swellings on my face and my cuts, but continuous fever followed and pains, terrible pains throughout my body, but especially in my sides and belly, and I lost my appetite. And as the doctor said, if I hadn't spontaneously lost a great deal of blood – I was already suffering intense pain and in despair – I would have died from an abscess. But this loss of blood saved me.³⁴

The contrast with the description of the attack and its effects in the *Third Tetralogy* is striking. In the latter, the story is told very briefly and both parties concentrate on the guilt or innocence of the doctor, not what he prescribed; here, Demosthenes relies on a vivid narrative as a key part of his proof, with a rightly renowned portrait of the characters of Ariston and Conon in particular.³⁵ He also pays a good deal of attention to the medical evidence, which would have impressed the jurors and which is consistent with the medical knowledge of the time.³⁶ Of course, we have to allow for the fact that the *Tetralogies*, being model speeches, had no dedicated narratives and were designed to illustrate methods of argumentation, and also for the development of rhetorical techniques in the perhaps one hundred years that separated them from Demosthenes.³⁷ Nevertheless, the *Conon* speech is an excellent example of how a persuasive narrative, such as Lysias was renowned for in particular (cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias* 18), can draw the audience or reader in and lead us to overlook questionable elements of the story which may or may not be significant. In this

³³ Trans. Bers (2003).

³⁴ Trans. Bers (2003).

³⁵ Further on this ἠθοποιία see Carey and Reid (1985) 73–4. They, and MacDowell (2009) 242, 245, focus on the character portrayal of Ariston, but we should not overlook the importance of the less developed, but still damning portrayal of Conon. See also Morford (1966); De Brauw (2001–02): 163–65.

³⁶ See Carey and Reid (1985) 85. Wohl (2010) 79 notes that the medical details given in this passage are “virtually unparalleled in forensic oratory”, though we will meet another passage below that comes close.

³⁷ It is impossible to date the *Tetralogies* with any certainty; they could be as early as the 440s. Dem. 54 may be datable to 355 or 341, though again this is uncertain; see Carey and Reid (1985) 69.

regard, it is noticeable that Ariston talks sometimes of his doctor in the singular (§§10, 11, 12) and at other times of his doctors in the plural (§§1, 9, 36). Carey and Reid noted an obvious possible rhetorical reason for this confusion,³⁸ as well as a more sinister explanation, that “several doctors attended him, only one of whom was convinced that Ariston was close to death”. But it is the case that Ariston refers to doctors in the plural in §36, who provided witness testimony, and it was not unreasonable for Ariston to focus in the core of his narrative on the leading physician who was responsible for his treatment, as in the *Third Tetralogy* but here with a positive outcome.³⁹

Doctors, then, can receive a good or a bad press in forensic speeches, largely depending on which side of a case they are on. In the ongoing, bitter dispute between Mantitheus and his half-brother Boeotus (Demosthenes 40),⁴⁰ Mantitheus alleges that Boeotus had made a cut on his own head, with the purpose of accusing Mantitheus before the Areopagus of wounding with intent to kill (§32). But Euthydicus, the doctor he went to originally to ask him to make the cut, told the Areopagus the truth of what had happened. Again, in prosecuting Evergus and Mnesibulus for giving false testimony on behalf of his opponent Theophemus at a previous trial for battery (ps.-Demosthenes 47), the unnamed speaker tells the story of an assault on an old woman, his former nurse who had been set free by his father but now lived with the speaker again (§§58–59):

ταῦτα δὲ λεγούσης τῆς γυναικὸς οὐχ ὅπως ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιθῆς τὸ κυμβίον λαβούσης παρακείμενον αὐτῇ, ἐξ οὗ ἔπινεν, καὶ ἐνθεμένης εἰς τὸν κόλπον, ἵνα μὴ οὗτοι λάβοιεν, ἐπειδὴ εἶδεν ἔνδον ὄντας αὐτούς, κατιδόντες αὐτὴν οὕτω διέθεσαν ἀφαιρούμενοι τὸ κυμβίον Θεόφημος καὶ Εὐεργὸς ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ οὕτωσι, ὥστε ὕφαιμοι μὲν οἱ βραχίονες καὶ οἱ καρποὶ τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῆς ἐγένοντο ἀποστρεφομένης τὸ χεῖρε καὶ ἐλκομένης ὑπὸ τούτων ἀφαιρουμένων τὸ κυμβίον, ἀμυχὰς δ' ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ εἶχεν ἀγχομένη, πελιὸν δὲ τὸ στῆθος. εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἦλθον πονηρίας ὥστε, ἕως ἀφείλοντο τὸ κυμβίον ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο ἄγχοντες καὶ τύπτοντες τὴν γραῦν.

In spite of my wife's words, not only did they not stop their rampage but when the nurse took hold of the small cup that was set before her from which she had been drinking and when she put it in her bosom to prevent the men from seizing it since she saw they were inside the house, then the men – Theophemus and Evergus his brother – caught sight of her and treated her so brutally as they were wrenching the small cup away from her that her arms and wrists were all bloodied from having her hands twisted and pulled this way and that by them as they wrenched the cup away, and she had bruises on her throat from being strangled by them, and her chest was black and blue. Indeed, their meanness

³⁸ Carey and Reid (1985) 84: “he seeks to strengthen his case by exaggerating the number of expert judgements on the seriousness of his condition”.

³⁹ Λεντάκης (2018) 72 acutely observes that Ariston may have been seen by more than one doctor at the public baths and at his home, with one doctor signing the critical testimony.

⁴⁰ Boeotus was now technically also named Mantitheus after his victory in an earlier suit (Demosthenes 39).

was such that they didn't stop throttling and striking the old woman until they had yanked the cup free from her bosom.⁴¹

The speaker next day demanded that Theophemus bring a doctor for the woman (§62), but Evergus and others attacked his house again instead (§§63–66). The speaker himself, therefore, summoned a doctor he had known for a long time, but the doctor told him that she would not survive and indeed she subsequently died (§67). The speaker brought in witnesses to the freedwoman's condition, and their testimony supports the horrendous story of the assault on her, which again acts as *ēthopoia* for the characters of the speaker and his opponents. Furthermore, the vivid description of the injuries will again, as in Demosthenes 54, have had an impact on the jurors.⁴² That the speaker is then advised by the exegetes that he cannot take legal action on the freedwoman's behalf (§§69–70) only adds to the pathos of the story.⁴³ Finally, as part of his attack on Aeschines in the speech *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes turns to the occupations of Aeschines' family, noting that his father worked as a schoolteacher 'by the house of "the hero", the doctor' (Dem. 19.249).⁴⁴ As MacDowell notes,⁴⁵ a scholiast on this passage (474 Dilts) gives the name of the doctor as Aristomachus and says he was called 'the hero' because of his size; and we are told in the *Lexeis Rhetorikai* (s.v. ἥρωος ἰατρός)⁴⁶ that he was buried at Marathon. Demosthenes may be subtly contrasting Aeschines' father Atrometus, whom in a second attack at 18.129 he refers to by the servile name Tromes, with 'the hero' to indicate how Atrometus, and by implication his son, was exactly the opposite.

On the other side of the coin, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of withdrawing from an embarrassing embassy to Philip by pretending to be sick; his brother went to the Council with the doctor Execestus, swore an oath of exemption over Aeschines' illness and was elected in his place (Dem. 19.124). As is usual when these two bitter enemies are involved, Aeschines has a different version of the story at 2.94–95, that he did send his brother, with his nephew as well as the doctor, to the Council to testify that he was ill, but not to swear the oath, which had to be sworn before the Assembly.⁴⁷ In prosecuting Demosthenes' ally Timarchus for prostituting himself in his youth (and so debarring himself from a political career), Aeschines alleges that in his younger days Timarchus lived at the home of the doctor Euthydicus in Piraeus, 'ostensibly to learn the profession but in reality because he had determined to sell himself' (1.40).⁴⁸ Euthydicus, whom we came across earlier as a truthful doctor in the Boeotus case, appears here in less favourable light, with the possible implication that he was acting as Timarchus' pimp.⁴⁹ At any rate, he was ready to sell Timarchus to

⁴¹ Trans. Scafuro (2011).

⁴² As with Dem. 54, the medical details are found in other medical texts of the period. See Wohl (2010) 105 n. 69. For a detailed analysis of the narrative of this speech see Fisher (2020) 186–210, esp. 199–200.

⁴³ On the advice of the *exegetai* here see Wohl (2010) 106–108; see further Pepe (2018).

⁴⁴ πρὸς τῷ τοῦ ἥρω τοῦ ἰατροῦ (trans. Yunis [2005]).

⁴⁵ MacDowell (2000) 307.

⁴⁶ = *Anecdota Graeca* (ed. Bekker) 1.262.16–18.

⁴⁷ See further on this MacDowell (2000) 256.

⁴⁸ προφάσει μὲν τῆς τέχνης μαθητῆς, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ πωλεῖν αὐτὸν προηρημένος (trans. Carey [2000]).

⁴⁹ See Fisher (2001) 169–70.

Misgolas, ‘who has a phenomenal passion for this activity’ (§41).⁵⁰ In Fisher’s view,⁵¹ Euthydicus was probably a citizen, though another doctor from Piraeus, Eryxias, was probably a metic. The latter features in ps.-Demosthenes 33, *Against Apaturius*, whom the unnamed speaker accuses of concocting a plot against him (§18). Eryxias in turn, as MacDowell notes,⁵² may have been related to Eryximachus, a doctor who appears in the list of names of those who had mutilated the Herms at Andocides 1.35 and in Plato’s *Symposium* (cf. 176d, 185d for his profession as a doctor).⁵³

There are tantalising references to an abortion case in the fragments of Lysias, which included discussion of whether a foetus is living in the womb (frgs. 20a–20d Carey), and there is a reference in another fragment of Lysias to a doctor leaving a quantity of hellebore to a woman named Antikyra when he died (frg. 220 Carey). Hellebore was used as a cure for madness, which allows Demosthenes to attack his great enemy Aeschines, ‘why don’t you take some hellebore for your trouble?’ (18.121),⁵⁴ an expression that in essence means ‘you are mad’.⁵⁵ Drugs also appear in epideictic oratory. In his defence of the legendary Egyptian king Busiris, Isocrates tells us how priests in Egypt

τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἰατρικὴν ἐξεῦρον ἐπικουρίαν, οὐ διακεκινδυνευμένοις
φαρμάκοις χρωμένην ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτοις ἃ τὴν μὲν ἀσφάλειαν ὁμοίαν ἔχει τῇ τροφῇ
τῇ καθ’ ἡμέραν, τὰς δ’ ὠφελείας τηλικαύτας ὥστ’ ἐκείνους ὁμολογουμένως
ὕγιεινστάτους εἶναι καὶ μακροβιωτάτους.

discovered medicine to aid their bodies by employing not dangerous drugs but only those that are as safe as their daily food, and so beneficial that the Egyptians are by common agreement the healthiest and longest living of peoples.⁵⁶

Athenians could obtain their drugs not from a priest but from a pharmacist, such as the Plataean Aristobulus (Aeschin. 3.162), but there may also have been a more sinister source of supply, women who were accused of being witches, such as ‘the foul potion-maker Theoris from Lemnos’ (ps.-Dem. 25.79).⁵⁷ The speaker alleges that the defendant Aristogeiton’s twin brother secured drugs from her slave-girl and claimed to be able to cure epilepsy (§80), but we should note that he also says Theoris and her entire family were executed, a case unparalleled in Athenian law,⁵⁸ and this is

⁵⁰ περὶ δὲ τὸ πρῶγμα τοῦτο δαμονίως ἐσπουδακῶς (trans. Carey [2000]).

⁵¹ Fisher (2001) 169.

⁵² MacDowell (2004) 103 n. 25.

⁵³ On this list see Canevaro and Harris (2012) 100. On the identification of the names see MacDowell (1962) 86; Edwards (1995) 167, 170; also Dover (1980) 86.

⁵⁴ τί σπαντὸν οὐκ ἐλλεβορίζεις ἐπὶ τούτοις; (trans. Yunis [2005]). See further on this passage Usher (1993) 211.

⁵⁵ For the expression ‘Drink hellebore!’ cf. Ar. *Wasps* 1489, with the commentaries of MacDowell ([1971] 323–24) and Biles and Olson ([2015] 503); Men. fr. 63; and similarly Callias com. fr. 28; see further on treatment with hellebore Hippoc. *On Regimen* 23; Pliny, *Natural History* 147–50; also Strabo 9.3.3.

⁵⁶ Isoc. 11.22, trans. Mirhady (2000).

⁵⁷ τὴν μαρὰν Θεωρίδα, τὴν Λημνίαν, τὴν φαρμακίδα (trans. Harris [2018]).

⁵⁸ See Harris (2018) 223 n. 113.

almost certainly not a genuine speech of Demosthenes or a contemporary.⁵⁹ The drugs themselves will have been made by slaves, such as Moschion the ‘drug grinder’ (φαρμακοτριβης) and his fellow-slaves at ps.-Demosthenes 48.12–14.⁶⁰

It was not a difficult matter, rhetorically, to accuse one’s opponents of being villains, and in this context men could be accused of using poison like women (cf. Dem. 40.57). Harpocration (s.v. καταδεδέσθαι, = Dinarchus fr. 8) preserves a fragment of Dinarchus’ impeachment of Pytheas in which he referred to ‘drugging’ and ‘binding with drugs’ (καταδεδέσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ πεφαρμακεῖσθαι καὶ δεδέσθαι φαρμάκοις), but the context of that remark is unknown. Another rhetorical method involving both doctors and drugs was, unsurprisingly, their employment in metaphor and simile.⁶¹ The defendant in Antiphon’s *First Tetralogy* (2β13) implores the judges to ‘take pity on my misfortune and cure it’ (lit. ‘become doctors of it’);⁶² while in Antiphon’s other courtroom speech (5, *On the Murder of Herodes*) Euxitheus, arguing that his trial for homicide is being held in the wrong court, pleads with the judges directly in apostrophe, ‘if you believe me, you can still change your minds and cure your mistake by punishing me the second time’ (5.94).⁶³ For Isocrates (frg. 30) reasoning is like a good doctor.⁶⁴ In a political context, Demosthenes (3.33) compares the dole given to the Athenians from the Theoric Fund to the foods prescribed by doctors, which ‘neither build strength nor allow the patient to die’.⁶⁵ Analogies with disease occur several times in Demosthenes (cf. 2.21, 9.29),⁶⁶ and he attacks Aeschines’ silence as being like that of a doctor not telling his patient how to be cured, then at his funeral declaring ‘If the man had only done such and so, he would still be alive’ (18.243).⁶⁷ This analogy is anticipated in his prosecution speech by Aeschines (3.225), a *procatalēpsis* which probably indicates post-trial revision of the speeches.⁶⁸ Further examples may be found in the two speeches *Against Aristogeiton* (ps.-Dem. 25.95, 26.26), but as we saw, these are probably products of the Hellenistic period rather than genuine speeches of Demosthenes.⁶⁹ Finally, in a speech whose

⁵⁹ Harris (2018) 195–96 argues forcefully that this speech (and also ps.-Dem. 26) was written during the Hellenistic period. He indicates in his footnotes that there are several words in §§79–80 which do not occur elsewhere in forensic oratory, but he is mistaken about *pharmakos* (‘scapegoat’, n. 116), which is found at Lys. 6.53 – unless he believes that this speech is also a later forgery; *contra* Todd (2007) 403–408, who in a generally inconclusive discussion of the authenticity or otherwise of the speech expresses his opinion “that the one hypothesis which can be firmly rejected is that of the late rhetorician” ([2007] 407).

⁶⁰ Scafuro notes (2011) 341 n. 27 that “presumably the drugs ground by the slaves were medicinal”, in support of which cf. Ael., *NA* 9.62. It could be, on the other hand, that φαρμακοτριβης should be translated as ‘colour-grinder’, as it was by Murray (1939).

⁶¹ See in general Brock (2013) 69–82.

⁶² ἐλεήσαντας τὴν ἀτυχίαν μου ἰατροὺς γενέσθαι αὐτῆς (trans. Gagarin [1998]).

⁶³ τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ πειθομένοις ὑμῖν μεταμελῆσαι ἔστιν, καὶ τούτου φάρμακον τὸ αὐθις κολάσαι (trans. Gagarin [1998]). The Greek word translated here by the verb ‘cure’ is the noun φάρμακον.

⁶⁴ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡσπερ ἰατρὸν ἀγαθὸν.

⁶⁵ καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν’ οὐτ’ ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὐτ’ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐᾷ (trans. Trevett [2011]). The same imagery is found at Dem. *Ex.* 53.4.

⁶⁶ See Usher (1993) 239.

⁶⁷ εἰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπος οὐτοσί, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν’ (trans. Yunis [2005]).

⁶⁸ See Yunis (2001) 243; though Usher (1993) 253 posits that Demosthenes, who had a ‘partiality for imagery from disease’, may have already used it in an unpublished speech. Aeschines ridicules Demosthenes’ use of metaphor and simile at 3.166.

⁶⁹ See n. 59 above.

authenticity has also been doubted but is now generally accepted, the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes biting compares the Athenians to ‘people who have drunk mandrake juice or some other such drug’ (10.6).⁷⁰ This poisonous plant, often associated with magic and witchcraft, is soporific, the effect Demosthenes is presumably alluding to here, but since it is also hallucinogenic, it has been used since antiquity as a narcotic.⁷¹

The noun *θεραπεία* and its verbal form *θεραπεύειν* are also used extensively (and especially by Isocrates and Demosthenes) both to mean caring for the sick (as in ps.-Dem. 47.62, 67),⁷² and caring for the old and young (Isoc.7.55; Lys. 13.45), and in other senses, such as service to the people (Isoc. 9.46; Dem. *Ep.* 3.27) and the gods (Isoc. 2.20, 11.24, 15.282), means of conciliation (Isoc. 3.22), helping Athens and other states (Isoc. 4.53; Dem. 18.307, 322), and especially cultivating the friendship of Athens or the Athenian people, and of other states and individuals (Isoc. 1.36, 2.53, 4.104, 5.104, 9.28, 12.47, 14.36, 15.70, 131, 137, 165, 309, *Ep.* 2.19; Lys. 19.37; Dem. 6.19, 19.138, 226, 341, 23.8, 24.3, *Ex.* 40.2; Aeschin. 1.157, 182, 2.111). But a more sinister use of the noun is exemplified at Isaeus 8.37:

τά τε οὖν χρέα πάντα ὅσα ὠφείλετο αὐτῷ, καὶ <τοὺς> τόκους ἔπειθε <πράξασθαι>, τά τε φανερά δι’ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, παράγων ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον θεραπείαις καὶ κολακείαις, ἕως ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκείνου περιέλαβεν.

So he [Dioctes] gradually persuaded Ciron to let him manage all the debts that were owed to him and the interest on them, as well as his visible property, seducing the old man by his attentions and blandishments until he took over all his property.⁷³

Finally, all three terms of the terms we have been exploring are employed in an extended metaphor by Isocrates (8.39–40):

ὕμᾱς δὲ χρὴ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο γινώσκειν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων πολλαὶ θεραπείαι καὶ παντοδαπαὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς εὐρηναί, ταῖς δὲ ψυχᾶς ταῖς ἀγνοούσαις καὶ γεμούσαις πονηρῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο φάρμακον πλὴν λόγος ὁ τολμῶν τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἐπιπλήττειν, ἔπειθ’ ὅτι καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν τὰς μὲν καύσεις καὶ τὰς τομὰς τῶν ἰατρῶν ὑπομένειν ἵνα πλείονων ἀλγηδόνων ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζειν πρὶν εἰδέναι σαφῶς, εἰ τοιαύτην ἔχουσιν τὴν δύναμιν ὥστ’ ὠφελῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

As for you, first you should know that for bodily illnesses many and varied remedies have been discovered by doctors, but for minds that are ignorant and

⁷⁰ ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἢ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον εἰκόκαμεν ἀνθρώποις (trans. Trevett [2011]). On the authenticity of the speech see MacDowell (2009) 354–56; and more generally on the speech see Hajdú (2002) (44–49 on the question of authenticity).

⁷¹ As Trevett (2011) 182 n. 13. Further on the soporific qualities of mandrake (cf. Plato, *Resp.* 6.488c) see Hajdú (2002) 120.

⁷² See above; cf. *ψυχή* at Dem. frg. 13.32; caring of cities in times of misfortune is compared to caring for human bodies when they are sick at Hyp. 2, *Against Philipides* frg. 10. Apollodorus notes how men have ‘concubines for meeting our bodily needs day-by-day’ (ps.-Dem. 59.122, trans. Bers [2003]). See further on this well-known passage Carey (1992) 148; Kapparis (1999) 422–24.

⁷³ Trans. Edwards (2007).

full of evil desires, there is no other drug than discourse, a thing that dares to rebuke errors. Furthermore, it is ridiculous that we will endure the cauteries and incisions of the doctors so that we might be rid of greater pains, but we reject discourses before we know clearly if they have the power to help their audience.

Isocrates clearly, like Galen centuries later,⁷⁴ is fully aware of the great power of medicine when combined with rhetoric.

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⁷⁴ See the recent study of Petit (2018).

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Constructing the *Chemical* Theory of *Meteorologica* IV: the Aristotelian Argumentation

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Abstract

This paper aims to show how Aristotle formulates his theories in the fourth book of *Meteorologica*. At first, the Stagirite selects the appropriate verbal tenses in accordance with the desired meaning. Secondly, he takes advantage of three types of argumentation (syllogistic methods): analogy, induction and deduction. In addition, he exploits the use of examples effectively. Lastly, Aristotle takes for granted stereotypical phrases or theories already proven in the rest of his physical work and builds his new ideas upon them.

The treatise *Meteorologica* IV makes no reference at all to meteorological phenomena, like the previous three books. In fact, it goes far beyond that by introducing a new scientific field, which is actually one of the main reasons that prolong questions of authenticity as well as those of taxonomy with regards to the rest of the Aristotelian corpus¹. However, one can support the idea with reasonable certainty that several references lead us back to the previous three books²; furthermore, similarities that this treatise shares both in style and in vocabulary with

¹ The arguments against the authenticity of *Mete.* IV can be summarised as follows: (a) no evidence of teleology is found in the text, (b) the author follows a mechanistic way of thinking, a non-Aristotelian characteristic, (c) the theory of pores (*Mete.* IV, 9) conflicts with the Aristotelian theory of void. However, these arguments are rather easily disputable if we take into account that: (a) the employment of teleology is present in the treatise but it is not very obvious, since the research is about the ὁμοιομερῆ bodies; their form is very primitive, so their τέλος is vague but not nonexistent; (b) in the same framework, the author's theory is not mechanistic, since the meaning of goal (τέλος) and the idea that nothing in nature occurs in vain are present in the whole text; (c) in the theory of pores discussed in *Mete.* IV there is no reference to the void, as is incorrectly argued. With reference to the placement of the treatise, Andronicus of Rhodes in his edition recorded it after the *Meteorologica* I–III (see Düring [1957] 423). This place is claimed to be inappropriate, as (i) in *Mete.* IV the author does not proceed with the research of metals and minerals that he announced at the end of the third book of *Meteorologica*, (ii) it has no connection with the content of the previous three books. Nevertheless, reference is made to metals in *Mete.* IV, but in this context they are approached as a type of ὁμοιομερῆς. In addition, there are a lot of cases in the fourth book that echo theories already put forth in the previous three books. For further details about the above-mentioned issues, see Hammer-Jensen (1915) 115–16; Gottschalk (1961) 66–68; Strohm (1979) 232; Peppe (1982) 35; Lee (1952) xvii; Düring (1944) 74–78; Gill (1997) 145–46; Solmsen (1985) 455–58; Tricot (1976) x–xi; Zikou (2019) 14–35.

² Two examples in support of this thought may suffice here: (a) In the fourth chapter of the second book, Aristotle refers to the two kinds of exhalations and especially to the ἀτμίς (Arist., *Mete.* II 359b32–35). The same description of this phenomenon is found in the fourth book of the treatise, namely Arist., *Mete.* IV 387a24–30, see also Baffioni (1981) 24; (b) In the third chapter of the first book we find the description of the four elements, their properties and their reciprocal transformation; in the same context we also find the reference that they are the material of the natural world (Arist., *Mete.* I 339b1–5). This theme is more extensively treated in the major part of the treatise's fourth book.

the rest of the Aristotelian corpus further disarm the relevant arguments³. In short, the text of *Mete.* IV deals with the shaping of homogenous bodies as a result of the reciprocal transformation of the four elements, namely earth, water, air and fire. This transformation is a procedure that follows the interaction between the two pairs of qualities, the active (hot-cold) and the passive (dry-wet). Thanks to I. Düring, *Mete.* IV is also known as the ‘Aristotelian chemical treatise’⁴, despite the fact that it is also related to contemporary scientific fields such as Physics and Biology. Consequently, it is a treatise that can be considered as belonging to the field of natural philosophy and science; however, although it contains some of the most typical characteristics of a scientific text in the modern sense⁵, it lacks the most important one: the validation provided by experiments. Indeed, it is evident throughout the treatise that Aristotle constructs and develops his arguments rather through logic and everyday experience. In doing so he exploits several methods.

Initially, his theoretical purposes are obviously assisted by the choice of the appropriate verbal terms. To be more specific, the treatise starts with the word *διώρισται*⁶, which is the passive present perfect of the verb *ὀρίζειν* / *διορίζειν*. The term has two meanings here: define and determine. This form has not been randomly chosen: Aristotle’s purpose was to recall existing theories that had already been proved in the rest of the Aristotelian physical works, a typical Aristotelian method of employing previous knowledge in order to build upon it. In addition, the passive voice subtly ensures that these theories need no further proof but are taken for granted - they have the status of Axioms and comprise the basis on which Aristotle constructs his thought in *Mete.* IV. Indeed, in *De generatione et corruptione* Aristotle also exposes his theory about the shaping and the reciprocal transformation of the elements. He discusses their number and their properties, and within this framework he distances himself from the opinions of some of the pre-Socratic philosophers and those of Plato. Furthermore, in the same treatise he states axiomatically that the elements should be four, not either only one or innumerable. This means that, at least, his theory is closer to the Empedoclean one, which is based on the four *ρίζώματα*, attested in the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosopher⁷. However, Aristotle holds that the elements, as meant in his system, should not be the unchangeable *ἀρχαὶ* of the

³ For example, the beginning of the second chapter of the first book (*ἐπειδὴ γὰρ διώρισται πρότερον ἡμῖν μία μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν σωμάτων*, Arist., *Mete.* I 339a11) is similar to the first phrases of the fourth book (*ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα αἴτια διώρισται τῶν στοιχείων*, Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b10). In the context of both passages one observes not only an accordance in vocabulary, but also in the style and in the way Aristotle constructs his arguments, see also Baffioni (1981) 212.

⁴ The majority of researchers such as Strohm (1983) 93 n.1, Happ (1965) 313, Kullmann (1998) 200 and Viano (2015) 213, agree with this type of characterisation. Others, however, reject it: see e.g. Furley (1983) 90; Horne (1966) 21–27.

⁵ For more details about this issue, see Zikou (2019) 41–50.

⁶ *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα αἴτια διώρισται τῶν στοιχείων, τούτων δὲ κατὰ συζυγίας καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τέτταρα συμβέβηκεν εἶναι, ὧν τὰ μὲν δύο ποιητικά, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, τὰ δὲ δύο παθητικά, τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν*, Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b10–13 (‘We have distinguished in the elements four casual factors whose combinations yield four elements: two of the factors are active, the hot and the cold, two are passive, the moist and the dry’; here and throughout translated by Lee [1952]).

⁷ *Τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ρίζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε: / Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Αἰδωνεύς / Νῆστις θ’, ἢ δακρῦοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον*, Empedocles, D-K 6 (‘Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who with her tears fills the springs of mortal men with water’, trans. by Kirk–Raven [1971]).

physical world, but should undergo reciprocal transformation. This is made real through the interaction of the pair of qualities attributed to each of the elements, a pair that also determines their properties. In this line of thinking, earth is characterised by the pair dry-cold, water by wet-cold, fire by dry-hot and air by wet-hot. The elements are also considered to be of equal power. In addition, Aristotle disagrees with the Platonic view of the elements, as presented in *Timaeus*, that their creation is attributed to the combination of triangles (Plato, *Timaeus* 48b6–48c2). It should also be noted that in the *De caelo*, Aristotle describes the elements' movements, thus developing a theory that proves to be very useful in the justification of a theory that explains away a difficult phenomenon, namely olive oil's property of floating on water: here, Aristotle proposes that oil contains air, which by nature moves upwards⁸. To return to the term διώρισται, the opening lines of *Mete.* IV are not the only place where it is applied, but there are four more occurrences. We find it first after the description of the properties that the two pairs of qualities (hot-cold, dry-wet) acquire and after the description of the way they determine the natural bodies; these lines are again reminiscent of the corresponding theory presented at *De generatione and corruptione*. In this last treatise, Aristotle thoroughly analyses the actions of these qualities and axiomatically summarises it in *Mete.* IV, as an already proved and familiar theory⁹. Secondly, the verb διώρισται also appears in the description of *concoction* (πέψις). This time πέψις is to be understood as the procedure which encompasses all the completed procedures (τελείωσις τις) by means of which the interaction of the opposite pair of qualities takes place. These include the maturing of fruit, boiling and roasting. So, Aristotle initially clarifies the term πέψις and its opposite ἀπεψία; πέψις is the main term, which sums up the others. He takes these terms for granted and moves on to describe the types of concoction (πέψις μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀπεψία διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, Arist., *Mete.* IV 380a10 ['This completes our description of concoction and inconcoction']). We come across the term διώρισται once more in the reference to hotness and coldness as defining attributes of the elements; hotness and coldness actually do not apply to all of them, but only to water and earth, elements which form the matter of the homogeneous bodies¹⁰. In this textual context, it is evident that Aristotle adopts the pre-existent belief in the obvious knowledge that the bodies including mainly water are cold, whereas the bodies consisting mainly of earth are hot. Finally, the last application of the verb διώρισται is in the beginning of the

⁸ αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶν ὅτι ἀέρος ἐστὶν πλήρες. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἐπιπολάζει· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ φέρεται ἄνω, Arist., *Mete.* IV 383b24–26 ('The reason is that it [oil] is full of air, which is why it floats on water, since air moves upwards'); the theory that air moves upwards is also present in Arist., *De Caelo* (books 3 and 4) and in Arist., *Mete.* I, chs 2–3.

⁹ ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ μὲν ποιητικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικὰ, φανερόν· διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λεπτόν ἂν εἴη τὰς ἐργασίας αὐτῶν, Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b25–26 ('It is clear, therefore, that of the four factors two are active, two passive. Having established this, we must describe the operations of the active factors and the forms taken by the passive').

¹⁰ ἔχει μὲν οὖν οὕτως, ὅμως δέ, ὥσπερ διώρισται, ἐν οἷς μὲν ἡ ὕλη ὕδατος τὸ πλεῖστον, ψυχρά· (ἀντίκειται γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦτο τῷ πυρὶ), ἐν οἷς δὲ γῆς ἢ ἀέρος, θερμότερα, Arist., *Mete.* IV 389b15–18 ('This is true. Nevertheless, as we have laid down, things in which the material factor is mainly water are cold [for water is the extreme opposite of fire], things in which it is mainly earth or air contain more heat').

treatise's final chapter¹¹. Through this term the author here summarises his whole theory with regard to the shaping of the homogeneous bodies. He continues by giving examples of these types of body and by comparing them to the ones he calls ἄνομοιομερῆ.

Staying with tenses, one can find several times in the text the form εἴρηται. Although it is a passive perfect again, its use appears to be different as compared to that of διώρισται. The form εἴρηται denotes that a reference relevant to an issue under discussion has already been made and the author reminds the reader of it in order to avoid repetition¹², while the role of διώρισται, as we have already noted, is not only to underline the fact that the relevant theories have already been put forward, but also that they are used as a point of reference for whatever follows. For these reasons, the most appropriate translation of εἴρηται would be 'it has been referred to', whereas for διώρισται it would be 'it has already been proved'. Apart from εἴρηται, one will frequently encounter in the treatise several forms of the verb λέγω (λέγεται, λέγομεν, φαμέν, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν)¹³. This is explained by the fact that Aristotle deliberately employs terms and references to procedures which are familiar to everyone and widely accepted; therefore, he uses and adopts them in his theories. This is also the case with regard to various forms related to the sense of vision, as καὶ ὀρῶντες, φαίνεται, συμβαίνει, δῆλον¹⁴. Their choice serves one type of argumentation already noted in this treatise, which is also frequently applied in the Aristotelian corpus in general: ἐπαγωγή (induction). Obviously, Aristotle starts from something familiar taken from everyday experience in order to make a generalised statement relevant to it. He actually follows the method of argumentation he has already specified in his *Analytica Posteriora* and in the *Topica*: his thought passes from something specific to a statement that can be applied on every occasion amongst bodies of the same or similar kind¹⁵. It is worth mentioning, too, that the verbal tenses of λέγω can be taken

¹¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων διώρισται, καθ' ἕκαστον λέγομεν τί σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν Arist., *Mete.* IV 389b23–24 ('Having dealt with these matters, let us proceed to give separate accounts of flesh and bone and the other homoeomerous bodies').

¹² Some examples: τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ γένεσις καὶ τί φθορά, εἴρηται, Arist., *Mete.* IV 379b9 / πέπανσις μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστὶν, Arist., *Mete.* IV 380a27; ἔψησις μὲν οὖν καὶ μόλυνσις εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τί ἐστὶν, Arist., *Mete.* IV 381a22.

¹³ E.g.: τὸ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὡς ποιητικὰ λέγομεν, Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b22 ('For we speak of hot and the cold as active'); λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ὠμότης ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πέπανσις, πολλαχῶς, Arist., *Mete.* IV 380b3 ('rawness too, like ripeness, has many senses'); καὶ ζῶον οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῇ πέψει, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει σηπομένη ἐν τῇ κάτω κοιλίᾳ, Arist., *Mete.* IV 381b10–11 ('And it is not true that worms are generated in the process of digestion as some say; they are generated in the excrement which decays in the lower belly').

¹⁴ E.g.: φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἢ μὲν θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης ὀρίζουσαι καὶ συμφύουσαι καὶ μεταβάλλουσαι τὰ θ' ὁμογενῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ, Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b15–17 ('It is always heat and cold that are observed to determine, combine and change things both of the same and of different kinds'); διὸ ἀμφοτέρωθεν δοκεῖ τισιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ψυχρὰ οἱ δὲ θερμὰ ταῦτα φασι εἶναι, ὀρῶντες, ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῇ φύσει ᾧσιν, θερμὰ, ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῶσιν, πηγνύμενα, Arist., *Mete.* IV 389b13–15 ('So there are two views about them, and some regard them as cold, some as hot, seeing that as long as they retain their nature they are hot, but when they depart from it they solidify').

¹⁵ δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῆ γινώσκουσι ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ, Arist., *An. Post.* 100b2 ('Clearly then it must be by induction that we acquire knowledge of the primary premisses, because this is also the way in which general concepts are conveyed to us by sense-perception', trans. by Tredennick [1960]); ἐπαγωγῆ [ἐστὶν] ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ὅλον

as a proof of orality, an inference that would allow us to support the view that the treatise was included in Aristotle's teaching programme. This is also ensured by the use of the subjunctive moods εἴπωμεν, λάβωμεν and of the conditionals ἄν εἴη, δόξειεν ἄν. In particular, ἄν εἴη further highlights another Aristotelian characteristic: the philosopher does not claim that his views are absolute, but rather accepts the possibility of the existence of different alternatives in each case, thus setting the frame for further discussion.

In addition, the use of verbs related to vision not only ensures the empiricism of Aristotle, but also underlines the importance and the reliability he attributed to this sense¹⁶. This is also made clear in his treatise *De anima*, where the major role of vision for the existence of a living organism is duly remarked on. Except for the method of induction, deduction is also employed¹⁷. Aristotle starts from an initial point which he tries to elevate to the status of approved knowledge and then continues to the next step of his research. The structure is as follows: if A is accurate, let us move on by proving B, which is dependent on A. The A element of the argumentation is introduced by the conjunctive εἰ or ἐπεὶ and B is inserted either by a verbal adjective or by a subjunctive verbal form. In other words, A is the presupposition in order to take B as accurate. To give an example, Aristotle supports that ὕλη is a kind of coldness (δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν τὴν ὕλην ψυχρότητα τινα εἶναι, *Arist., Mete.* IV 389a29). He claims that, after taking for granted a presupposition that has already been proven: the matter of the natural bodies is the element of earth and water (ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὕλη [ταῦτα γὰρ παθητικά], τούτων δε σώματα μάλιστα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ ἐστί, ταῦτα δὲ ψυχρότητι ὄρισται, *Arist., Mete.* IV 389a30–34 [‘For as dry and moist are matter [being passive], and find their principal embodiments in earth and water which have cold as a defining characteristic’]. Earth, as an element, is characterised by the pair of qualities cold-dry, whereas water by the pair cold-wet. It is obvious then that both elements have in common the quality of cold (δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ σώματα ὅσα ἐκατέρου ἀπλῶς τοῦ στοιχείου, ψυχρὰ μᾶλλον ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ ἔχη ἀλλοτρίαν θερμότητα, *Arist., Mete.* IV 389a35–b2 [‘It is clear that all bodies that are made of either element alone tend to be cold unless they have an external source of heat’]). Since (a) these elements are the matter of the natural world and (b) cold is the quality they both share, the idea that matter (ὕλη) is a kind of coldness is in this line of thinking. In addition, Aristotle tries to categorise in the twelfth chapter the ὁμοιομερῆ and to highlight the properties of each category. Before proceeding to this step, he has already clarified what an ὁμοιομερὲς in general is (ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων [τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν] διώρισται, καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγωμεν, *Arist., Mete.* IV 389b22 [‘Having dealt with these matters, let us proceed to give separate accounts’]).

The description of the procedures that lead to the determination of the natural bodies' properties, in other words of solidification, liquefaction, thickening and rarefaction, is assisted by the use of examples. Indeed, examples complete each theory

ἔφοδος, *Arist., Top.* 105a14 (‘induction is the progress from particulars to universals’, trans. by Forster [1960]).

¹⁶ For the ancient notion of vision as the primary sense, cf. Herodotus 1.8.10.

¹⁷ For further discussion of the Aristotelian syllogistic methods in *Mete.* IV, see Zikou (2016) 58–63.

Aristotle develops and make it more comprehensible¹⁸. The examples employed in the treatise could be divided into four wider categories: (a) the six known metals, namely gold, silver, copper, lead, mercury and tin, (b) the parts and the secretions of living organisms, plants and animals, (c) the different kind of stones, and (d) nutrition products and items for everyday use. The use of examples as a means of supporting a thought is highlighted in the *Rhetoric* (1356b3–14). For Aristotle, an example serves three main purposes¹⁹: first, it is an auxiliary ‘tool’ for a theory to be proved, since there is a large variety of materials that can be used as paradigms. Secondly, one has the ability to construct one’s own argument by correlating it with a paradigm, thus making the verification of a theory more effective. Thirdly, an example is a type of description of a specific occasion without the need of generalisation. It is obvious, I think, that Aristotle includes examples in his argumentation and assigns to them a major role. In addition, as regards especially the third chapter of *Mete.* IV, he describes in detail the procedures by means of which the interaction of the two pairs of qualities takes place. The common point in these descriptions is that, in order for each procedure to be carried out, the appropriate ratio (λόγος) between the pair of qualities should be achieved. This is how we should understand the infinitive used in the text, κρατεῖν. This remark underlines the influence exercised on Aristotle by ancient medicine and medical schools, mainly the Hippocratic one. To be more specific, his argumentation at this point is reminiscent of the Hippocratic theory regarding the χυμοί that are present in the human body²⁰, which also survives in the work of Galen²¹. According to this, a human living organism consists of four humours, black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm. Our bodies’ healthy functions are carried out thanks to the balance secured by the appropriate ratio of these humours. Without this ratio, illness occurs. Except for the Hippocratic school, a similar theory was already discussed by the pre-Socratics, namely Alkmaion and Philistion. They both contend that health is the result of symmetry between opposite powers, hot, cold, wet and dry²². This idea, however, is not limited to the field of medicine: we could

¹⁸ Lloyd (1991) 70–72.

¹⁹ Thompson (1975) 94–95.

²⁰ Τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτέῳ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγέει καὶ ὑγιαίνει. Ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὀκόταν μετρίως ἔχη ταῦτα (sc. αἷμα, φλέγμα, χολὴν ξανθὴ καὶ μέλαινα) τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιος καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ἦ, Hippocrates, *De natura hominis* 4 (VI.40 L. = 172,4 Jouanna) (‘The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; these make up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or enjoys health. Now he enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, and when they are perfectly mingled’, trans. by Johnes [1959]).

²¹ διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ποιῶν κρᾶσιν ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων ὡδί πως ἐνεργοῦντος ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ διὰ τὴν βλάβην αὐτῶν ἢ διαφθεῖρεσθαι τελῶς ἢ ἐμποδιζέσθαι γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ οὕτω νοσεῖν τὸ ζῶον ἢ ὅλον ἢ κατὰ τὰ μέρη, Galen, *De naturalibus facultatibus* 2 (VII.118 K) (‘For, seeing that every part functions in its own special way because of the manner in which the four qualities are compounded, it is absolutely necessary that the function [activity] should be either completely destroyed, or, at least hampered, by any damage to the qualities, and that thus the animal should fall ill, either as a whole, or in certain of its parts’, trans. by Brock [1952]).

²² Alkmaion, D-K B 4: τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου παθητικὴν (‘The bond of health is the equal balance of the powers, moist and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, and the rest, while the supremacy of one of them is the cause of disease’, trans. by Kirk–Raven [1971]).

rather claim that it builds upon the political theory present both in the Aristotelian corpus and in pre-Socratic philosophy. In this context the reference is to the μεσότης, a term present in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; according to this text, there is only one way to achieve ἀρετή, and this is the mean between exaggeration and its absence, the two opposites. Of course, this bears similarities to Anaximander's phrase: διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (fr. 12 B 1 D-K) ('For they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time', trans. by Kirk–Raven [1971])²³.

This latter remark indicates the firm connection between political and natural philosophy: society and the natural bodies are taken to function in a similar way, since a suitable portion of the powers which determine them is needed in order for them to acquire their ideal form, and thus function properly and achieve their goals. The engaging vocabulary applied by the author of *Mete.* IV, a vocabulary drawn from other fields, allows him to correlate two different fields of study.

Another remarkable point that enriches Aristotle's argumentation is the repeated use of certain phrases, representative of his ideas, in several passages of the treatise. One can assume that they function as a kind of *formulae* that summarise the Aristotelian views and are exploited by him so as to strengthen his ideas or to make the text flow better. One of them is the phrase πίστις τούτων ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ('This can be confirmed by considering some examples') in Arist., *Mete.* IV 378b15: this phrase, which is actually found very frequently in Aristotle's work, confirms that the observation and the everyday experience of the natural world lead to *axioms*. Another one is: ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν ('For human operations imitate natural', Arist., *Mete.* IV 381b6), which by means of analogy underlines the relationship between natural and artificial bodies. In both cases, it is noted that the same procedures occur and the same effects are achieved. The most representative example of this is the analogy between the living bodies' concoction and the artificial procedure of boiling. And the last ones are τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον τοῦ ἐναντίου ('the same cause operating on the same substance in the same way cannot produce opposite effects', Arist., *Mete.* IV 383a8) and τὰναντία ἔσται αἴτια τῶν ἐναντίων ('opposite causes will thus produce opposite effects', Arist., *Mete.* IV 383b16, 384b2): these phrases are used in the context of the description of solidification and liquefaction. The main idea that conceptually dominates this context is that only the power which is opposite to the prominent power in a body is able to provoke changes in its form and its properties. This theory echoes the corresponding one appearing already in the *Physica*, which helps us deduce that *Mete.* IV is also one of the Aristotelian physical works and belongs to the Aristotelian corpus.

A point of departure from Aristotle's previous practice, which is also rather awkward, is the fact that this treatise contains no reference to his predecessors, although this is a method familiar to Aristotle. Indeed, in several cases in his extant work we observe that he begins by recording the existing views that are relevant to the theories he proposes. He proceeds by criticizing them and pointing out his own arguments. However, in the fourth book of *Meteorologica* there is an intriguing

²³ For further discussion of these issues, see Zikou (2019) 140–42.

absence of this specific characteristic²⁴. In all, Aristotle here adopts only two Empedoclean phrases and adapts them in a framework that enables them to strengthen his own theory. On the first occasion the phrase ἄλφιτον ὕδατι κολλήσας ('gluing meal together with water', Arist., *Mete.* IV 381b31 [fr. 31 B 34 D-K]) is employed only to clarify and make more comprehensible the Aristotelian view that the dry and the wet (the passive pair of qualities) are firmly connected and that one of them (the wet) limits the other (the dry). The second occasion is in the description of the bodies called θυμιατά and specifically in the description of smoke as a kind of fumes (θυμιάσις) in *Mete.* IV 387b5. The Empedoclean passage²⁵ is cited here so as to show that there is no specific term for each one of the natural bodies that share a common property. For this reason, they are categorised in a wider group by applying analogy²⁶.

In conclusion, Aristotle's argumentations employed in the development of his chemical theory as presented in the fourth book of *Meteorologica* may be briefly summarised as follows: (a) he chooses consciously the tenses and the moods of the verbs he employs; (b) he aptly uses the methods of induction and deduction; (c) he exploits inventively the role of the examples; (d) he takes advantage of stereotypical phrases, which include Aristotelian theories already present in his other physical works and (e) he inserts abstracts from Empedocles in two cases of the text, so as to assist his own way of thinking.

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²⁴ Viano (2006) 19 and 27 attributes this absence to the fact that Aristotle's method in *Meteorologica* IV is different in comparison to his rest physical work.

²⁵ ταῦτα τρίχες καὶ φύλλα καὶ οἰωνῶν περὰ πυκνὰ καὶ λεπίδες γίνονται ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσι, Arist., *Mete.* IV 387b4 (fr. 31 B 82 D-K) ('The same are hair and leaves and birds' thick feathers and scales upon strong limbs').

²⁶ For more detailed discussion of these subjects, see Zikou (2016) 63–65.

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Aristotle on the Limits of Inquisitive Enterprise: The Case of *kompos* in *On Respiration* and Beyond

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Abstract

This paper addresses the problem that arises in attempting to interpret the two adjectives *kompos* and *periergos*, used by Aristotle in *On Respiration* 27 [21].480b21–30 to single out those doctors who, as he stresses, speak about nature, claiming a right to derive their principles from it. The broad semantic spectrum covered by these terms in antiquity makes it difficult to decide what meaning Aristotle intends them to convey in *On Respiration*, and whether he employs them in a purely positive way, in a negative one, or in both ways, in pursuit of some third goal. In this study we will focus on *kompos*, first considering its meaning in Aristotle's texts and then examining selected passages mainly from the Hippocratic Corpus. In the final section we will go on to offer a fresh perspective on *kompos* in *On Respiration*. It will be argued that in Aristotle's hands *kompos* becomes a tool of both praise and criticism, in the sense that it may be used to approve of ingenious, innovative or interdisciplinary advances, while still being sceptical, polemical or critical of them, especially when the methods a person adopts in the construction of a theoretical account are not motivated by a genuine desire to search for truth.

1. Introduction

In the famous concluding section of *On Respiration*,¹ Aristotle notes:

Concerning life and death and the subjects kindred to this inquiry our discussion is practically complete. As for health and disease, it is the business not only of the doctor but also of the student of nature to discuss their causes up to a certain point. However, in what sense they are different and study different things, should not be ignored, since the facts prove that their discussions are to a certain extent contiguous: those doctors who are ingenious and inquisitive do have something to say about nature and think it important to derive the principles of their discipline from the study of nature; and concerning those students of nature who are most distinguished, one may well say that they end with the principles of medicine. (trans. van der Eijk)²

¹ Taken in this paper as part of *On Youth and Old Age, on Life and Death, on Respiration*.

² Περὶ μὲν οὖν ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων. περὶ δὲ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν. ἣ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ ἣ διαφέροντα θεωροῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε σύνορος ἡ πραγματεία μέχρι τινός ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον· τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ καὶ περιέργοι λέγουσιν τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσιν λαμβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγματευθέντων οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἰατρικὰς (27 [21].480b21–30). The translation is drawn from van der Eijk (2005) 194. Quotations from Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* follow Ross (1955).

This passage has been interpreted in two ways. Geoffrey Lloyd and Philip van der Eijk take it to refer to ‘the distinguished among doctors’, those ingenious (*kompsoi*) and inquisitive (*periergoi*) minds who transgress the confines of their discipline and draw upon the principles of nature in order to gain a more theoretical knowledge of the body.³ Douglas Hutchinson, on the other hand, troubled by the double-edged nature of the epithets *kompsoi* and *periergoi*, proposes that Aristotle is very diffident about this ‘sophisticated’ (*kompsoi*) and ‘speculative’ (*periergoi*) style of medical theorist, who ‘says something’ (*legousi ti*) about nature and ‘claims’ (*axiousi*) to derive his principles from it.⁴ What is most puzzling about the passage, as can be inferred from the above interpretations, is how one should deal with the adjectives used to single out doctors: *kompsoi* and *periergoi*.⁵ *Kompsoi*, in particular, covered a broad semantic spectrum in antiquity and for this reason proves to be especially difficult to interpret, inevitably calling for further explanation. This paper will focus on *kompsoi*, but also considers related terms to the extent that these help to provide a more complete picture of the meaning of *kompsoi* in Aristotle’s text.

As P. Chantraine claims,⁶ the occurrences of *kompsoi* in the extant ancient Greek corpus allow us to infer that the word was used quite freely. It encompasses a wide range of meanings, from ‘elegant’ and ‘well-arranged’ to ‘refined’, ‘elaborate’ or even ‘manipulative’ and ‘dishonest’. A clearer picture of the variety of meanings expressed by *kompsoi* can be gained from the discussions of the word found in the works of E. Norden, P. Chantraine, G. de Vries, and L. Carter,⁷ the results of which may be summarised as follows:

- The original meaning of the word seems to have been ‘elegant’, ‘chic’, ‘neat’, ‘well-groomed’, ‘well-arranged’, and probably ‘intelligent’ or ‘attractive’.
- Later the word took on additional meanings, such as ‘well-mannered’, ‘refined’, ‘fine’, ‘nice’, ‘sophisticated’, ‘elaborate’, ‘delicate’, ‘subtle’, and ‘ingenious’.
- The word is also quite often employed ironically in Plato, Attic comedy, and Euripides, with the latter two sources using it in a negative sense. Here the word has acquired pejorative connotations, and carries the meanings ‘subtle’, ‘witty’, ‘clever’, ‘artful’, ‘slippery’, ‘untrustworthy’, and, by extension, ‘devious’, ‘cynical’, ‘manipulative’, and ‘dishonest’.

³ See Lloyd (2003) 177–79; van der Eijk (2005) 193–97; van der Eijk and Hulskamp (2010) 65.

⁴ Hutchinson (1988) 41.

⁵ For the negative connotations of *periergoi*, see Leigh (2013) 161–70 and additionally Korobili (2022) Essay 1. A similar interpretation is given by Miller (2018) 252. According to Leigh the terms *periergoi* and *periergeia* already had negative connotations in Isocrates’ time, ‘with regard to refinement or over-refinement in dress, haircare, perfume, food, drink, art, medical treatment, and sundry other categories’ (p. 163). Ogle (1897) 135 n. 157 seems to be trying to preclude the possibility that any such negative connotations may be conveyed by the use of *kompsoi* and *periergoi* in the epilogue when he puts forward the following claim: ‘That *κομμοὶ ἢ περιέργοι* is used in a good sense, and not intended to imply a pretence of over-refinement, is shown by the parallel passage in the *De Sensu* (i. 4; 436, a, 20)’.

⁶ Chantraine (1945) 95.

⁷ Norden (1915³) 69 n. 1; Chantraine (1945); de Vries (1984); Carter (1986) 54 n. 7.

In light of these considerations, how can we decide which meaning(s) Aristotle intends *kompsos* to convey in *On Respiration*? Does he employ *kompsos* (a) in a purely positive way, so as to single out a particular group of doctors? Or (b), in a negative way, in order to criticise them severely? Or perhaps (c), in both ways, in pursuit of some third goal? Our paper will address these questions by first considering the meaning of *kompsos* in Aristotle's texts and then examining selected passages (mainly) from the Hippocratic Corpus which highlight methods and practices of certain medical practitioners. In the light of the analysis given in these two sections, we will then go on to offer a fresh perspective on *kompsos* in *On Respiration*.

2. Aristotle

2.1 *On the Heavens* II 9.290b14–15

[...] κομψῶς μὲν εἴρηται καὶ περιττῶς ὑπὸ τῶν εἰπόντων, οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχει τᾶληθές.

[...] in spite of the grace and originality with which it has been stated, is nevertheless untrue. (trans. Stocks)⁸

On the Heavens II 9.290b14–15 testifies to the idea that a particular theory (in this case the theory that the movement of the stars produces a harmony) may be untrue, notwithstanding its having been stated *kompsōs* and *perittōs*. These adverbs do seem to be deployed here in praise of someone's speech, but *only to the extent* that this speech is not examined with respect to its truthfulness. So, what exactly are *kompsōs* and *perittōs* referring to? Does Aristotle wish to stress here (a) the content of what has been said, (b) the refined manner of expression, (c) the accuracy of the treatment or account, (d) the witty wording, (e) the inventiveness of certain conceptions, or (f) the innovativeness and sagacity of the ideas set forth? And what actually prevents an account that has been stated *kompsōs* from being truthful? In other words, why does the presence of *kompsōs* in a certain speech not guarantee its truthfulness?

In *Metaphysics* III 7.1011b25–28 Aristotle provides his definition of truth and falsehood. According to this definition, truth is a sort of correspondence:

This is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false. (trans. Ross)⁹

In light of the aforementioned definition, to speak *kompsōs* and *perittōs* must now be taken as implying that one speaks a falsehood, that is, one utters statements that do not correspond to any fact. Indeed, in the context of the passage of *On the Heavens* we find Aristotle emphasising that the theory of those who propose that the stars produce concordant sounds is not in agreement either with the fact that we hear no

⁸ Stocks (1984). The text is taken from Moraux (1965).

⁹ Ross (1984). Cf. *On Interpretation* 5.17a15–17.

sound at all or with the fact that no forcible effect is observed to be produced upon us (290b31–291a6). However, the way in which the thinkers who hold this theory try to wipe out these absurdities is further qualified (besides the adverbs *kompsōs* and *perittōs* at 290b14) as harmonious and delicate (ἐμμελῶς μὲν λέγεται καὶ μουσικῶς, 290b30–31). But is it possible for an account to be harmonious and musical but not true? Aristotle argues that it is impossible (ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον, 290b31).¹⁰ It seems that such an account is tailored to meet a demand for verisimilitude rather than truth. This is to say that a certain speech is constructed in such a way as to resemble the musicality of truthful speech without imparting truth. As we will see later, those delivering such speeches could well be credited with disingenuous motives rather than with simply wittily cloaking their inability to construct truthful theories. Be that as it may, Aristotle’s emphatic contrast between *kompsōs* and *alēthōs* seems to leave no room for doubt: those who speak *kompsōs* are still far from speaking the truth.

Evidence supporting the idea that the word *kompsōs* here carries a somewhat negative nuance is offered by another word that features prominently in this section of the treatise, namely *eulogon* or *eulogōs* (‘reasonable’, ‘with good reason’) and its opposites *alogon* (‘unaccountable’ or ‘unreasonable’) and *atopon* (‘absurd’).¹¹ These words appear to be employed as approbative and disapprobative terms respectively in the process of assessing whether or not certain facts about the world surrounding us are satisfactorily explained by a particular theory. They also seem to acquire the same semantic force when it comes to the discussion of how one can attain a better understanding of what happens in the heavens. In this section of *On the Heavens*, an account is *eulogos* insofar as it offers an explanation (a) of the things which are at a great distance from us (the heavens) on the basis of a theory that does not contradict the observed facts, and (b) of the bodies or facts around us on the basis of a theory that, in accounting for the heavenly things, affirms what is in agreement with the bodies or facts around us.¹² In light of this clarification, those who have spoken *kompsōs* and *perittōs*, and have thus constructed a harmonious but untruthful account, may be seen as having attempted ingeniously or sophistically to transform an *alogos* account into a *eulogos* one (or, put differently, to make the more *alogos* account appear the more *eulogos*).¹³

¹⁰ Simplicius (*On Aristotle’s On the Heavens* II 9.290b30 [CAG 7, p. 465.9–11 Heiberg]) is partly concerned with such a question: ‘Just before this when he set out the view in a plausible way he said it was spoken in an ingenious (*kompsōs*) and clever way (*perittōs*), but now he says it is spoken tunefully and musically, using these appropriate words ironically’. Trans. Mueller (2004). Cf. II 9.290b12 (CAG 7, p. 465.3–5 Heiberg): ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἅτε ὄντα πιθανά, κομψῶς εἰρησθαί φησι, τουτέστιν εὐπρεπῶς, καὶ περιττῶς δέ, τουτέστιν εὐρετικῶς καὶ ἐπινοημένως.

¹¹ See II 9.290b24 and b32, 291a4 and a14.

¹² Cf. Falcon and Leunissen (2015) 218.

¹³ An interesting objection to the view set out above might be that the word *kompsōs* is employed here as a term of wholehearted praise, intended to extol the good arrangement of these thinkers’ theory, its inventiveness or even its elegance, notwithstanding the fact that such a theory is still distant from the truth. This being the case, *kompsōs* would be better construed as serving to bring to light some of the basic features a truth-oriented theory must have while at the same time drawing attention to the methodological shortcomings that prevent it from attaining the truth. Such an interpretation would undoubtedly absolve these thinkers from any intention to deceive and would reveal a more sympathetic attitude towards those who may have committed methodological errors, while taking a few first steps towards the discovery of truth. However, the evidence in support of such an interpretative approach is

2.2 *On the Heavens* II 13.295b10–25

In this passage, Aristotle focuses on those ancient thinkers who are said to have thought that the earth remains at rest because of its ‘indifference’ (*homoiotēs*, 295b11). Most likely stemming from the observation that the earth, so they claim, maintains its position at all times, the explanation that these thinkers offer rests on the idea that whatever is put at the centre must remain there because it is impartially related to every extreme point. Against this argument, Aristotle expresses himself in a rather plain manner, granting that these thinkers may have spoken *kompsōs* and yet not *alēthōs* (295b16). He seems to be warning here against assimilating what is stated *kompsōs* to what is stated *alēthōs*, as if it were much anticipated that these two could be so mixed up with one another as to become hardly distinguishable.

The first and most obvious shortcoming of this account is its failure to give due weight to the property that is peculiar to the earth alone (τὸ γὰρ εἰρημένον οὐκ ἴδιόν ἐστι τῆς γῆς, 295b18–19). A second drawback relates not to the content of the argument *per se*, which loses its essential or imperative character, as we have seen, in the presence of a resounding focal debacle, but rather to the indispensability of its articulation (ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀναγκαῖον, 295b19), which is in fact put into question on the basis that it stands in plain contradiction to the observed facts. To put it another way, what necessitates an account to be formulated, or, much better, what qualifies it as indispensable in nature, is its having been designed to record the data provided by experience, such that a verbal necessity is generated which is in flawless concurrence with the facts. Failure to formulate an account in this way, however, as is manifestly the case here (since the earth is observed not only to remain at the centre, but also to move towards it, 295b19–21), inevitably renders it superfluous. It turns out, then, that the proper steps one should take in succession in formulating a satisfactory account involve first beginning from a set of correctly observed facts and then constructing a theory¹⁴ – one which is not only in perfect accord with these facts but also has as its primary reference point the property that is peculiar to earth as such and, hence, cannot be shared by any other element. Without proceeding through these steps in this order, there is no way, according to this passage, in which these thinkers could have arrived at a truthful account. Yet this deficiency alone, as the text makes clear, is by no means sufficient to prevent one from speaking *kompsōs*.

There are, undoubtedly, many important elements missing from the account given by these thinkers, which seems to disqualify *kompsōs* from being, in and of itself, a term of ringing endorsement. It is, however, a term that is employed to recognise (without necessarily approving) a certain quality in their account, and the most likely candidate for this position is the ingeniousness or resourcefulness enlisted in an attempt to develop a theoretical construct in artificial coherence with observational data. This somewhat counterfeit philosophical effort to attain truth, in conjunction

scanty, since there are almost no instances in the surviving Aristotelian Corpus in which *kompsōs* is explicitly aligned with, and not opposed to, *alēthōs*.

¹⁴ Cf. *On the Generation of Animals* III 10.760b27–33: ‘Such appears to be the truth (τρόπον) about the generation of bees, judging from theory (λόγου) and from what are believed to be the facts (ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνειν δοκούντων) about them; the facts, however, have not yet been sufficiently grasped; if ever they are, then credit must be given rather to observation (τῆ αἰσθήσει) than to theories, and to theories only if what they affirm agrees with the observed facts (τοῖς φαινομένοις)’. Trans. Platt (1984). The passage quoted is taken from Drossaart Lulofs (1965).

with the emphasis placed by Aristotle on these thinkers' failure to investigate and speak of the property peculiar to earth, clearly recalls *Metaphysics* III 2.1004a34–b26.¹⁵

In this passage from the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle focuses on the business of the first philosopher, which is to inquire into the essence of being and its properties, and he clearly distinguishes between first philosophy and sophistic: although they both deal with the same subjects, sophistic is a counterfeit philosophy (οἱ [...] σοφισταὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστὶ).¹⁶ '[T]he bogus characteristics of sophistic come into clear view only when exposed to the bright light of genuine philosophy – and of first philosophy in particular'.¹⁷ These thinkers err especially in terms of methodology, since they appear to disregard the priority that needs to be attributed to substance, inquiring instead into properties which are not abstract enough to lead them to true beliefs.

2.3 On the Heavens III 5.304a7–b22

In *On the Heavens* III 5.304a7–b22 Aristotle shifts the focus from theories that posit a plurality of elements being distinguished by their size (the most salient difficulty of which has been proved to be that they lead to a blurring of any absolute distinction between the elements) to theories that assume as a preliminary hypothesis that fire is the single element. Those who advance the latter type of theory are subdivided into two groups: on the one hand, those who give fire a particular shape, offering arguments in support of the divisibility of the primary body; and, on the other hand, those who offer no opinion on the question of shape, but, generally, set forth reasons in favour of its indivisibility. With regard to the first of these groups, Aristotle proceeds to make a very specific distinction:

The reason given may be – more crudely – (οἱ μὲν ἀπλουστέρως λέγοντες) that the pyramid is the most piercing of figures as fire is of bodies, or – more

¹⁵ 'And it is the function of the philosopher to be able to investigate all things. For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what contrariety is, or how many meanings it has? And similarly with all other such questions. Since, then, these are essential modifications of unity *qua* unity and of being *qua* being, not *qua* numbers or lines or fire, it is clear that it belongs to this science to investigate both the essence of these concepts and their properties. And those who study these properties err not by leaving the sphere of philosophy, but by forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other things. For number *qua* number has peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly the solid and the motionless and that which is in motion and the weightless and that which has weight have other peculiar properties. So too certain properties are peculiar to being as such, and it is about these that the philosopher has to investigate the truth. – An indication of this may be mentioned: – dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is philosophy which exists only in semblance, and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things; but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy. – For sophistic and dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy, but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not'. (trans. Ross [1984])

¹⁶ Quotations from the *Metaphysics* are based on Jaeger (1957).

¹⁷ Shields (2018) 338.

ingeniously – the position may be supported by the following argument (οἱ δὲ κομψοτέρως τῷ λόγῳ προσάγοντες). As all bodies are composed of that which has the finest parts, so all solid figures are composed of pyramids; but the finest body is fire, while among figures the pyramid is primary and finest; and the primary body must have the primary figure: therefore fire will be a pyramid (304a11–18). (trans. Stocks [1984])

Manifestly *kompsoterōs* suggests here a manner of argumentation that is noticeably different from arguing *haplousterōs*, thus further distinguishing, on this basis, between two subgroups of thinkers within the same group. Most translators have rightly captured the gist of the passage by rendering ἀπλουστέρως λέγοντες as something like ‘offering a cruder argument’. Indeed, upon careful examination of the text, *haplousterōs* qualifies the proposed argument in the following fourfold way:

- (i) It is constructed in a makeshift way.
- (ii) It lacks refinement, stylistic elegance, sophistication or subtlety; hence it is simplistic and superficial.
- (iii) It does not take into account certain important information, thereby running the risk of falling into a childish naivety.¹⁸
- (iv) It falls into precarious generalisations, and hence lacks punctiliousness.

In view of the distinction introduced in this passage, an argument uttered *kompsoterōs* is expected to display precisely the opposite qualities (i.e. assiduousness, refinement, sophistication, stylistic elegance, complexity, informativeness, thoroughness, thoughtfulness and precision). This conceptual contrast can hardly go unnoticed by scholarly readers in the context of the present discussion and would certainly endow *kompsoterōs* with an unqualifiedly approving nature were the remainder of the passage tailored to fit this purpose. Yet this seems not to be the case here.

Although the thinkers who fall under the shape-assigning category are further divided, as we noted above, into two subgroups with respect to the peculiar features of their argument, this distinction is immediately set aside and the arguments are treated as a single unit when Aristotle considers their logical validity (304b2–6). In Aristotle’s own words:

εἰ δὲ διαρετόν, τοῖς μὲν σχηματίζουσι τὸ πῦρ συμβήσεται μὴ εἶναι τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς μέρος πῦρ [...] (304b2–3)¹⁹

If, on the other hand, the primary body is divisible, then those who give fire a special shape will have to say that a part of fire is not fire [...] (trans. Stocks [1984])

This passage is highly revealing of Aristotle’s opinion concerning the logical validity of the proposed arguments. Hypothesis and apodosis come together to form a beautiful structure designed to show that the whole shape-assigning group, irrespective of whether a particular thinker has spoken *haplōs* or *kompsōs*, has not taken into account – perhaps has not even thought of – the logical consequences of

¹⁸ Cf. *Meteorology* I 3.339b30–37.

¹⁹ Cf. 304a8–9.

their assertions. These consequences, as soon as they are made explicit (at 304b2–6), uncover the severe difficulties faced by the proposed arguments, and eventually reduce them to absurdities or contradictions (*aloga*, 304a9; *duscherē*, 304a22). The principal culprit of this kind of reduction is a failure to build up a *logos* that is attuned with the facts of nature – an argument or theory the logical consequences of which asseverates what is revealed by the natural facts.²⁰ In spotlighting the (methodo)logical error committed by these thinkers, Aristotle can be seen to attach a greater importance to the logical solidity of the foundations upon which an argument is built than to its sophisticated formulation or structural complexity – matters that turn out to be mere extraneous ornamentation. In this sense, a cruder argument can lay claim to reasonableness, so long as it does not conflict with the facts of nature.²¹

2.4 *Meteorology* I 13.349a12–b2

Another passage that provides evidence for the preferability, on certain occasions, of a cruder argument over a more sophisticated one is *Meteorology* I 13.349a12–b2.²² Here Aristotle assigns the label ‘*kompseuma*’ (349a30) to an idea proposed by some ancient thinkers on the grounds that they draw an arbitrary parallel between two natural phenomena. Aristotle ushers in a discussion of the nature of winds and rivers with an undertaking to analyse argumentatively all the difficulties (*diaporēsantes*, 349a13–14) involved in this subject. He begins the discussion with a critical comment on the quality of the relevant theories that have been laid down up until his time.²³ As a close inspection of the passage reveals, Aristotle’s argument here develops in four parts: (a) criticism of the specific motivation for the fabrication of an account, (b) portrayal of the unpleasant effects of such misguided motivations, (c) detection of the methodological error committed as a result of this bewilderment, and (d) the displacing of the defective motivation by the methodologically proper process of

²⁰ ‘For it is a matter of observation that every natural body possesses a principle of movement’ (304b13–14); cf. 304a24–25: ‘And further the theory is inconsistent with a regard for the facts of nature’. (trans. Stocks [1984])

²¹ Cf. *On Generation and Corruption* I 2.316a5–11.

²² ‘Let us explain the nature of winds, and all windy vapours, also of rivers and of the sea. But here, too, we must first discuss for ourselves the difficulties involved (πρῶτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαπορήσαντες πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς); for, as in other matters, so in this nothing has been handed down to us that anyone could not have thought of (ὃ μὴ κἄν ὁ τυχὼν εἴπειεν). Some say that what is called air, when it is motion and flows, is wind, and that this same air when it condenses again becomes cloud and water, implying that the nature of wind and water is the same. So they define wind as a motion of the air. Hence some, wishing to say a clever thing (τῶν σοφῶς βουλομένων λέγειν τινές), assert that all the winds are one wind, because the air that moves is in fact all of it one and the same; they maintain that the winds appear to differ owing to the region from which the air may happen to flow on each occasion, but really do not differ at all. This is just like thinking that all rivers are one and the same river, and the ordinary unscientific view is better than a scientific theory like this (διὸ βέλτιον οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν ἅνευ ζητήσεως τῶν μετὰ ζητήσεως οὕτω λεγόντων). If all rivers flow from one source, and the same is true (τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον) in the case of the winds, there might be some truth in this theory; but if it is no more true (ὁμοίως) in the one case than in the other, this ingenious idea is plainly false (δῆλον ὅτι τὸ κόμψευμα ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ψεῦδος). What requires investigation (προσῆκουσαν...σκέψιν) is this: the nature of wind and how it originates, its efficient cause and whence they derive their source; whether one ought to think of the wind as issuing from a sort of vessel and flowing until the vessel is empty, as if let out of a wineskin, or, as painters represent the winds, as drawing their source from themselves’. Trans. Webster (1984). Quotations of *Meteorology* are drawn from Fobes (1919).

²³ 349a12–16. Cf. Wilson (2013) 157.

inquiry. It would be useful to discuss the contents of these four parts in a more detailed way.

(a) *Criticism of the specific motivation for the fabrication of an account.* Aristotle focuses his critique on the motivating force behind the formulation of some of his precursors' accounts – the wish to say clever things (τῶν σοφῶς βουλομένων λέγειν τινές, 349a20–21), a propensity to appear somewhat wise which drives them to invent new ideas (in particular, that all the winds are one wind) that unquestioningly rely on older ones (in particular, the idea that water and wind are of the same nature).²⁴ This same tendency also leads these thinkers arbitrarily to allow, through the vocabulary employed in their theories,²⁵ that two different cases (here rivers and winds and their associated issues) could be extremely similar ([...] ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις οἶοιτο καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς πάντας ἕνα ποταμὸν εἶναι, 349a25–26).

(b) *Portrayal of the unpleasant effects of such misguided motivations.*

A light is thus shone on the devastating consequences resulting from being guided by this kind of motivation, the most prominent being that one is led to formulate accounts that are scarcely distinguishable from what *anyone* could have said or thought about the subject (ὁ μὴ κἄν ὁ τυχὼν εἴπειεν, 349a16). Accordingly, ζήτησις, the act or process of conducting an inquiry of a more philosophical nature, which presupposes an inquisitive mind and often involves ingenious inventions, is ineluctably put under a more sceptical lens here by Aristotle and eventually rejected in favour of a less or non-zetetic approach (349a26–27).

(c) *Detection of the methodological error committed as a result of this bewilderment.*

It turns out then that the root of the problem detected must be traced back to certain profound methodological misconceptions: the *kompseuma* (349a30), the subtle intellectual gimmick which these thinkers have exposed to public discussion, assumes that an extreme similarity (*homoiōs*, 349a30) holds between the cases of rivers and winds, a hypothesis which is inferentially false (ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ψεῦδος, 349a31). Such an approach to framing the issue could, perhaps, lay claim to truth if it were to provide an analogical exposition of these two cases, setting out to determine the extent to which what happens in the case of rivers also holds in the case of winds *ton auton tropon* (349a28–29).²⁶ A nice example of this kind of exposition is offered by Aristotle himself later at *Meteorology* II 4.360a27–33.

²⁴ Lee (1952) 89 n. a notes that both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Olympiodorus refer to Hippocrates, *On Breaths*. See Alexander, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* I 13.349a9 (CAG 3.2, p. 53.27–54.2 Hayduck); Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* I 13.349a16 (CAG 12.2, p. 100.25–30 Stüve); Diogenes of Apollonia 64[51]C2DK; Anaximander 12[2]A24DK. It is very interesting to note here the way in which this view is introduced by Aristotle, i.e. with ὡς + participle (349a18–19), which suggests that the bedrock on which it is founded is believed to be true and treated as a fact, without necessarily implying that it is unquestionable. In *Meteorology* II 4 Aristotle goes on to put this idea to the test, showcasing its absurd implications (360a27).

²⁵ See especially the use of ῥέων (διὰ τοὺς τόπους ὅθεν ἂν τυγχάνη ῥέων ἐκάστοτε, 349a24), the subject of which is not 'river', as literal language would allow, but 'wind'.

²⁶ Evidence testifying to the somewhat interchangeable use of *ton auton tropon* and *analogon* includes: *On the Generation of Animals* II 4.740b8–10 and 7.746b4, *On Youth and Old Age*, *on Life and Death*, *on Respiration* 1.468a9–12, *Topics* IV 6.128a34–35. On the difference between *homoiōs* ('similarly') and *ton auton tropon/analogon* ('by analogy'), see e.g. *On the History of Animals* II 1.497b32–33 (τῷ δὲ στήθει τῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πάντα τὰ ζῷα ἀνάλογον ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, ἀλλ' οὐχ

(d) *Displacing of the defective motivation by the methodologically proper process of inquiry.*

From the preceding, we can see that an urgent need emerges for a methodologically proper process of inquiry (*prosékousa skepsis*, 349a31–32) which supersedes any motivational zetetic force that might drive one away from the path that leads towards truth. Such a process must necessarily start with what we might call a Socratic ‘What is F-ness?’ question, before extending to queries about the issues pertaining to the subject under investigation as well as potential analogical expansions (349a32–b2).

2.5 Politics

2.5.1 Politics II

Aristotle’s insistence on the importance of the motivations that underlie the construction and formulation of accounts can also be seen in another context in which the language of *kompso*s/-on appears, in a discussion at *Politics* II 1–6 of the ideal states described in Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws*. He starts with a prefatory methodological statement that serves to justify his engagement in the present inquiry:

Our purpose is (προαιρούμεθα) to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem, so that what is good and useful may be brought to light (ἵνα τό τ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῆ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον). *And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistic display at any cost* (ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτάς ἕτερον μὴ δοκῆ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων); *we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions which now exist are faulty* (1.1260b27–36). (trans. Jowett; our emphasis)²⁷

In this statement Aristotle anticipates and defuses any possible criticism that his discussion is motivated by a desire to display his ingenuity by clarifying the real motivation for giving this account: all current constitutions, whether in place in some actual polity or mere theoretical constructions, are far from being well-balanced (and thus beneficial for the citizen) and hence need to be reconsidered. This kind of zetetic exigency (τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτάς, 1260b33) has nothing to do with a superfluous engagement in unnecessary subtleties in the context of well-grounded constitutional constructs.²⁸ *Zētēsis*, in view of this pressing need, is thus cleansed of any entanglement with stimuli that may lead it away from the truth, and is, accordingly, given a positive signification. The establishment of this purified notion of *zētēsis* at the beginning of Book II of the *Politics* positions it to run as a theme throughout the entirety of the book. As such, it must stand in some sort of opposition to the kind of

ὅμοιον, taken from Balme [2002]); *Metaphysics* Θ 6.1048b6–7 (λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεῖα οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ’ ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον).

²⁷ Jowett (1984). The text is taken from Ross (1957).

²⁸ On *sophizesthai*, see also *Politics* II 1.1260b34, *Rhetoric* I 15.1375b21 and *Sophistical Refutations* I 17.176b23.

inquiry suggested by the cluster of words that characterise Socrates' discourses at II 6 when Aristotle moves from considering the *Republic* to the *Laws*:

τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν [...] (II 6.1265a10–12)

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. (trans. Jowett [1984])

Why are the qualities represented by *to zētētikon* and *to kompson*, and their collocation with *to peritton* and *to kainotomon*, insufficient for attaining the highest degree of fineness or beauty? And what exactly does the kind of fineness they do reach consist in? To answer these questions, we need briefly to survey Aristotle's criticism (presented in the *Politics* II 2–6) of the ideal constitutions envisaged by Socrates in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

2.5.2 Aristotle's Critique of the *Republic* (*Politics* II 2.1261a10–5.1264b25)

2.5.2.1 Part 1. 2.1261a10–4.1262b36: *The difficulties (duscherias, 1261a10) confronting Socrates' proposal for the community of women and children*

The main points in Aristotle's critical appraisal can be summarised as follows:

- (a) The primary justification for bringing into being the suggested community does not follow from Socrates' arguments (1261a11–12).
- (b) Socrates' proposed community (which aims to achieve what he considers to be best for the entire state, that is, the state's fullest possible unity) is impossible (*adunaton*) to bring about, and the details of his account have not been thoroughly worked out (*ouden diōristai*) (1261a13–16).

Further consideration of Socrates' end in and of itself unveils a number of additional shortcomings of Socrates' account. These are:

- (i) A misconception of the greatest good for a state (1261b8-9).²⁹
- (ii) Use of ambiguous language, which may yield an *admirable* meaning, yet remains, whichever way it is to be construed, ineluctably bound up with what Aristotle describes as 'impracticabilities' or practical consequences that lead to discord rather than harmony.³⁰
- (iii) Formulation of assertions that either rest upon incomplete observations, i.e. observations of human behaviour that do not take into account things shared in common, or upon utopian communist projects.³¹

²⁹ 'and that what is said to be the greatest good (μέγιστον ἀγαθόν) of cities is in reality their destruction (τὰς πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ)'. (trans. Jowett [1984])

³⁰ τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν (3.1261b20); διὰ τὸ διττόν (1261b29); ὥδι μὲν καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὥδι δ' οὐδὲν ὁμοιοητικόν (1261b31–32).

³¹ 'Nor is there any way of preventing [...] from sometimes recognizing [...]' (οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μὴ τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν [...], 3.1262a14–15). Trans. Jowett (1984).

- (iv) A discrepancy between theoretical analysis and its practical application (4.1262a25–29).
- (v) An undermining of Socrates' position due to the lack of exhaustiveness in his argumentation (1262a30) – which indicates not only discriminatory practices of exposition, but, most notably, an inability to construct an account on the basis of a thoroughgoing observation of the facts.
- (vi) Inclusion of suggestions that lack the firm ground of properly founded judgments about what is good for the individuals concerned (1262a37), or even fail to accommodate, or harmonise themselves with, the purpose at which they aim (1262b4–5).

2.5.2.2 Part 2. 5.1262b37–1264b25: The difficulties (dusphereias, 5.1263a22) confronting Socrates' proposed communal ownership of property

The main point of Aristotle's criticism becomes even clearer here: one of the most fundamental flaws in Socrates' account, if not *the* most fundamental, is his shallow knowledge (not to say complete ignorance) of human affairs, dispositions and tendencies – in other words, his lack of penetration into human psychology, which necessarily points to some lack of hermeneutical astuteness. This is evident, Aristotle insists, from Socrates' misapprehension of what is best for the state (cf. (b) in Part 1, above). Yet an error so striking and deeply embedded in his account should surprise us when set against the *admittedly attractive appearance* (*euprosōpos*, 1263b15) of Socrates' proposal, which is responsible for rendering his speech highly humane (*philanthrōpos*, 1263b15–16) and thus more acceptable and palatable to anyone listening to it (ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, 1263b16–17). This contrast between being outwardly appealing and inwardly repulsive is clearly meant to make an important point: a speech may 'appear' fine-looking, sound harmonious and actually be convincing, but this does not mean that it has substantial content, since it may be based on incorrect conceptions (1263b23–24) or false assumptions (1263b29–31) which attest its lack of intrinsic consonance (*parakrouseōs*, 1263b30).³²

However, the story does not end here. Among the other, largely 'technical' limitations that Aristotle identifies in Socrates' proposal for the communal ownership of property, the most notable are the following:

- (a) A failure to align the means with the ends of (the proposed) legislation (1263b39–40).
- (b) Omission of any detailed description whatsoever of the way in which theoretical principles can be practically applied.³³
- (c) Fallacious analogical argumentation (1264b4–5).
- (d) Precarious generalisations (1264b6–7).

³² The message passed on here is strongly reminiscent of the context in which the terms *emmelōs* and *mousikōs* are introduced in *On the Heavens* II 9.290b14 (see p. 53 above), and certainly brings to mind *Rhetoric* II 22.1395b27–30, in which we are told that 'It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences – makes them, as the poets tell us, 'charm the crowd's ears more finely' (*mousikōterōs legein*)'. Trans. Rhys Roberts (1984). On this view, should we take Aristotle to imply that Socrates was in some sense an uneducated man?

³³ 1264a11. Cf. *περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώρισται* (1264a14); *νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται* (1264a37); 6.1264b28–29, 37.

- (e) Inadvertent self-contradiction (cf. *anagkaion*, 1264b10) – i.e. making claims that are inconsistent with each other – and presupposing premises that are never explicitly stated.

2.5.3 Aristotle's Critique of the *Laws* (*Politics* II 6.1264b26–1266a30)

We can now turn to the criticism that Aristotle directs at the account of the ideal constitution in the *Laws*, which is introduced using the four terms we touched upon above (see p. 60). Aristotle's critique seems to be based on his view that this part of Plato's text is beset by the following underlying difficulties:

- (i) The assumption of ideal yet impractical conditions.³⁴
- (ii) Methodological inaccuracy due to rudimentary empirical observation or absence of indispensable inputs.³⁵
- (iii) Provision of determinations or definitions that are insufficiently explicit (1265a28–30).
- (iv) Use of generalisations.³⁶
- (v) Lack of clarity stemming from Plato's use of false hypotheses (1265a39–b1).
- (vi) Advocating poorly grounded socio-political innovations.³⁷
- (vii) Neglect of fundamental questions (1265b18–21).
- (viii) Insertion of abstract or vaguely justified assertions that are consequently difficult to assess (1265a29–b6).
- (ix) Irreconcilable dissonance between the goal of particular utterances and their actual consequences (1266a5–7), or between statements and the necessary practical application of the underlying ideas (1266a22–25).

We are now close to identifying the meanings of *peritton*, *kompson*, *kainotomon* and *zētētikon* as they are used in *Politics* II 6 to characterise both the semantic and pragmatic aspects of Socrates' discourses. But it will first be useful to look at another, closely related, passage from the fourth book of the *Politics*. Here Aristotle once again criticises views that appear in Plato's *Republic* and *kompsons* once again plays a critical role.

2.5.4 *Politics* IV 4.1290b21–1291b13

διόπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται (1291a10–11).

Hence we see that this subject, though ingeniously, has not been satisfactorily treated in the *Republic*. (trans. Jowett [1984])

In *Politics* IV 4.1290b21–1291b13, the main target of Aristotle's criticism is Plato's division of the citizen body into four classes (cf. *Republic* II 369b–371e). Aristotle's aim here is to disprove Plato's constitutional classification, a goal that is pursued with the help of a zoological analogy. Taking as its starting-point the principle that every

³⁴ 1265a17–20. Cf. Part 1, 'b' (p. 60 above); Part 1, 'ii' and 'iii' (p. 60).

³⁵ 1265a20–21 and 25–26. Cf. Part 1, 'iii' (p. 60).

³⁶ 1265a31–35. Cf. Part 2, 'd' (p. 61 above).

³⁷ 1265b12–16. Note that this passage contains a clear, explicatory allusion to the *kainotomon* of 1265a12. Cf. 7.1266a35.

city consists of many parts rather than just one (1290b23–24), the analogy seeks to set up a pattern of constitutional taxonomy that mirrors zoological classification. That is to say, if someone is to speak of different animal kinds, they must first determine (*apodiōrizomen*, 1290b25–26) the organs/parts that are indispensable to every animal (ἄπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῴον, 1290b26), observe possible differences in them, and underline the possible combinations of these differences (which necessitate – ἐξ ἀνάγκης, 1290b32 – a variety of animal kinds). So too in the case of the taxonomy of constitutions: the variety of constitutions must be in direct proportion to the possible combinations of the differences in the necessary constitutional parts.

It is clear that this analogical argument signposts the methodological path that must be followed in order for someone to be able to speak of constitutional kinds. However, the consequences of the argument are much more significant than one might, perhaps, have expected. It turns out that the Platonic Socrates' erroneous classification of constitutions is due to his *incorrect conception of a state's necessary parts*, which is in turn due to his *misapprehension of the sake for which a state is formed*, that is, the noble (τοῦ καλοῦ, 1291a18). In view of these imperfections, Plato's Socrates can by no means be said to have spoken *hikanōs* ('satisfactorily' or 'adequately'), even if he can be credited with having spoken *kompōs* ('ingeniously') (1291a10–11). Ingenuity and innovation³⁸ have no merit of their own when they appear in the context of methodological misorientation.

2.5.5 Back to the *Politics* II 6

Now, when confronted with the aggregate of all the above shortcomings, one might reasonably wonder what claim words such as *peritton*, *kompson*, *kainotomon* and *zētētikon* can lay to fineness. If they are not to be understood as mere conveyors of irony or pejorative meanings, they should instead be taken as pointing us back to the beginning of Book II of the *Politics* and the introductory methodological statement that we discussed at the outset of this section (pp. 59–60 above). On this view, the words (a) *peritton*, (b) *kompson*, (c) *kainotomon* and (d) *zētētikon* seem to acquire an overlay of affirmative signification ((a) 'extraordinary' or 'striking', (b) 'ingenious' or 'elegant', (c) 'innovative' and (d) 'inquisitive', respectively) when the processes of inquiry to which they refer are strictly motivated by the exigency of constructing a well-founded and truth-oriented theoretical account. Under other motivational circumstances, however, they take on a rather negative cast, meaning, respectively, (a) 'superfluous', (b) 'subtle', (c) 'unorthodox' or 'off-centre' and (d) 'meddlesome', 'prying' or 'over-curious'. In these latter cases, preference must be given to qualities opposite to those generally denoted by *peritton*, *kompson*, *kainotomon* and *zētētikon*, that is, ordinariness, crudeness, conventionality and non-inquisitiveness (cf. p. 56 above). It can reasonably be suggested, therefore, (a) that in his frequent use of *kompōs* in somewhat negative contexts, Aristotle intends to alert inquisitive minds to the danger of motivational disarray; and, accordingly, (b) that words such as *peritton*, *kompson*, *kainotomon* and *zētētikon* are best understood as pointing to some sort of inquisitive self-restriction (by serving as good indicators of methodological boundaries in inquiry).

³⁸ Note the use of ἀναγκαῖον at 1290b26, which may be thought to recall an earlier, latent contrast between κεκαινοτόμηκεν and ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων (II 7.1266a35–36).

3. The Hippocratics

From the preceding analysis we can conclude that *kompsos* and its derivatives are used by Aristotle as clear markers of necessary and appropriate self-limitation in relation to one's method of inquiry, way of speaking and approach to dissemination of knowledge. When something or someone who is labelled as *kompsos* does not conform to such limitations, this labelling occurs in contexts such as the following:

1. Very frequently, those who speak *kompōs* cannot be credited with speaking the truth.
2. In many cases a *kompsos logos* proves to be a 'harmonious' but untruthful account, which has been constructed in a sophistic way in order ingeniously to transform an *alogos* account into a *eulogos* one.
3. When it does not follow the proper succession of methodological steps in its formulation (i.e. starting from a set of correctly observed facts and then constructing a theory), an account can be characterised as *kompsos*. Moreover, a methodologically proper process of inquiry must supersede any motivational zetetic force that drives one away from the path leading towards truth. *Zētēsis* is acceptable only when it is driven by a pure motivation to reveal a hidden truth. When this is not the case, the inquiry process might be portrayed as *kompseuma*.
4. Sophisticated formulation, structural complexity and features that aim at mere extraneous ornamentation are likely to indicate an argument spoken *kompōs*. In light of this, a cruder argument can lay claim to reasonableness, so long as it does not conflict with the facts of nature.

The central question that now arises – which connects directly to our initial puzzlement regarding Aristotle's attribution of *kompsos* to physicians in the epilogue of *On Respiration* – is whether the flaws signalled by the presence of *kompsos* in the contexts we have already seen are likely to have been attributed to physicians, and specifically to the way in which they conducted their inquiries and communicated their results to others (whether professionals or the wider public). There is a plethora of evidence in ancient Greek literature that may be of use in this regard. Reproach is a well-developed means of persuasion in the Hippocratic texts while the language of rhetoric is so common as to be almost routine, employed for didactic purposes, for the defence of the medical *technē* or, more frequently (and without excluding the previous two), for the pursuit of polemics against rivals.³⁹

Ancient physicians were often asked to prove their competence by presenting their skills in public (a sort of *dokimasia*).⁴⁰ At the beginning of *On the Art of Medicine*, the author accuses some doctors of showing off their knowledge: 'There are some who make an art of demeaning the arts, so they think, not achieving the result I just mentioned, but rather making a display (ἐπίδειξιν) of their special 'skill''.⁴¹ To make

³⁹ See Agarwalla (2010); Lo Presti (2010). Cf. Horstmanshoff (1990) 195: 'Ancient physicians were above all craftsmen. Nevertheless the more ambitious among them cloaked over the manual aspects of their art and explained away the remuneration for their services with the help of rhetoric'.

⁴⁰ Harris (2016) 29 and 32.

⁴¹ 1.1 Jouanna. Quotations of *On the Art of Medicine* follow Jouanna (1988). Trans. Mann (2012). Cf. his comments *ad loc.* regarding the work's 'rhetorical resemblance to eminent members of the sophistic family' (p. 66).

things worse, some others seem to have ‘enriched’ their displays with features foreign to the art of medicine in order to create a favourable impression in their audience. The author of the *Precepts*, a later work probably dating to the 1st-2nd cent. AD according to Ecce, seems to draw on personal experience when advising those who take part in such public activities not to include in their speech citations from the poets:

And if for the sake of a crowded audience you do wish to hold a lecture, not driven by an illaudable ambition (οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀκλεοῦς ἐπιθυμίας), at least avoid all citations from the poets, for to quote them argues feeble industry (ἀδυναμίην γὰρ ἐμφαίνει φιλοπονίης). For I forbid in medical practice an industry not pertinent to the art, and laboriously far-fetched (μετὰ πόνου ἱστοροεμένην), and which therefore has in itself alone an attractive grace (αἴρεσιν ... χαρίεσσαν). For you will show the same willingness as the drone to work (περιποιήσει γὰρ κηφήνος [...] ἔτοιμοκοπήν) (8.3 Ecce). (trans. Jones, modified)⁴²

Plato’s *Gorgias* depicts another (probably conjectural) sort of public display, one between a doctor and an orator, which gives the famous master of rhetoric the opportunity to boast once more to Socrates:

Many a time I’ve gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn’t make any showing at all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished (456b–c). (trans. Zeyl)⁴³

This passage reveals Gorgias’ belief in the power of his art and its superiority over crafts involving manual skill. At the same time, however, it is indicative of the skills a physician was expected to possess if he wanted to maintain his reputation and a competitive profile. Galen, especially in his early career, must have been a model physician of this kind.⁴⁴

The examples discussed so far underscore the tendency of some physicians to promote themselves as exceedingly capable and effective. The medical profession was highly competitive, despite the difficult working conditions, the often inadequate therapeutic approach adopted by some of them, and the doctors’ co-existence with other kinds of healers and other kinds of *iatro*- occupations (such as *iatraleiptai*, *iatroklustai*, *iatromaiai*, *iatromathēmatikoi* and *iatromanteis*).⁴⁵ Leaving these

⁴² Cf. 9 Ecce. The passage quoted is taken from Ecce (2016). Trans. Jones (1923).

⁴³ Zeyl (1997). Dodds (1959) 211 supports the view that this comparison between an orator and a physician must have been pursued by the historical Gorgias (cf. *Hel.* 14), and, even beyond him, by Aeschylus (cf. *P.V.* 380).

⁴⁴ Hankinson (2008) 11–13; Rocca (2003) 173–74 n. 8 and 9.

⁴⁵ See Harris (2016) 18. Cf. *Places in Man* 41.1–2 Craik: ‘It is not possible to learn medicine quickly for this reason: that it is impossible for any fixed expertise to come about in it, such as when a person who has learned writing in the one way by which it is taught knows everything. And all who

competing kinds of healers aside, medical professionals were very frequently observed to differentiate themselves from one another with regard to their recommendations concerning the most effective treatment for particular ailments. One of the best-known texts that points in this direction is the Hippocratic *On Ancient Medicine*, which opens as follows:

All those who have undertaken to speak or write about medicine, having laid down as a hypothesis for their account (αὐτοὶ ἐωντοῖσιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ) hot or cold or wet or dry or anything else they want, narrowing down the primary cause of diseases and death for human beings and laying down (ὑποθέμενοι) the same one or two things as the cause in all cases, clearly go wrong in much that they say (καταφανεῖς εἰσιν ἀμαρτάνοντες). But they are especially worthy of blame (μάλιστα δὲ ἄξιον μέμψασθαι) because their errors concern an art that really exists, one which all people make use of in the most important circumstances and whose good craftsmen and practitioners all hold in special honor. Some practitioners are bad (φλαῦροι), while others are much better (οἱ δὲ πολλὸν διαφέροντες). [...] For this reason I have deemed that medicine has no need of a newfangled hypothesis (καινῆς ὑποθέσιος) [...] (1.1–2 & 1.3 Jouanna). (trans. Schiefsky [2005])

Here the Hippocratic author, as Armand D’Angour claims, hints at theories that assume a fixed number of elements underlying human health, and rejects them as both arbitrary and reductive. The reason for this rejection is that the healing art rests on a long-established set of empirical practices, and these should also be used to guide future research. In D’Angour’s words, ‘The terms in which the author rejects the value of novelty are polemical, but his insistent repudiation of *to kainon* draws attention to how intellectual innovations were popularly promoted and received. Rhetoric was inescapable, since the uses of novelty and its evaluation remained a matter of debate rather than proof. Physicians were not just practical healers; they had to be able to expound their methods in a manner that was meant to impress and persuade. They also needed to create a new technical terminology, something that seemed as reprehensible to Plato as the physical conditions described’.⁴⁶

Immediately after, and not coincidentally, D’Angour goes on to cite the following passage from Plato’s *Republic*:

ὀνόματα τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομμοῦς Ἀσκληπιάδας (III 405d4–5)

have knowledge (of writing) have like knowledge for this reason, that the same thing, done in the same way, now and at other times, would never become the opposite, but is always [steadfastly] the same and does not require discrimination. But medicine now and at other times does not do the same thing; and does opposite things to the same individual; and the same things are opposites to one another’. Text and translation are taken from Craik (1998). Cf. also *On Ancient Medicine* 9.3–4 Jouanna: ‘Wherefore it is laborious to make knowledge so exact (ἀκριβῶς) that only small mistakes are made (σικκρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν) here and there. And that physician who makes only small mistakes would win my hearty praise (ἰσχυρῶς ἐπαινέοιμι). Perfectly exact truth (τὸ δὲ ἀτρεκέες) is but rarely to be seen. For most physicians seem to me to be in the same case as bad pilots [...]’. Trans. Schiefsky (2005). The text follows Jouanna (1990).

⁴⁶ D’Angour (2011) 55. Cf. Schiefsky (2005) 25, 135–36.

[...] so that sophisticated Asclepiad doctors are forced to come up with names [...] (trans. Grube, rev. Reeve)⁴⁷

As the text makes clear, this group of physicians, who are presented as *kompsoi* by Plato, is called upon to invent new terms for new diseases caused by a particular, rather obnoxious, lifestyle. Yet the attribution *kompsos* is also a suggestively censorious reference to the Asclepiads,⁴⁸ inducing a strong reaction to *to kainon*, which in fact stands at the centre of Plato's criticism (405c8–406e5). Specifically, (a) the ability of these physicians to contrive new terms to convey as yet unfamiliar concepts; (b) the very process of name-giving which is here described as resulting from a strong propensity to look beyond the confines of their science; (c) the crossing of disciplinary boundaries which sets their particular field of science on new paths but is unavoidably linked to *polupragmosunē* (406c4–5); and, finally, (d) their proclivities for innovation leading to a break with established practices or patterns. All these become subject to a subtle form of criticism that recalls the train of thought pursued by the author of *On Ancient Medicine*.⁴⁹

Likewise, the author of *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* starts his work with an analogous polemic against rival doctors, specifically those who wrote the *Cnidian Sentences*:

Yet the many phases and subdivisions of each disease were not unknown to some; but though they wished clearly to set forth (σάφα ἐθέλοντες φράζειν) the number of each kind of illness their account was incorrect (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγραψαν). For the number will be almost incalculable if a patient's disease be diagnosed as different whenever there is a difference in the symptoms, while a mere variety of name is supposed to constitute a variety of the illness (3.2 Joly). (trans. Jones)⁵⁰

Again, one of the accusations levelled here is that some physicians began to invent new names for already existent diseases whenever they observed variations in symptoms. This tendency is deemed to be incorrect by the Hippocratic author, despite the fact that these healers were driven by the motivation to present their account with clarity.⁵¹

The invention of new names for diseases was not the only practice through which some physicians provocatively demonstrated their 'art'. Some also attempted to persuade their clients of an imperative need to take action even in cases in which a sick person could be healed without prescribing any particular professional regimen,

⁴⁷ Grube, rev. Reeve (1997). The text quoted refers to Slings (2003). Cf. Moeris s.v. κομψούς: κομψούς Πλάτων οὐ τοὺς πανούργους ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους (Hansen [1998] 111).

⁴⁸ Cf. Tuozzo (2011) 110.

⁴⁹ Cf. Thucydides II 49.3: 'and vomits of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued' (trans. Forster Smith [1928²]) and Schiefsky (2005) 41. Cf. also Pl. *Statesman* 284e11–285b6 and the discussion of *kompsoi* and their shortcomings by Barney (2021) 129–34.

⁵⁰ Jones (1952). The text is taken from Joly (1972).

⁵¹ Cf. *On the Art of Medicine* 2.3 Jouanna: 'For it's absurd – not to mention impossible – to think that forms grow out of names (ἄλογον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ εἶδη βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀδύνατον): names for nature are conventions imposed by and upon nature, whereas forms are not conventions but outgrowths (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα φύσιος νομοθετήματά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ εἶδη οὐ νομοθετήματα, ἀλλὰ βλαστήματα)'. (trans. Mann [2012])

and in which a conventional treatment, obvious to almost everyone, would restore the patient to a healthy state. The author of *On Fractures* describes such a case with disarming honesty:

In dislocations and fractures, the practitioner should make extensions in as straight a line as possible, for this is most conformable with nature; but if it inclines at all to either side, it should turn towards pronation (palm down) rather than supination (palm up), for the error is less (ἐλάσσων γὰρ ἢ ἀμαρτὰς). Indeed, those who have no preconceived idea (οἱ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν προβουλευόνται) make no mistake as a rule, for the patient himself holds out the arm for bandaging in the position impressed on it by conformity with nature. The theorizing practitioners are just the ones who go wrong (οἱ δὲ ἰητροὶ σοφίζόμενοι δῆθεν ἔστιν ἄρα ἐφ' οἷς ἀμαρτάνουσι). In fact the treatment of a fractured arm is not difficult, and is almost any practitioner's job, but I have to (ἀναγκάζομαι) write a good deal about it because I know practitioners who have got credit for wisdom (σοφούς δόξαντας εἶναι) by putting up arms in positions which ought rather to have given them a name for ignorance (ἀφ' ὧν ἀμαθείας αὐτοὺς ἐχρῆν δοκεῖν εἶναι). And many other parts of this art are judged thus: for they praise what seems outlandish (ξενοπρεπέες) before they know whether it is good, rather than the customary which they already know to be good; the bizarre rather than the obvious (τὸ ἀλλόκοτον ἢ τὸ εὐδηλον). One must mention then those errors of practitioners as to the nature of the arm on which I want to give positive and negative instruction, for this discourse is an instruction on other bones of the body also (1). (trans. Withington)⁵²

Criticism of 'errors' permeates the text, and this criticism is rather intense.⁵³ The author not only presents us with two distinct categories of physicians distinguished by reference to their probability of falling into error (beginners or those who pass medical judgements drawn on accumulated experience, on the one hand, and *sophizomenous*, on the other), but also with gradations of errors (cf. ἐλάσσων γὰρ ἢ ἀμαρτὰς), a view which is in complete accord with what we saw in *On Ancient Medicine*.⁵⁴ To complicate things even further there were also healers who did not even realise that they erred,⁵⁵ as can be seen, for example, in this description from *On Regimen IV*:

[Diviners interpret symptoms] sometimes with, sometimes without success (τὰ μὲν τυγχάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνουσι). But in neither case do they know the cause, either of their success or of their failure. They recommend precautions to be taken to prevent harm, yet they give no instruction (οὐ διδάσκουσιν) how to

⁵² Text and translation are drawn from Withington (1948).

⁵³ The typology of errors in the Hippocratic Corpus, among other things, is presented in considerable detail in Lo Presti (2010).

⁵⁴ *On Ancient Medicine* 9.3–4 (see n. 45).

⁵⁵ See e.g. *On Ancient Medicine* 15.1–2 Jouanna; *On the Nature of Man* 1.2–3 Jouanna; *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* 44.1 Joly.

take precautions, but only recommend (κελεύουσι) prayers to the gods (87.2 Joly-Byl).⁵⁶

The passage has been astutely clarified by Lo Presti: ‘The author highlights the disastrous outcome which results from the superimposition of two different orders of technical knowledge: one relating to the interpretation of dreams of a divine nature, the other to dreams of a ‘psychosomatic’ nature. The forced extension of a single explicative framework to cover two different dream typologies produces a condition of *atechnia*⁵⁷, the most serious symptom of which is not, in my view, the fact that one sometimes errs, but the fact that one never understands the reason behind either success or error. On the other hand, a cognitive relation with the patient which is not limited to vehement exhortation and even less to authoritarian command, may be generated in those cases in which the practitioner is able to identify the degree to which his judgement, his actions and the reality of the circumstance in which he is called to intervene, actually correspond, and in those cases where he is able to propose himself as the active agent of knowledge, capable of elaborating strategies of rational control over his own procedure and of recommending similar strategies which might be understood by the patient’. ([2010] 155–56)

Another way of astonishing the public and patients was through the use of ‘exotic’ drugs.⁵⁸ Non-specialist patients, after having been impressed by an encounter with some extraordinary ‘medical’ practice or prescription, often showed a great interest in this novel treatment as a possible therapeutic measure in their own case, despite being unqualified to evaluate the practitioner’s use of the treatment:

Now laymen do not accurately distinguish those who are excellent in this respect from their fellows, but rather praise or blame strange remedies (ἑτεροίων ... ἰημάτων). For in very truth there is strong evidence that it is in the proper treatment of these illnesses that ordinary folk show their most stupid side (ἄσυνετώτατοι αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν), in the fact that through these diseases chiefly quacks get the reputation of being physicians (οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἰητροὶ ἰητροὶ δοκέουσιν εἶναι μάλιστα διὰ ταύτας τὰς νόσους). For it is an easy matter to learn the names of the remedies usually given to patients in such diseases. If barley-water be mentioned, or such and such a wine, or hydromel, laymen think

⁵⁶ Trans. Jones (1953). The text quoted refers to Joly–Byl (2003).

⁵⁷ Cf. *On the Art of Medicine* 5.5–6 Jouanna: ‘The mistakes of medicine, too, no less than the benefits, are testimonies to its being. For what is beneficial brings benefit through correct application, while what is harmful causes harm through incorrect application. And where the correct and incorrect each has its own determination, how could this not be art? There is artlessness, I claim, where there is neither correctness nor incorrectness; but where each of these is present, the work of artlessness would be absent’ (trans. Mann [2012]) and Pl. *Republic* I 340d–e: ‘I think that we express ourselves in words that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an accountant, or a grammarian. But each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never errs, so that, according to the precise account (and you are a stickler for precise accounts), no craftsman ever errs. It’s when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and in regard to that error he is no craftsman (ἐπλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός)’. Text and translation, as n. 47. The examples are discussed in Lo Presti (2010) 141.

⁵⁸ For examples of unusual practices and exotic *materia medica*, see Harris (2016) 51–55. Cf. *ibid.* p. 13: ‘[...] even illustrious members of the profession sometimes strayed outside the limits of therapies that the stricter members observed’.

that physicians, good and bad alike, prescribe all the same things. But it is not so, and there are great differences between physicians in these respects (*On Regimen in Acute Diseases* 6 Joly).⁵⁹

In addition, in the Hippocratic texts we find references to therapeutic methods which took the form of spectacles, in that they seem to have had the same effect as theatrical performances. A very suggestive passage from *On Joints* is particularly interesting in this respect:

When the hump-back is due to a fall, attempts at straightening rarely succeed. For, to begin with, succussions on a ladder (αἰ ἐν τῇ κλίμακι κατασεΐσεις) never straightened any case, so far as I know, and the practitioners who use this method are chiefly those who want to make the vulgar herd gape (ἐκχαυνοῦν τὸν πολλὸν ὄχλον), for to such it seems marvellous to see a man suspended or shaken or treated in such ways; and they always applaud these performances, never troubling themselves about the result of the operation, whether bad or good. As to the practitioners who devote themselves to this kind of thing, those at least whom I have known are incompetent (σκαιοί). Yet the contrivance is an ancient one, and for my part I have great admiration for the man who first invented it, or thought out any other mechanism in accordance with nature; for I think it is not hopeless, if one has proper apparatus (καλῶς σκευάσας) and does the succussion properly (καλῶς κατασεΐσειε), that some cases may be straightened out. For myself, however, I felt ashamed (κατησχύνθην) to treat all such cases in this way, and that because such methods appertain rather to charlatans (ἀπατεῶνων) (42). (text and trans. Withington [1948])⁶⁰

This rather bizarre attitude of certain physicians, which often proved to be frivolous and fruitless, was one of the most significant contributing factors in the gradual development of an unfavourable picture of the art of medicine. This negative image of their profession is repeatedly criticised by medical experts themselves, as, for example, in the prologue of the Hippocratic *Law*:

Medicine is the most distinguished of all the arts, but through the ignorance (ἀμαθίην) of those who practise it, and of those who casually judge such

⁵⁹ Trans. Jones (1952). Cf. *Precepts* 3.3 Ecce (2016): ‘And yet some patients ask for what is out of the way (ξενοπρεπές) instead of what is ordinary, through prejudice, deserving indeed to be disregarded, but not to be punished’. (trans. Jones [1923], modified)

⁶⁰ Cf. later in chapter 48: ‘For my part, I know of no method (μηχανήν) for reducing such an injury, unless succussion on the ladder may possibly be of use, or other such extension treatment as was described a little above. I have no pressure apparatus combined with extension, which might make pressure reduction, as did the plank in the case of humpback. For how could one use force from the front through the body cavity? It is impossible. Certainly neither coughs nor sneezings have any power to assist extension, nor indeed would inflation of air into the body cavity be able to do anything. Nay more, the application of large cupping instruments (σικύαι), with the idea of drawing out the depressed vertebrae, is a great error of judgment (μεγάλη ἀμαρτὰς γνώμης), for they push in rather than draw out; and it is just this which those who apply them fail to see. For the larger the instrument applied, the more the patients hollow their backs, as the skin is drawn together and upwards. I might mention other modes of extension, besides those related above, which would appear more suitable to the lesion; but I have no great faith in them (οὐ κάρτα πιστεύω αὐτοῖσι), and therefore do not describe them’.

practitioners, it is now of all the arts by far the least esteemed (πολύ τι ... ἀπολείπεται). The chief reason for this error seems to me to be this: medicine is the only art which our states have made subject to no penalty save that of dishonour, and dishonour does not wound those who are compacted of it. Such men in fact are very like the supernumeraries in tragedies. Just as these have the appearance, dress and mask of an actor without being actors, so too with physicians; many are physicians by repute, very few are such in reality (1 Heiberg). (trans. Jones)⁶¹

The analogy between bad medical practitioners and actors who play no real role in the action of a play might seem too strong an accusation. Yet the Hippocratic *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* provides another analogy which sounds even more bitter. According to the author, some doctors resemble those engaged in augury (or hepatoscopy) who make speculative claims by observing the direction in which birds fly. In both cases, as can be induced from these passages, lay people are helpless and lack confidence in the medical art and those who represent it:

Yet the art as a whole has a very bad name (διαβολήν ... μεγάλην) among laymen, so that there is thought to be no art of medicine at all. Accordingly, since among practitioners there will prove to be so much difference of opinion about acute diseases that the remedies which one physician gives in the belief that they are the best are considered by a second to be bad, laymen are likely to object to such that their art resembles divination; for diviners too think that the same bird, which they hold to be a happy omen on the left, is an unlucky one when on the right, while other diviners maintain the opposite. The inspection of entrails shows similar anomalies in its various departments (8.1.2 Joly). (trans. Jones [1952])

Now, physicians like those described in the passages discussed in this section could easily be labelled ‘*kompsoi*’, in as much as they are all distinguished by at least some of the negative features we have identified in the Aristotelian passages examined in Section 2. Although in the epilogue of *On Respiration* Aristotle specifically targets not all kinds of physicians but only those who tend to make use of the principles of natural philosophy, it is hard to deny that Aristotle has in mind here the further subset of those who practice the medical art ‘in a different, non-typical way’. Admittedly, our task would be easier if there been an explicit reference to *kompsoi* in the Hippocratic texts that have come down to us. In fact, there is a passage from *On Joints*, one of the oldest surviving texts of the Hippocratic Corpus, in which we find a derivative of *kompsoi* in a particularly illuminating context:

Dislocation of the thigh at the hip should be reduced as follows, if it is dislocated inwards. It is a good (ἀγαθή) and correct (δικαίη) method, and in accord with nature (κατὰ φύσιν), and one too that has something striking about it (ἀγωνιστικόν), which pleases a dilettante (κομψευόμενος) in such matters. One should suspend the patient by his feet from a cross-beam with a band [...] (70). (trans. Withington [1948])

⁶¹ Cf. 4 Heiberg. Trans. Jones (1952). The text is taken from Heiberg (1927).

The text of *On Joints* was systematically commented upon in antiquity.⁶² For our present purposes, it suffices to cite Galen's comment:

Displaying some form of witty knavery (τὸ χαριέντως τι πανουργεῖν) is usually called κομψεύεσθαι by the Attics; this is exactly the sense in which Hippocrates uses the word κομψευόμενος here (18a.737.11–13 Kühn). (trans. ours; cf. Erotianus s.v. κομψευόμενος, Nachmanson [1918] 53)

The author of *On Joints* prescribes his therapeutic method as an ideal remedy for the unhealthy condition described in the text. He does this based on three preliminary criteria: (a) it is good and correct, i.e. effective as a treatment of the particular dislocation and thus beneficial to the patient; (b) it is in accordance with nature, i.e. it is congenial to and convenient for the human body *qua* natural body (as the author explains throughout the remainder of the chapter); (c) it is *agōnistikon*, i.e. it has something impressive about it, in that it is capable of triggering a sense of suspense that is similar to the effect produced in contests, and for this reason it is pleasant to a *kompseuomenos* in such matters. If we add to our account Galen's own comment, then a *kompseuomenos* observer would be pleased to see that this method would eventually highlight a degree of knavery on the part of its extoller.

4. *Kompsos* in the epilogue of *On Respiration*

We can now return to the concluding section of *On Respiration* and to our initial questions about its use of *kompsos*:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων. περὶ δὲ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν. ἧ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ ἧ διαφέροντα θεωροῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε σύνορος ἢ πραγματεία μέχρι τινός ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον· τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ καὶ περίεργοι λέγουσιν τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσιν λαμβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγματευθέντων οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἰατρικὰς (27 [21].480b21–30).⁶³

As has been observed,⁶⁴ there is a great deal of similarity in wording between this passage and another found in the short collection of treatises into the science of nature

⁶² See Craik (2015) 109–10.

⁶³ For translation, see p. 50. This passage is sometimes very reasonably cited as a parallel to *Protreptic* B46 Düring. There Aristotle compares doctors who are sophisticated (*kompsoi*) with good legislators, noting the experience both have with nature: ‘Just as the doctors who are sophisticated and most of those concerned with athletic training pretty much agree that those who are to be good doctors or athletic trainers must be experienced about nature, so good legislators must be experienced about nature too, indeed much more than the former. For some are craftsmen of virtue only in the body while others, being concerned with the virtues of the soul and pretending to be an expert in the success and failure of the state, also have much more need of philosophy’. (trans. Hutchinson and Johnson [2017]) However, even here Aristotle seems to give us a wink when he uses *prospoioumenoi* to allude to an act of pretense which the legislators find necessary in order to achieve their ultimate goal, i.e. infusing virtue into the soul of the citizens.

⁶⁴ Van der Eijk (2005) 193–94.

known as *Parva Naturalia*. The passage in question is found at the beginning of *On Sense and Sensible Objects*:

φυσικοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου τὰς πρώτας ἰδεῖν ἀρχάς· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγίαιαν οὔτε νόσον οἶόν τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς. διὸ σχεδὸν τῶν περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρωσ τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται [περὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς] (1.436a17–b1).⁶⁵

The analogy between physicians and students of nature is presented here in a context that is highly reminiscent of the conclusion of *On Respiration*. If we suppose that Aristotle refers to the same group of physicians, then the *kompsoi* (and *periergoi*) *iatroi* of *On Respiration* are (according to *On Sense and Sensible Objects*) those doctors who pursue their art more philosophically. That is to say, they are prone or inclined to inquire philosophically into things, inquisitive minds who busy themselves with acquiring knowledge of the whole body,⁶⁶ doctors of ingenuity and refinement⁶⁷ who do not hesitate to cross the boundaries of their discipline in search of new knowledge.

Yet it still remains true that these doctors' art rests upon some kind of 'transitional' knowledge (*metiontes*), and, as such, is constantly subject to reconfiguration or review – a situation that unavoidably involves a major pitfall. Among the *kompsoi iatroi* who lay claim to truths about nature and think they have a right to derive their principles from the study of nature, some either speak inanities or utter sheer nonsense in a bid to satisfy their audiences' desire for pleasure, being totally, and repulsively,⁶⁸ unconcerned with truth. Others have philosophical interests that are restricted to the refined technical banalities with which their expertise is eventually equated, going no further in their philosophical approach than the non-specialists of the general population (this idea, we suggest, may be among the key concepts that underlie *On Divination in Sleep* 1.463a4–7⁶⁹).

Kompsoi, thus, seems to be assigned a double role: (a) to distinguish philosophical from non- (or less) philosophical doctors, applauding the former's proclivity to endorse or apply procedures which are aligned with those of the students of nature; and (b) to flag Aristotle's alertness to, and criticism of, those refined but pseudo-philosophical doctors who sophistically assert themselves to be groundbreaking inquirers but eventually prove to be mere pleasure-yielding, idle talkers.

⁶⁵ 'But it behoves the natural scientist to obtain also a clear view of the first principles of health and disease, inasmuch as neither *health* nor *disease* can exist in lifeless things. Indeed we may say of most physical inquirers, and of those physicians who study their art more philosophically, that while the former complete their works with a disquisition on medicine, the latter start from a consideration of nature' (emphasis in the original). Trans. Beare (1984).

⁶⁶ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* I 13.1102a21–23: τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν – note the echo here of *polupragmosunē* (cf. p. 67 above). The passage quoted is taken from Bywater (1894).

⁶⁷ On *charientes*, cf. van der Eijk (2005) 193.

⁶⁸ Cf. pp. 61–62 above. Note that what is implied here is that in such cases *charieis*, 'charming' or 'graceful', proves to denote aspects of the exact opposite quality.

⁶⁹ For a coherent interpretation of the passage, see van der Eijk (1994) 271–73; van der Eijk (2005) 192–93.

5. Concluding remarks

Kompsos thus shows itself to be a flexible term that can adjust to different, sometimes opposing, semantico-pragmatic requirements. To be sure, in Aristotle's hands *kompsos* becomes a tool of both praise and criticism: it may be used to approve of ingenious or innovative advances, while still being critical of them; it may encourage interdisciplinarity, while still being sceptical or polemical of its transgressions. Its overarching purpose is to identify boundaries when the methods a person adopts in the construction of a theoretical account are not motivated by a genuine desire to search for truth, or when they may unknowingly be in a state of confusion with respect to the proper route to the truth. *Kompsos* is also intended to function as a verbal expression that points to the necessity of *imposing* limits upon inquisitive enterprises when one's motivation for putting forward a certain account is far from being truth-oriented, and *sophizesthai* – 'displaying ingeniousness' or 'dealing in subtleties' (cf. pp. 59–60 above) – is sought as an end in itself. If none of the above cases hold, and methods and motives are geared purely towards the discovery of truth, then it may reasonably be inferred that grace, charm and wit (i.e. the *charis* of *charientes*) come about as the natural consequence of a truth-oriented account.

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Aeneas the Tactician's Authorial Strategies in the *Poliiorcetica*

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Abstract

For decades, Aeneas the Tactician's *Poliiorcetica* was considered to be among those ancient technical works whose apparent lack of stylistic ornamentation or emotional appeal was thought to deprive them of staking their claims to rhetoric and persuasion. More recent scholars, however, have begun to challenge this view. Following this lead, my aim in the present paper is twofold. The first is to explore, decode and analyse some of the main pillars upon which Aeneas' authorial strategy in the *Poliiorcetica* is built. The second is to disassemble a select number of Aeneas' authorial structures and identify how they work. It will be argued that behind the composition of this treatise stands an author who displays serious interest in infusing his text with strong literary, didactic and communicative elements. In shining further light on the formal aspects of the *Poliiorcetica*, my ultimate aim is to urge more strongly the need to re-consider and re-evaluate the rhetorical background of Greek and Roman technical prose.

Introduction

The inclusion of a paper dealing with Aeneas the Tactician and his military manual entitled *Poliiorcetica*¹ in a volume devoted to the rhetoric of ancient scientific discourse might at first sight seem strange. Perhaps the first question that might arise is: what qualifies tactics as a 'science'? Or even: how can a tactical handbook be regarded as a scientific treatise, or, in general, as forming a part of a body of scientific knowledge? An answer to these questions may be found in Aelian the Tactician (late 1st-early 2nd cent. AD), who preserves Aeneas' definition of tactics as 'the science of military movements'.² Could the kind of science contained in this definition somehow correspond to what we nowadays would call or recognise as 'science'/'scientific', that is, as having to do with some sort of observation, investigation, systematisation and theoretical explanation of certain phenomena? In the second half of the fifth century BC, Zhmud³ claims, most activities involving skills based on knowledge and experience were subsumed under the notion of τέχνη.⁴ The same name, τέχνη, was assigned to the kind of prose that was gradually developed under the influence of

¹ Aeneas' handbook, as Formisano (2009) 352 claims, conventionally bears the title *Poliiorcetica*, which in reality was to constitute a part of a much more extensive text, perhaps entitled *Στρατηγικά*, comprising at least three other parts (*Παρασκευαστική βιβλος* [on which see 7.4, 8.5, 21.1 and 40.8], *Ποριστική βιβλος* [on which see 14.2] and *Στρατοπεδευτική βιβλος* [on which see 21.2]; cf. n. 54), to which Aeneas himself refers in the portion of the surviving work. See also 352–53 n. 14; Bettalli (1990) 10–12; Vela Tejada-García (1991) 19–20; Cuomo (2007) 64–65 n. 102; Burliga (2008) 93.

² Ὅρον δὲ αὐτῆς ἔθεντο Αἰνεΐας μὲν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι πολεμικῶν κινήσεων [...] (*Τακτικὴ θεωρία* iii.4.1-3 Köchly & Rüstow); cf. Oldfather (1923) 2.

³ (2006) 45.

⁴ See also Vela Tejada (2018) 116 n. 64.

Socrates and the sophists –⁵ didactic handbooks that were concerned with practical knowledge and had their roots in Ionic scientific prose of the second half of the fifth century BC. Accordingly, this technical prose, represented in the fourth century BC by such technical works as Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* or Aeneas the Tactician's *Poliorcetica*, has been singled out by Thesleff⁶ as being characterised by a moderately consistent and wide application of the so-called 'scientific style', which Thesleff defines as 'a continuous, systematic, and discursive, though non-rhetorical and non-emotional prose'.⁷ Nearly half a century after the publication of Thesleff's article, studies have shown that an ancient technical work's apparent lack of stylistic ornamentation or emotional appeal does not necessarily deprive it of staking its claim to rhetoric and persuasion,⁸ especially when we use the term 'rhetoric' to refer to a set of techniques, strategies and procedures employed for the production of texts with a view to accommodating communicative purposes.⁹ I will leave aside the question of the extent to which a technical text applies, if at all, the technique of emotional appeal, although the preface of the *Poliorcetica*, as will be shown below (pp. 81–82), appears to challenge Thesleff's (and Vela Tejada's)¹⁰ claim. I will rather dwell a little further on the element of communication, on which there seems to be a consensus among scholars: the defining characteristics of τέχναι are practical utility and expert audience-orientedness.¹¹ Dissemination of specialist knowledge, at a time when the need for expertise is steadily increasing,¹² now becomes a central goal of a technical treatise.

The above considerations are not intended to delve deeper into issues relating to the causes of the development of written prose and the gradual removal from oral transmission.¹³ Rather, they are aimed at emphasizing when and on what occasion the terms 'scientific' and 'technical' start to interrelate: that is, when τεχνίται begin to use the principles, language, style and practices of 'older' 'scientific' prose. One such example is Aeneas the Tactician: his *Poliorcetica*, despite the fact that in some places the connections between paragraphs or chapters may leave the impression of logical incoherence, and in others certain transitions may strike us as ill-marked, shows

⁵ See e.g. Oldfather (1923) 7; Zhmud (2006) 45; Formisano (2009) 354 (but cf. Thesleff [1966] 106; Burliga [2008] 94). See also Whitehead (1990) 34: 'It seems to have been in the last third of the fifth century – during the Peloponnesian war – that military expertise began to evolve from its origins as a loose-knit body of traditional wisdom and experience, passed on from father to son where it could not be absorbed from reading or listening to Homer, into a technical subject, a branch of formal education taught by sophists and other self-styled experts'. See also Formisano (2009) 354.

⁶ (1966) 107.

⁷ Cf. Vela Tejada (2018) 116, and 116 n. 65; Thesleff (1966) 89.

⁸ See e.g. Van der Eijk (1997); Fögen (2005); Taub-Doody (2009); Doody-Föllinger-Taub (2012); Taub (2017). Cf. also Asper (2007a); Asper (2013); Asper (2016); Formisano-Van der Eijk (2017).

⁹ Van der Eijk (1997) 77.

¹⁰ See n. 7.

¹¹ Vela Tejada (2018) 116 n. 66. Cf. Van der Eijk (1997) 93–99; Zhmud (2006) 45; Burliga (2008) 98; Formisano-Van der Eijk (2017) 1–2; Vela Tejada (2018) 117 n. 68.

¹² See Cuomo (2007) 67; Vela Tejada (2018) 116 n. 67.

¹³ For some detailed studies of these issues, see e.g. Havelock (1982); Thomas (1989); Yunis (2003); Asper (2007b). Cf. also Van der Eijk (1997) 93–99; Formisano-Van der Eijk (2017) 4–5; Vela Tejada (2018) 117 n. 68.

evidence of systematic planning.¹⁴ Aeneas' language displays a style consisting of amalgamation of argumentation that is typical of 'scientific' prose.¹⁵ Aeneas also shows a wide knowledge of literary tradition, cultivating prose by writing in Attic *koinē*, which provides a suitable ground for devising new technical terminology or specialised lexis¹⁶, and for achieving either exactness or abstractness of expression – both being 'typical tendencies' of a scientific style.¹⁷ The very fact, also, that in the fifth and fourth centuries BC there seems to be no clear distinction between 'science' and 'philosophy'¹⁸ should make us more cautious in the use of the terms 'science'/'scientific' when referring to what we would call 'scientific prose' of that time. Rather than projecting our modern-day experience onto the past and employing these terms strictly with reference to the systematic study of the nature of the physical universe, or, simply, to the systematic study of nature, it would perhaps be better, as has been suggested,¹⁹ to broaden the scope of their application to cover any attempt at studying and understanding the nature of things, and, subsequently, at fleshing out verbal expressions to communicate about the results of this enterprise with a certain audience. In view of this orientation, the semantic bonds developed between the terms 'scientific' and 'technical' become more firmly forged.

If one of the defining characteristics of the newly-created kind of prose, the technical treatise, is its inherent tendency to communicate knowledge to a specific audience, then a technical text should be seen as investing heavily in the ways in which this communication will be achieved, or, in other words,²⁰ in constructing its rhetorical, and hence literary²¹, nature and identity. From this perspective, Vela Tejada's²² insistence on Aeneas' use of both λέξις εἰρομένη and λέξις κατεστραμμένη, of such Gorgian figures as repetition and antithesis, as well as of μεταβολή (*Variatio*) deserves not only greater attention, but also to be considered in light of Aeneas' general authorial strategy, instead of merely being attributed to the carelessness of an unskilful writer.²³ Burliga's²⁴ and Formisano's²⁵ contributions should also be revisited with fresh eyes: the former highlights the rhetorical education of Aeneas, who shows conscious awareness of the rhetorical rules for creating an attractive but credible text, in order for persuasion to be effected; the latter, aiming to bring out the need to analyse the *Poliortetica* from both a historical and a literary perspective, focuses on what he calls 'strategies of authorisation' of Aeneas, whose purpose, according to Formisano, is twofold: to pass on his technical knowledge by

¹⁴ See Oldfather (1923) 10.

¹⁵ Vela Tejada (2018) 117.

¹⁶ See Hunter-Handford (1927) liii; Vela Tejada (2018) 114–15.

¹⁷ See Thesleff (1966) 89; Vela Tejada (2018) 115, and 115 n. 62.

¹⁸ Van der Eijk (1997) 77 n. 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Viz. according to the restrictive proviso of correlating 'rhetoric' with communication, added earlier in pp. 78–79.

²¹ This does not rule out the possibility that literariness may also result from processes other than rhetorical polish, such as textualisation of knowledge, see e.g. Formisano-Van der Eijk (2017) 13.

²² See (2018) 115.

²³ See e.g. Hunter-Handford (1927) lxxvii and lxxx. Cf. Bettalli (1986) 84; Bettalli (1990) 82, 84 and 211; Whitehead (1990) 98.

²⁴ (2008).

²⁵ (2009).

writing, and to authorise writing as the new medium for transmitting knowledge.²⁶ Following the lead of the aforementioned scholars, my aim in this paper is twofold. The first is to explore, decode and analyse some of the main pillars upon which Aeneas' authorial strategy in the *Poliorcetica* is built. By 'authorial strategy' I mean any elaborate, systematic and overarching plan or method for achieving communicative purposes, as well as any technique of developing and employing argumentative instruments to accomplish the goal of appearing most persuasive. The second is to disassemble a select number of Aeneas' authorial structures and identify how they work. Again, by 'authorial structures' I mean both the manner in which the elements of a textual entity are arranged and interrelated, and the final outcome of this procedure, the textual entity itself, which has been constructed of these elements. In shining further light on the formal aspects of the *Poliorcetica*, my ultimate aim is to urge more strongly the need to re-consider and re-evaluate the rhetorical background of Greek and Roman technical prose.

The Preface of the *Poliorcetica*: in defence of the things worth the most

Perhaps there is no stronger indication of the rhetorical²⁷ nature of this military handbook than its preface, which is worth citing, at least in part:

Τοῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, ἱερῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γονέων καὶ τέκνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἴσος οὐδὲ ὅμοιος ἀγὼν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σωθεῖσι μὲν καὶ καλῶς ἀμυναμένοις τοὺς πολεμίους φοβεροὺς τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ δυσεπιθέτους εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον εἶναι, κακῶς δὲ προσενεχθεῖσι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς σωτηρίας ὑπάρξει. Τοὺς οὖν ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτων καὶ τοιούτων μέλλοντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι οὐδεμιᾶς παρασκευῆς καὶ προθυμίας ἐλλίπεις εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων ἔργων πρόνοιαν ἐκτέον, ὅπως διὰ γε αὐτοὺς μηδὲν φανῶσι σφαλέντες.

But for those who are to incur peril in defence of what they most prize, shrines and country, parents and children, and all else, the struggle is not the same nor even similar. For if they save themselves by a stout defence against the foe, their enemies will be intimidated and disinclined to attack them in the future, but if they make a poor showing in the face of danger, **no hope of safety will be left. Those, therefore, who are to contend for all these precious stakes** must fail in no preparation and no effort, but must take thought

²⁶ See (2009) 354–55. To summarise Formisano's argument: a problem intimately connected with the new medium, during the transition from orality to writing, was to provide a justification, or, much better, an 'authorisation' to one's own text. Aeneas responds to this need by underlining his technical competence in military matters, while providing, at the same time, sufficient proof of the indispensability of the *Poliorcetica*, and, therefore, of writing itself. This attitude is in line with that of other 'technical' authors, who often in their works express the will to capture the reader's attention precisely through the same line of argumentation. Cf. Cuomo (2007) 62.

²⁷ Cf. Bettalli (1990) 211: 'E. [: Enea] può attingere ad una tradizione retorica già ricca [...]'. See also 212. Cf. also Burliga (2008) 94 n. 9.

for many and varied activities, so that a failure may at least not seem due to their own fault (Pr. 2–4).²⁸

Aeneas begins his treatise with a preface which appears to have been composed with especial care.²⁹ Some scholars³⁰ have argued that the effort to achieve a literary style is much more conspicuous here than anywhere else in the book. The sentences are carefully, even rhythmically, constructed, while there is much studied antithesis, balancing of phrases, and a preference for double expressions.³¹ This short foreword sounds like a powerful emotional appeal, in which Aeneas appears to address his readership's emotions in order to put them in the right frame of mind to decide on crucial matters in accord with his urging. Indeed, what is at stake here is of the utmost importance.³² In employing the locution *ιερῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γονέων καὶ τέκνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, that is, the *topos* of defending one's possessions, places of worship, family and homeland, Aeneas brings forward some of the most indispensable elements in any list of 'the fundamentals' which a Greek citizen-soldier would hold in high esteem.³³ Concepts like security, safety³⁴ and foresight, all making up the *topos* of the maximum effort to be produced in view of a decisive confrontation, and of the necessary preparation for it,³⁵ are meant to alert readers to the risk of jeopardizing not only the things they most value, but also their own honour. Following a literary tradition stemming from Homer (see e.g. *Il.* 2.297-8), Aeneas is seen here to recall the 'stigma' of (military) defeat or failure by underling the particular disgrace resulting from failure due to one's own fault, rather than to misfortune.³⁶ Yet his use of such emotionally-charged language seems further tailored to fit one ultimate, overarching, authorial purpose: to highlight that the only way to escape the present danger is through following this handbook's instructions to the letter. This produces a strong rhetorical effect which should be seen to spread throughout the whole work, as it justifies the purpose of its composition: Aeneas' *Poliorketica*, we are instructed, has been put into the service, or, much better, has undertaken the defence, of the most important values in an individual's life.

²⁸ All texts and translations are taken from the Loeb (1923) edition.

²⁹ Hunter-Handford (1927) 102; Whitehead (1990) 98.

³⁰ See Hunter-Handford (1927) 102, cf. lxxx; Bettalli (1990) 82, 84 and 211; Vela Tejada-García (1991) 29 n. 1; Whitehead (1990) 98.

³¹ Such as [...] οὐκ ἴσος οὐδὲ ὅμοιος, σωθεῖσι καὶ καλῶς ἀμυναμένοις, φοβεροῦς καὶ δυσεπιθέτους, παρασκευῆς καὶ προθυμίας, see Hunter-Handford (1927) 102.

³² The same idea – namely, that those who defend themselves risk much more than the attackers – is developed in e.g. Dem. 1.25–27, on which see Bettalli (1990) 211–12.

³³ See e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 402–405; Thuc. 7.69.2; Whitehead (1990) 98. Cf. also Isoc. 8.93 and Bettalli (1990) 212. On the failure to specify wives among these 'fundamentals', see Whitehead (1990) 98, and cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.56–57, 10.418–22, 15.496–99; Callin. 1.6–8; Aesch. *Pers.* 402–405; Thuc. 7.69.2; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 2; Polyb. 3.109.7.

³⁴ On the idea that Aeneas is here likely to accentuate rhetorically the possible consequences of a war, see Bettalli (1990) 212. On the concept 'safety', cf. also 11.10, 12.4 and 13.1–4.

³⁵ On this *topos*, see e.g. Thuc. 4.92.4; Vitr. 10.10.1. Cf. Bettalli (1990) 211; Whitehead (1990) 98.

³⁶ See Thuc. 5.111.3; Whitehead (1990) 98–99.

Foreseen actions, best options, and Aeneas' authorial intentions: bringing out the role of historical illustrations in the *Poliorcetica*

If one were to choose, apart from the above-mentioned chief signifiers of a certain value system, two notions for the position of the most potent intellectual instruments of the preface, exercising a significant ideological impact on the reception of the remainder of the text, these would be the notion of *the necessity of a foreseen action* and that of *the criticalness of choosing the best option among a set of available alternatives*. Indeed, these two notions appear to figure prominently throughout the text – the former being represented most frequently by such terms as δεῖ or χρῆ, the latter by the terms ἄριστον or κρεῖσσον –,³⁷ but, what is more interesting, at least for the scope of this study, is that they are time and again recalled thanks to a particular authorial technique: Aeneas' constant appeal to historical examples. Admittedly, the *Poliorcetica* is chiefly valuable as containing a large number of historical illustrations. However, my aim here is not to assess its value as a historical source. Rather, I want to draw attention to the functions these examples are meant to serve in order to retrieve Aeneas' authorial intentions in citing them.³⁸ Interestingly, judged *en masse*, Aeneas' appeals to historical examples appear to have principally shouldered the following tasks:

(a) the task of reinforcing why Aeneas' proposal or instruction is the best option available and must, as a consequence, be endorsed:

Ἄριστον δὲ τὰς ἀχρεῖους οὐσας εὐρυχωρίας ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἵνα μὴ σωμάτων εἰς αὐτὰς δέη, τυφλοῦν ταφρευόντα [...] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὴ, Θηβαίων ἐμβαλόντων, [...] Πλαταιεῖς δὲ [...]

And that there may be no need of troops to guard them, **it is best** to block up the useless open places in the city by digging ditches [...] So, when the Thebans had broken in, the Lacedaimonians [...] On another occasion, when the Plataeans [...] (2.1–2);

(b) the task of showing and convincing readers of the devastating consequences of the state of lacking knowledge relating to the proper course of action under siege:

Εὐθύτατα δεῖ αὐτοῖς πεποιῆσθαι σύσσημα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ἀγνοήσουσι τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτοῖς: ἤδη γὰρ τοιόνδε συνέβη. Χαλκίς ἡ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ [...]

As quickly as possible the besieged **must** be provided with signals, **so that they will not fail to recognize** those who approach them. For this is the sort of thing that has happened: Chalcis on the Euripus [...] (4.1–2);

³⁷ For the notion of *the necessity of a foreseen action*, see (besides the passages to be shortly cited) e.g. 2.8, 20.1, 22.7, 23.5, 30.1–2 (cf. Preface 3; Burliga [2008] 96); for that of *the criticalness of choosing the best option among a set of available alternatives*, see (besides the passages to be shortly cited) e.g. 16.10, 16.13, 17.6, 20.3, 27.3.

³⁸ Aeneas' method when quoting Herodotus or Thucydides is particularly noteworthy. Rather than sticking to the actual words of his original, Aeneas replaces words or expressions not current at his time by the ordinary vocabulary, and goes on to paraphrase his author in order to bring out his own points most clearly. See Hunter-Handford (1927) 107. Cf. Burliga (2008) 98–101.

(c) the task of underlining the devastating consequences of neglecting Aeneas' instructions:

Τοῖς δὲ μὴ οὐτῶ πράττουσιν ἃ συμβέβηκεν ἐμφανισθήσεται τινῶν ἤδη γενομένων, ἃ ἐπὶ παραδείγματος καὶ μαρτυρίου καθαροῦ παραλέγεται. Πεισιστράτῳ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦντι ἐξηγγέλθη [...]

What has befallen those who did not take such precautions will be clear from some actual incidents which may be told in passing as illustration and definite evidence. Word was brought to Peisistratus, when he was general at Athens [...] (4.7–8);

(d) the task of foregrounding Aeneas as both an authorial and a righteous defender of a city under siege, in the sense that he provides practical solutions to problems that the person consulting the *Polioretica*, the potentially besieged, either has identified but does not know how to resolve them, or has not even identified yet:

Ἔτι τοίνυν μηδὲ εἰς τὰς κοίτας λαμπτήρας φέρεσθαι [...] ἤδη γάρ τινες, ἐπεὶ πάντῃ ἐξείργονται [...] διὸ **δεῖ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποπτέειν**.

Again, citizens are not to go to bed with lamps [...] for in some instances persons who have been thwarted in every way [...] Accordingly, **all such matters must be regarded with suspicion** (10.25–26).

It is clear from the above that these four tasks, when examined strictly from the point of view of Aeneas' didactic handbook, appear quite telling of the authorial plan underlying Aeneas' use of historical illustrations. The information revealed from these passages about the benefits of consulting the instructions offered in the *Polioretica* may be summarised as follows:

Aeneas' instructions in the <i>Polioretica</i>	→ ensure that the best option is chosen every time, → prevent the devastating effects of ignorance ³⁹ , → offer detailed information about the measures proposed, foresee any probable occurrence whatsoever under siege and provide ample solutions, thus exuding a strong sense of security.
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A more careful observation of the excerpts quoted above enables us to go one step further and speak of benefits in terms of the qualities to be acquired by all those consulting the *Polioretica*. This step reveals the nature of the mission assumed by the *Polioretica*, which turns out to be deeply educational and didactic, modifying the scheme drawn up above in the following way:

Aeneas' instructions in the <i>Polioretica</i>	→ shape readers into well-informed,
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³⁹ For the emphasis that the text places on the need to avoid ignorance, see also 4.3–5, 6.1–2, 11.15, 15.7, 22.6–8.

proactive and prudent, that is, practically wise and effective human beings-citizens.

Historical references thus appear to be subsumed under the purpose of confirming the authority of Aeneas' handbook, and of ensuring the safety of trusting in the instructions contained in it. Aeneas seems not concerned with offering historical specifics with any consistency.⁴⁰ Rather, as Pretzler claims,⁴¹ he appears to initiate an entirely new kind of didactic literature in which historical examples could be used to enhance practical or technical advice. This, according to Pretzler, is effected through resonating with his readership's own personal memories: following the practice of contemporary political orators, Aeneas appeals to his readership's memories in order to enhance his credibility as an advisor.⁴² I am inclined to think, however, that mere appeals to memory do not seem to suffice for the purpose Pretzler wants them to serve; they rather need to be accompanied by a constant effort to show readers how the advice offered will benefit them, what types of harm they will avoid, and what kind of person they will become once the reading is over. This seems to be the primary goal of the *Poliorcetica*, which in the reader's hand becomes, as Formisano has aptly noted,⁴³ a tool of intellectual self-promotion, or, as I might call it, 'self-improvement'. The following passage is particularly revealing:

Ὅς δὲ αὐτως καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων θελημάτων χρὴ τὰ ἐνόητα ὑπεναντία τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις ὑπονοεῖν, **ἴνα μὴ ἀπερισκέπτως τι ἕτερον αἰρήῃ.**

In the same way in all other decisions one should consider the inherent objections to the prescribed rules, **that one may not inadvisedly adopt another course** (2.8; cf. 31.10–11).

It turns out therefore that insertion of exempla in the *Poliorcetica* reflects a desire for credibility, authority and varied presentation, and that in many respects it resembles political rhetoric, rather than history.⁴⁴ What is more, in his use of historical exempla, Aeneas appears to break the conventions of historiography by combining narrative and didactic prose while focusing on literary effect and didactic impact.⁴⁵ His methodological attempt, on the other hand, at modernizing, literarily modifying and didactically adapting historical information for the sake of clarity⁴⁶ reveals a systematic effort to communicate his technical knowledge as effectively as possible.

In this effort, the more the historical narrative appears to rest on personal experience, the further Aeneas' authority is enhanced.⁴⁷ Formisano⁴⁸ holds that even in the simplest illustration drawn from experience, the author is seen to intervene,

⁴⁰ Pretzler (2018) 76; cf. 88.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 69.

⁴² *Ibid.* 87.

⁴³ (2009) 356.

⁴⁴ Cf. Wheeler (2018).

⁴⁵ See Pretzler (2018) 84.

⁴⁶ Cf. n. 38.

⁴⁷ See Pretzler (2018) 87.

⁴⁸ (2009) 356.

either explicitly or implicitly, to authorise what has been said.⁴⁹ Throughout the *Poliorcetica*, it seems now clear, Aeneas' personal experience is intended to be disseminated to readers with a view to preshaping both their individual experience as well as their experience as a collective body, while his figure as a didactic narrator is implicitly yet clearly and constantly projected as belonging to a cultural *koinē* in which everyone recognises themselves.⁵⁰

Intratextual and Intertextual references: projecting authorial omniscience

One could go on listing additional functions that such appeals to historical illustrations aim to serve. But that would lead too far away from the scope of this study. Allow me rather to linger on the principal upshot of the above brief survey: that much of Aeneas' authority is expected to be seen as the result of his having drawn up a manual of instructions guaranteeing that nothing that could pose a danger to the besieged city will be left unattended. Elsewhere in the *Poliorcetica* Aeneas is seen to make a number of explicit intratextual and intertextual references. Examples of this technique include:

I. References to other places within the *Poliorcetica*:

(a) Καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔνεκα ἐπιμελείας ἡγεμόνες ἔσονται, ἄνπερ εὐθὺς ἡγεμονεύσωσιν ὧδε.

Moreover, there will be leaders to look after everything else, **provided that they thus assume immediate command** (3.6);

(b) Κατασκευασθέντων δὲ τούτων, ἂν τι ἀγγελθῆ ἢ πυρσευθῆ βοθηίας δεόμενον [...]

After the foregoing matters have been arranged, if a call for help come, either by messenger or by signal-fire [...] (15.1);

(c) Διὰ οὖν τὰ πρότερα εἰρημένα λυσιτελεῖ ποτε ἐφεῖναι καὶ ἔᾶσαι τοὺς πολεμίους ὡς πλείστην κατασῦραι τῆς χώρας [...]

Hence, for the reasons already stated, it is sometimes to your interest to give the enemy rein, and to allow him to lay waste as much of the land as he wishes [...] (16.8);⁵¹

Under this category, one observes, can also be placed certain passages in which, as Formisano stresses,⁵² clear references are made to what (i.e. the treatment of the topic that) has just preceded with the aim of intensifying, each time by means of a

⁴⁹ See 11.2, 15.10, 16.14, 17.2. To Formisano, citing examples is thus presented as intimately linked to the structure of the book, which in turn is authorised by the testimony offered by experience itself. Cf. Loreto (1995) 578, who sees in Aeneas' use of exempla a formulation of strategic thought which would hardly have been possible without a background of direct experience.

⁵⁰ Cf. Bettalli (1990) 223.

⁵¹ Cf. also 10.20 (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων τάξεων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον); 16.16 (ὡς προγέγραπται); 25.2 (εἴη δ' ἂν τὰ παρασυνθήματα τοιάδε); 26.6–7 (οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐπαινοῦσι τοῦτο διὰ τὰ προγεγραμμένα); 26.7–8 (χρὴ τὰ προγεγραμμένα κατὰ τὰς φυλακὰς πράσσειν).

⁵² (2009) 357.

demonstrative pronoun or adverb, the imperative to follow Aeneas' aforementioned piece of advice – a body of instructions that are meant, as it were, to 'take shape' in front of the reader's eyes;⁵³

II. References to other works of Aeneas, in which one can find more (or equally) analytical descriptions:

(a) Ὡς δὲ δεῖ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι καὶ ὡς αἶρειν τοὺς φρυκτούς, ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ πλείονως εἴρηται.

How this is to be done and how they are to raise the signal fires is **treated more fully in the book of *Military Preparations* (7.3–4)**;

(b) Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων πάντων ὧδε μὲν νῦν παραλείπεται, ὡς δεῖ ἕκαστον τούτων γίνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ταύτη, λίαν πολλὰ, δηλωῶται· γέγραπται δὲ τελέως περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ.

The particular treatment of all these subjects is **for the present omitted, to avoid explaining them at this point, since they are too numerous. They have been fully treated in the book on *Military Preparations* (8.5)**;

(c) Καὶ ὅπως ἴσως καὶ ἀλύπως τοῖς πλουσίοις ταῦτ' ἂν γιγνόμενα πράττειτο καὶ ἐξ οἴων πόρων πορίζοιτο, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν τῇ Ποριστικῇ βίβλῳ δηλωτικῶς γέγραπται.

How these measures may be taken fairly and without offence to the wealthy, and from what revenues the expenses may be met, **has also been clearly explained in the book on *Finance* (14.2)**.⁵⁴

Most interestingly, phrases such as πλείονως εἴρηται or γέγραπται δὲ τελέως are quite telling of the author's awareness of the need for diversified treatment of a particular subject depending on a work's overarching purpose. Yet they constitute at the same

⁵³ Such passages, as Formisano (2009) 357 notes, include (apart from passage 15.1 just cited): 16.22 (Ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως πράττοντες [...]), 18.22 (Διὸ δεῖ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα προνοεῖν), 22.10 (Τοῦτου δὲ οὕτω πρᾶσσομένου [...]), to which I would add passages 13.1–4 (and the ring structure of the chapter), 24.16, 31.31 and 31.35. Formisano (2009) 357 n. 3, drawing on Calame (2004) 15, bases his claim on the double *deixis* procedure made possible by the use of demonstrative pronouns (and I would add also adverbs): (a) intra-discursive reference to what has just been mentioned; and (b) extra-discursive reference to what readers have before them.

⁵⁴ Cf. 21.1: Περὶ δὲ ἀρμένων ἐτοιμασίας καὶ ὅσα χρή περὶ χώραν φιλίαν προκατασκευάζειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὡς δεῖ ἀφανίζειν ἢ ἀχρεῖα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὧδε μὲν παραλείπεται· ἐν δὲ τῷ Παρασκευαστικῷ περὶ τούτων τελείως δηλοῦται [‘Provision of tools, and all suitable preparations on friendly soil, and the methods necessary for concealing the property in the land or for rendering it useless to one's opponents, are here omitted, but these have been fully set forth in the book on *Military Preparations*’]. Cf. also 19 (πολλὰ δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἄλλα ὁμότροπα τούτοις γράψαι. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρετέον); 21.2 (τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τῇ Στρατοπεδευτικῇ βίβλῳ γραπτέον ὄν τρόπον δεῖ γενέσθαι, ὀλίγα δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ νῦν δηλώσομεν); 22.25 (περὶ μὲν οὖν φυλακῶν ἰσότητος ἱκανῶς μοι δεδηλώσθω); 38.5–6 (ἐν οἷς καιροῖς ἕκαστα τούτων δεῖ παρῆναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσμασι γέγραπται; on the scholarly debate on whether this sentence contains an internal cross-reference or a citation of another treatise, see e.g. Whitehead (1990) 201–202; cf. 11.2); 40.8 (ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ δεδήλωται).

time a subtle means to foresee possible questions, to anticipate critiques of inadequate treatment and to remind readers of the author's omniscience⁵⁵. From this perspective, topics appear to have been organised, and to have been distributed across the totality of Aeneas' work, in such a way as to be dealt with at the right point of the right work and to the right extent. Some themes may appear in different works, yet the extent to which they are treated of primarily depends on the purpose for which each theme is introduced and treated of. The author Aeneas thus emerges as a fully-fledged expert who handles his material masterfully, adding or removing information always for the sake of the economy of his works, as well as with a view to unhindered serving the purpose of their composition, and to keeping the communication of his messages unobstructed. It seems reasonable therefore to infer that in the *Poliiorcetica* (I) Aeneas' references to other places within this treatise are seen to create internal cohesion between its parts, which are devoted to different topics;⁵⁶ on the other hand (II), his references to some of his other works appear to establish a cross-textual interaction which reveals a deep level of literary intimacy between them and forges strong bonds of thematic affinity.

Personal and non-personal uses: decoding further direct and indirect apostrophes to the reader

Any attempt to delve into the structures and strategies of ancient scientific writings cannot but take into exhaustive account an author's first-second and third person uses, and even his non-personal uses. Here I will briefly touch upon Aeneas' use of the second and third person singular, one interesting case of the authorial 'I', and a rather technical person-neutral use. Let me first address the second person singular issue. Setting out to explore Aeneas' use of the second person proves a very challenging task, as it increasingly reveals itself as capable of meeting a different purpose each time. Some of these purposes, chiefly rhetorical in nature, can be summed up as follows.

(a) First, it signals a way to approach the reader by establishing a friendly relationship with him, one in which Aeneas, as a consultant, takes up the role of the reader's friend and companion, whose advice and instruction reflect the kind of benefit the former is able to confer upon the latter:

Ἄν δὲ θρασύνεσθαι τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν οἱ ἐπιόντες πρὸς σέ, τάδε ποιητέον.
Πρῶτον μὲν χρὴ σώμασι τόπους τινὰς τῆς οἰκείας χώρας καταλαβεῖν [...] Τούτων δὲ οὕτω πραχθέντων **τοῖς μὲν φίλοις θάρσος ἐμποιήσεις** ἐπιχειρῶν τι ἄλλ' οὐ δεδιώς, **τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις φόβον ἐμπαρασκευάσεις**, ὥστε ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἡρεμεῖν.

⁵⁵ Passages that reveal the author's willingness to lay bare his omniscience (especially in dealing with a particular subject) include 18.3–8 and 36.1–2.

⁵⁶ See Formisano (2009) 355, who claims that 'Dove si presuppone una sistematicità della messa per iscritto, che prevede un prima e un dopo nella fruizione del testo, ma al contempo si invita implicitamente il lettore a proseguire nella lettura dell'opera nell'offrirgli le nozioni esposte in altro luogo del testo', and, shortly afterwards, '[E]nea sembra anche volere evidenziare il proprio ruolo di autore nell'opera di sistemazione intrapresa'.

If the invaders try to overawe **you, your first action must be** to occupy certain places in your own country with men [...] If these things are so done **you will inspire your friends with courage** by your initiative and fearlessness **and arouse fear in your enemies** so that they will remain quietly at home (9.1–3).⁵⁷

Here Aeneas' advice seems pretty well geared towards communicating the author's experience to his friends, that is, his readers. Specifically, it draws on the traditional value system in order not only to remind readers of the aristocratic motto 'to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies', but, even more, to offer them the safest way to put it into action. Aeneas' handbook, thus, appears to claim its own place in a centuries-long tradition, attempting to effect persuasion through an intense emotional shake-up which results in reflecting on the role traditional values play in one's life.⁵⁸

(b) At other places in this work a similar but not identical purpose seems to be met, which differs from the first in that communication here, largely effected through arguments based on *eikos*, concerns imparting knowledge about human nature:

Ἔδ' οὖν ἄλλος τρόπος βοηθείας βελτίων ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐμβεβληκότας [...] τῶν μὲν ἐπειγομένων τὰ οἰκεῖα σῶζειν ὡς τάχιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἑτέρων δὲ πεφοβημένων εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους προϊέναι, οἷα εἰκὸς προσφάτως ἀγγελμένων [...] Δεῖ γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι τῶν πολεμίων οἱ μετὰ ξυνέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολεμίᾳ [...]

Still another kind of relief would be more effective against the invaders [...] **some hurrying with all speed to save their property on the farms, others dreading to face danger, as is natural** when the alarm is sudden [...] **For you must know** that when an enemy goes to war with judgment and understanding [...] (16.1–5).⁵⁹

An *eikos* argument builds on what can seem probable, reasonable and acceptable to the reader. It specifically invests in how, among a certain number of possibilities, something will appear to the reader's eyes as more likely to happen, inasmuch as it usually happens.⁶⁰ In revealing certain aspects of human behavior, the *eikos* argument employed here aims to impart knowledge about human nature to readers, inviting them to imagine how they themselves would react under the specific conditions described by Aeneas. The success of this type of argument lies in its ability to allow the reader to be mentally involved in the narrative, to express imaginatively his sympathy or dislike for its protagonists, and to disengage himself from it, once the

⁵⁷ On the change of style in this chapter and questions concerning its genuineness, see Hunter-Handford (1927) 126–27; Bettalli (1990) 233; Whitehead (1990) 115.

⁵⁸ Cf. Formisano (2009) 356, who aptly comments that: '[È] sul libro stesso che il lettore-fruitori deve basarsi per potere effettuare nella realtà la norma indicata nel testo'. The same motto recurs, in fairly similar terms, in 39.1–6. Cf. also 16.9 and 22.6–8.

⁵⁹ Peculiarities in the style of this chapter have also raised issues of authenticity, see e.g. Hunter-Handford (1927) 149; Bettalli (1990) 264; Whitehead (1990) 140.

⁶⁰ Cf. Arist. *Rh.* I.2.1357a34–b1.

teachings of the narrative have been impressed upon him, and he has realised the benefits of Aeneas' instructions.⁶¹

(c) Dissemination of experience and knowledge among readers is often seen to be accompanied by a desire to visualise the end result of an action appropriately guided by, or distanced from, the author's instructions. Here addressing the reader – most frequently the general – in the second person singular aims at positing him as a collective subject whose decisions determine the fate of the city's defenders:

Ἐπιτίθεσο δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν οἷς ἄκων μὲν μὴ μαχήσῃ, μαχόμενος δὲ μὴ ἔλασσον ἔξεις τῶν πολεμίων.

Attack the enemy where **you are not unwilling to do battle**, and where **you will not be at a disadvantage in the fight** (16.7–8).

Through the repetition of the negative μή, Aeneas manages to visualise the undesirable consequence of displaying inappropriate or akairic behaviour: failure to live up to the ideal of aristocratic *pleonexia*. He thus stresses anew the cruciality of making the right decision in war, which is now further qualified as being fully aware of one's responsibilities when doing battle, being equipped with the necessary knowledge and rational judgement in practical military matters, exercising that judgement, and seizing the opportunity or the right moment (*kairos*) for action. Yet behind that stress, one notices, looms Aeneas' persistent effort to highlight the *Poliorctica* as being utterly capable of responding to the needs raised in all the aforementioned aspects of military decision-making.⁶²

Visualisation of the end result may also have to do with providing the reader with step-by-step instructions for a particular construction:

Κομίζεται δὲ καὶ ὧδε. Κύστιν ἰσομεγέθη ληκύθῳ ὀπόση ἂν βούλη πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γραφησομένων φυσήσαντα καὶ ἀποδήσαντα σφόδρα ξηρᾶναι, ἔπειτα ἐπ' αὐτῆς γράψαι ὃ τι ἂν βούλη [...]

Messages are sent also in this way. Take a bladder in size equal to a flask **large enough for your purpose; inflate it, tie it tightly, and let it dry; then write on it whatever you wish** [...] (31.10–11).⁶³

In the context of Aeneas' visualisation technique, a letter-perfect description of the steps that the reader is to follow if he is to carry out a particular construction, in conjunction with a detailed analysis of its practical application, involves the reader in

⁶¹ Cf. 26.8 (οὐ γὰρ συμφέρει οὕτω διακείμενον τὸ στράτευμα ἔτι ἀθυμότερον καθιστάναι [εἰκὸς δὲ ὅταν εὐρεθῇ αἰσχροὺν τι ποιῶν ἀθυμεῖν], ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς θεραπείαν τε καὶ ἀνάληψιν αὐτῶν τραπέσθαι); 27.6 (Προειδόμενος οὖν εἰκὸς ἔστιν, ἐάν τι γίγνηται, μὴ ἀπροσδοκῆτους προσπείσειν, μηδὲ ὑπὸ φόβου ἐξαπιναιῶν ταρασσεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι). Cf. also 4.11, 7.1, 16.6, 16.12 and 39.2. Other passages that contain observations on human nature include: 10.23, 22.4–8, 22.15, 26.2, 26.6–11 and 38.1–5. Cf. Hunter-Handford (1927) xxxiii–xxxiv.

⁶² Cf. 15.2 and 38.5; Isoc. 1.31; Sipiōra (2012).

⁶³ Cf. 35 (Πίσσαν, θεῖον, στυππεῖον, μάνναν λιβανωτοῦ, δαδὸς πρίσματα ἐν ἀγγείοις ἐξάπτοντα προσφέρειν, ἐὰν βούλη τῶν πολεμίων τι ἐμπρησθῆναι); 40.6 (Ἐὰν δὲ θέλῃς ἐπὶ τῷ τείχει περιόδους πλείους φαίνεσθαι, χρὴ περιμέναι ἐπὶ δύο, ἔχοντας τὰ δόρατα τὸν ἕνα στίχον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριστερῷ ὄμῳ, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ· καὶ οὕτω φανοῦνται εἰς τέσσαρας).

a fictional but deeply experiential process of 'co-construction' and 'co-application'. Success at persuasion and communication, under these conditions, depends heavily on the degree of imaginary involvement and witnessing of a certain construction's functionality and effectiveness.

I will leave aside Aeneas' use of the third person singular (along with the passages in which an alternation of addressees can be observed or conjectured),⁶⁴ whose examination, just to mention in short, can yield interesting results regarding this work's potential to be read not as a whole but in parts, each containing specific information addressed to specific audience, and turn briefly to a rather intriguing case of the authorial 'I':

Δοκεῖ δέ μοι συναγαγόντι δηλωτέον τίνα δεῖ φυλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἐν οἷς καιροῖς ἕκαστα, ἵνα τις μηδὲν εὐήθως ἀποδέχεται.

It seems to me that I must show, by a collection of instances, against what things one must guard and on what occasions, so that one may not be so simple as to take anything for granted (28.7).

Here the author seems to be promoting himself as someone the reader can trust so as to escape being deceived by false appearances. In so doing, Aeneas presents us with a self-referential assurance of the weightiness of the present writing enterprise.⁶⁵ In Aeneas' *Poliorcetica*, I need to stress, the authorial 'I' can be present even if there is no word directly signifying it, even if what we are dealing with is a person-neutral use.⁶⁶ This is sometimes due to a particular authorial technique which I might call 'technique of infallibly predicting the future': this technique relates to reporting what is expected, if one follows Aeneas' advice, to happen in the future as if it had already taken place. By means of it the author appears to the reader's eyes as the ideal general, the model after which every reader-general needs to be fashioned if his city is to be successfully defended.

Concluding remarks

The above analysis of some of Aeneas' most important authorial techniques in the *Poliorcetica* suffices, I think, to show that behind the composition of this treatise stands an author who displays serious interest in infusing his text with strong literary, didactic and communicative elements. Following an explicitly 'rhetorical' construction of the Preface of the *Poliorcetica*, which stresses the need to defend the most valuable things in an individual's life, as well as the opprobrium that accompanies the failure to do so, all chapters seem to have been organised in such a way as to deal with, each one separately, a particular issue, to raise the needs related to it and to meet them – all together leaving the impression of having been put in the service of the Preface's 'programmatic' statements. For the most part, chapters, in

⁶⁴ See e.g. 29.1 (third person singular) and 37.8–9 (alternation of addressees). Cf. also 22.21–22 (third person singular), 22.27–29 (third person singular), 26.12 (third person singular), 27.4 (third person singular), 31.14–16 (alternation of addressees) and 31.17–20 (alternation of addressees).

⁶⁵ Cf. Burliga (2008) 96.

⁶⁶ See e.g. 10.20, 18.1–2, 22.13, 23.6 and 39.7. Cf. also 1.1 and 2.7.

order effectively to serve the primary, overarching need raised in the Preface, appear to have been structured into three focal ‘sections’: (a) emergence or establishment of a ‘subsidiary’, overarched need for a certain action, (b) proposed measures to meet this need, and (c) ‘visible’ or visualised results of meeting or not the need. Aeneas’ communicative strategy is accordingly seen to unfold in keeping with the following pattern-principle: the more a particular ‘subsidiary’-overarched need is intensified, the more important and critical the measures that (are to) satisfy it appear (to the reader). Indeed, in many places we find Aeneas accentuating the need, for instance, for foresight, precaution and full preparation, avoidance of ignorance, practical wisdom and acumen, vigilance, skilfulness, cleverness and safety, agility and readiness for action, security and economy, order and timely action, gaining advantage and choosing the best option, circumspection and mistrust, handiness and simplicity. These needs, when intensified appropriately, are observed to prepare the ground for, and herald the importance of, the measures that will satisfy them.

On the other hand, the more the feeling of relief or distress is accentuated, or the more the type of benefit or harm brought about by the satisfaction of a particular ‘subsidiary’-overarched need, or by the failure to do so, respectively, is foregrounded, the more important, again, and critical the measures that (are to) satisfy it appear (to the reader). We thus witness in many passages a very vivid description of the devastating consequences of failing to satisfy one of the above-mentioned needs, such as acting in a state of ignorance or naivety, or being unsuccessful in living up to traditional ideals, or of the beneficial upshots of succeeding in doing so, such as prudent leadership, excellent judgment and choice, or guarantee of safety.

The above considerations suggest that the ‘reference point’ of Aeneas’ communicative strategy, among the focal ‘sections’ mentioned earlier, is the middle one (b), the very measures proposed by him, or, in other words, the text-treatise itself, the *Polioretica*. The ‘rhetorical’ building blocks, therefore, with which the two extreme ‘sections’ are constructed can be accounted for as being intended to cultivate or increase the reader’s receptivity, and to put him in the appropriate mental and emotional state, so that the way can be paved for accepting the *Polioretica* as the only comprehensive collection of measures that guarantees the fulfilment of each and every ‘subsidiary’-overarched need, and, as a consequence, of the primary-overarching need. In this context, the *Polioretica* emerges as the cornerstone on which a friendly relationship is built between the consultant Aeneas and the counselee reader – a relationship of trustful intimacy in which Aeneas shares with his readers his technical knowledge, his experience in matters that directly concern them and his precise knowledge of human behaviour, allows them to put themselves in the ‘shoes’ of the protagonist of a particular historical narrative, or invites them to imagine themselves as potentially experiencing the severities described, but, above all, teaches them the way that leads towards (their) real benefit. Through its authority, Aeneas’ *Polioretica* shows itself capable of ensuring how a need to act in a particular way can be translated into realised action, and, subsequently, into a quality acquired through action. To give an example: if there is a need for prognosis or foresight, he who acts in accordance with the measures proposed by Aeneas will not only act with foresight, but will also, and ultimately, acquire the quality of being foresighted. This entails a profoundly ‘educational’ progress, an intellectual and cognitive self-

advancement on the reader's part. Yet the *Poliorcetica* itself proves by no means scopally self-restricting; on the contrary, it implicitly but manifestly claims to be able to meet all the needs it raises by transmuting them into beneficial acquired qualities, thus endowing the reader with the cognitive resources required to live up to his value, human and military ideals – all being subsumed under the overarching ideal of defending the things he most values and of avoiding the disgrace of failure to do so.

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On Clarity (σαφήνεια) in Hellenistic Rhetoric and Historiography

Athanasios Efstathiou

Abstract

Style as a matter demanding definition goes back to antiquity. In the third book of his *Rhetoric* (1404b1–4) Aristotle states: ‘Let the virtue of style be defined as “to be clear” [...] and neither flat nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate (πρέπον)’. Aristotle seems to have been the first to systematically discuss style and its virtues. After him, style becomes a favourite subject matter for other Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans and later stylistic theorists. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to highlight the way in which clarity (σαφήνεια) is singled out as a key virtue of style in early and later style theories; and secondly, to bring out its role as a virtue of narrative in Hellenistic rhetoric and historiography.

Introduction

Cicero (*Orator* 122) singles out the following purposes for an admirable speech: the treatment of the subject matter itself, the winning of the audience’s favour, to arouse the audience, to put them in a receptive mood, to set forth the facts in question briefly, clearly and reasonably being made understandable, to prove one’s case and demolish the opponent’s by doing that not confusedly, but with conclusive arguments put in logical order.

However, style as a matter demanding definition goes back to antiquity, when style (λέξις, φράσις, ἑρμηνεία in Greek or *elocutio*, *dictio* in Latin) was simply represented as the verbal dress of thought, or even as the ornament of thought (κόσμος ἐπέων according to Democritus)¹; in Roman style theory, it is Quintilian (11.1.3)² who uses a similar metaphor writing on the issue of appropriate style. Thus, in antiquity, form and meaning are treated as two parts of the same unity in various theories of style or even in empirical conclusions which came from speaking and writing experience.

Clarity in early style theories

The discussion of style and its virtues (ἀρεταί) makes its first known appearance in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*; this discussion was continued by Theophrastus, who expanded Aristotle’s preliminary conception to a theory of four standard virtues (ἀρεταί), and it became a favourite subject matter for other Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans and later stylistic theory.

¹ Democr. frg. 21, 1.2 DK: “Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον (‘Homer became possessed of divine nature, the ornament of words’); see also Arist. *Rh.* 1408a14, Isoc. *Ad Archid.* 9.

² *ut monilibus et margaritis ac ueste longa, quae sunt ornamenta feminarum, deformentur uiri, nec habitus triumphalis, quo nihil excogitari potest augustius, feminas deceat* (‘men would similarly be disfigured by necklaces and pearls and long dresses – the ornaments of women; nor would the costume of the triumphant general, than which one can think of nothing more august, be appropriate for women’); see also Cic. *Brut.* 274, Quint. 8 Prooem. 20.

In particular, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (book 3, ch. 2–12 = 1404b1ff. [Kassel]) discusses the virtues of style (λέξις). In the first part chs 2–4, Aristotle deals with the virtue of single words, while further down he discusses style in sentences in the context of combinations of words (chs 5–12). Aristotle here and elsewhere (see *Eth. Nic.* II 5)³ seems to derive his theory from Plato's idea (*Rep.* I 352dff.)⁴, that the virtue of every single thing (e.g. knife, eye, hand etc.) or everything that can be used as an instrument is determined by its specific function (ἔργον); analogically, the special function of language is to explain one's meaning. Given the definition that a word's main purpose is to convey its main meaning, we need to allocate the way to do so; thus, perspicuity-clarity presented as an instructive virtue of style offers the necessary faculty of speech to communicate its meaning with appropriate verbal embellishment. Hence, this Aristotelian passage appears as an opening definition of clarity; in this formulation, Aristotle progressively deviates from viewing clarity as transparency and reaches a new concept, which posits that clarity achieves its optimum form only when it is combined with propriety and ornamentation. Consequently, the style must not be too low and degraded nor pompous and extravagant, but appropriate to the subject.

In *Poetics* (chs 21 and 22)⁵ we find again Aristotle's core concept of 'standard' or 'ordinary' speech in distinction to all the other categories, which arise from this as divergences or variations.⁶ In particular, chapter XXI of *Poetics* is suggestive, since it starts the discussion from standard speech with clear meaning (ὄνομά [...] κύριον) offering a confirmation that the virtue of clarity may be regarded as an unambiguous commencement of the theory of style itself. What follows (γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον) constitutes the essence of his stylistic theory. Similarly, in *Rhetoric* (1405a) Aristotle, improving his initial formulation of standard and clear speech, argues that since familiarity in style makes it seem degraded, the rhetor should use variation and elevation; in other words, the speech should be altered with the use of figures, and tropes-metaphors and similes, in such a way as it appears unusual or even exotic; the main rhetorical purpose is that style is to be presented as natural though not in fact being so.

Likewise, Anaximenes in his theoretical treatise *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (ch. 25 = 1435b1–6) in his discussion refers first to clarity as a virtue of single words, and next as a result of combinations of words in sentences, recalling not only the Aristotelian ideas on clarity but also the structure of Aristotle's account in *Rhetoric* 1404b1ff.

³ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1097b30ff.: ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς [...] θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; [...]. See also Dirlmeier (1964) 309–10.

⁴ [...] Τί δέ; μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλον κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς;

⁵ See 1457b3–13 (= ch. 21): ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ὃ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ὃ ἕτεροι ('All nouns can be ordinary terms, foreign terms, metaphors, ornaments, neologisms, lengthened terms, curtailed terms, altered terms. By ordinary word, I mean the one used by everybody, and by foreign term, one used by some. It is apparent that the same term may be both ordinary and foreign, but not in relation to the same people'). Also 1458a18–20 (= ch. 22): Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴ εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινὴ ('The virtue of nouns must be linked with clarity but not banality. Although the greatest clarity is originated from the use of ordinary nouns, this makes style flat').

⁶ See Halliwell (1989) 160.

Theophrastus, Aristotle's student, followed the main lines of his teacher's theory. In his lost book *On Style* (Περὶ λέξεως), Theophrastus actually enriched the ideas of Aristotle, presenting a theory of four standard virtues (ἀρεταί); Theophrastean theory is quoted by Cicero in his *Orator* (ch. 79): according to this account reworked by Cicero, the language will be pure Latin, expressed in a plain and clear manner; however, the main aim of language has to be propriety; only one feature of style may be lacking, the pleasure and richness of figurative ornament; the last feature is included by Theophrastus as a fourth virtue of style.⁷ This extended discussion on virtues attributed to Theophrastus appears to be an attempt to subdivide the clarity of Aristotle's model into correct speech and clarity, and this implies that according to Theophrastus' ideas, clarity is attained with use of correct grammar or even presupposes correct grammar.

Stoic theory comes to complete Theophrastus' list of virtues with brevity, a virtue which is regarded as being of particular importance by Stoics. Diogenes Laertius presents the Stoic model of five virtues of speech (ἀρεταί λόγου) as including correct Greek thus correctness (Ἑλληνισμός), clarity (σαφήνεια), brevity (συντομία), appropriateness (πρέπον) and ornamentation (κατασκευή). In particular, correct Greek is a language faultless in point of grammar and not pointless; clarity also is a feature of a style which presents the thought in a way that is easily understood, while brevity characterises the style which employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand; lastly, appropriateness lies in a style closely connected to the subject, whereas ornamentation points to a style which escapes vulgarity (ιδιωτισμόν)⁸. It is worth noting that the Stoics, apart from the addition of brevity, recall Aristotle's original formulation which emphasises the combination of clarity with propriety and ornamentation.

Clarity in later style theories

The works of later stylistic theory include [Demetrius] *On Style*. This is a treatise which has probably by mistake been attributed to Demetrius of Phaleron (360–280 BC), a student of Aristotle and governor of Athens in the period of 317–307 BC. The date of the work is also controversial: despite an early dating of the work in the Hellenistic period, some scholars (for example the first editors of the text Roberts and Radermacher) are inclined to accept a later date such as 1st century AD;⁹ in short, it seems that though of uncertain date, the work can be probably regarded as a text derived from the Peripatetic tradition belonging to the Hellenistic period with conjectural reference to the 2nd or even 1st century BC; the fact that the author

⁷ Cicero *Orator* 79: *sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur, quid deceat circumspicietur. unum aberit quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus: ornatum illud suave et affluens.*

⁸ See 7.59: Ἀρεταί δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμός μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαία συνηθεία· σαφήνεια δὲ ἐστὶ λέξις γνωρίμως παριστάσα τὸ νοούμενον· συντομία δὲ ἐστὶ λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δῆλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος· πρέπον δὲ ἐστὶ λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι· κατασκευή δὲ λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ιδιωτισμόν.

⁹ Some scholars recently have expressed the view that the work was written earlier, in about 270 BC according to Grube; 2nd century BC for Morpurgo Tagliabue; late 2nd century or early 1st according to Chiron; or even written originally in 2nd or early 1st century and reworked on 1st AD according to Schenkeveld.

mentions in his work only philosophers of the Peripatos (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Praxiphanes) or others closely attached to Aristotle himself like Archedemus and Artemon, may prove the author's strong relationship to the Peripatetic school.¹⁰

In this work – during his general discussion of style –, the author in an attempt to instruct the future writer simultaneously evaluates the writers of the past and presents his views on the characters of style, making an innovative distinction of four characters of style ([μεγαλοπρεπής (elevated), ἰσχνός (plain), γλαφυρός (elegant) and δεινός (forceful)]). [Demetrius], discussing specifically the two characters of style (grand and plain), seems to reject the view that only those two characters exist (see §§ 36–37)¹¹. On the contrary, [Demetrius] overcomes the stylistic theory of the past, opting for a model of four characters by subdividing the grand style into grand and forceful, and the plain into plain and elegant.

In the account of the plain character of style (ἰσχνός χαρακτήρ) (190–239), he presents his views on clarity in a quite extensive section (§§ 192–203), where he singles out several practical suggestions and methods by which clarity is achieved. Lysias (especially the speech *On the murder of Eratosthenes*) is regarded as a representative writer for the plain character. The plain character pursues clarity and simplicity, and draws on the diction of ordinary life. It shuns compounds, as well as neologisms, asyndeton and other ambiguities. Instead, it approves the use of normal words and also *epanalēpsis*, namely the resumptive repetition of the same connecting particle within a long sentence for the sake of clarity; with the same object, it will say one thing twice over; it also objects to the use of dependent constructions, and adopts the natural order of words (the subject first, then what it is, and then the rest); it prefers simple and short periods, with natural breaks giving a rest to the listener.¹² [Demetrius] approves the model of the virtues of narrative which included clarity, brevity and persuasiveness, adding vividness to them.

However, [Demetrius]' list of virtues seems to resemble the list which also Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers; Dionysius' list includes first the necessary qualities and then the additional: so καθαρά λέξις with σαφής λέξις and σύντομος λέξις (see Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.16ff., *Thuc.* 23, lines 31ff.) are referred to as necessary qualities (ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί), while a more extensive group of qualities including ἐνάργεια, ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῶν παθῶν μίμησις, κατασκευή, ὕψος, σεμνολογία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, τόνος, βάρος, πάθος, and even more ἡδονὴ καὶ πειθὼ καὶ τέρψις καὶ ὁμοιογενεῖς ἀρεταί (*Pomp.* 3.19), are characterised as additional virtues (ἀρεταί ἐπίθετοι).

In a separate category Dionysius (*Pomp.* 3.20) lists propriety (πρέπον) as the most important of all (πασῶν ἐν λόγοις ἀρετῶν ἡ κυριωτάτη τὸ πρέπον). Indeed, later stylistic theory underlines the importance of appropriateness: Quintilian (11.1.2ff.) regards it as the most important quality, since purity, clarity, and ornamentation without appropriateness have no point. However, Stoic stylistic theory deals with appropriateness only in relation to the object in question (τὸ πρᾶγμα), presenting the

¹⁰ See further Innes (based on W. Rhys Roberts) (1995) 316; for the dating of the work accepting 1st cent. BC as a *terminus post quem* see below.

¹¹ For the theory of two characters of style see Cic. *Brut.* 201: [...] *quoniam ergo oratorum bonorum – hos enim quaerimus – duo genera sunt, unum attenuate pressequae, alterum sublata ampleque dicentium [...]* ('[...] since then there are two distinct characters of good oratory – and that is the only kind we are considering – one simple and concise, the other elevated and abundant [...]').

¹² See Rhys Roberts (1902) 34, 159–63.

idea that the nature and the quality of the discourse play the most significant role, and style has to avoid using appropriate forms aiming at the audience's persuasion; clarity and thus communication of the discourse's subject must remain at front line.¹³

In sum, following Aristotle's fundamental theory, Theophrastus seems to rework and supplement Aristotle's ideas, speaking of four virtues of style, which were accepted and adapted by many later writers and theorists of style such as the Stoics, Epicureans and later Peripatetics. Moreover, it is Theophrastus too who contributes to the theory of style by presenting the three characters of style (*genera dicendi*: i.e. the grand, the plain, and the middle or smooth style). Theophrastus draws his model of characters of style from the Aristotelian tripartite virtue of clarity, ornamentation and propriety; so based on Aristotle he created a system of different characters of style using the virtue of propriety as the main regulator; in other words propriety acquires a decisive role both in the system of Theophrastus and the Peripatetics and in the system of four characters according to [Demetrius'] formulation [μεγαλοπρεπής ('elevated'), ἰσχνός ('plain'), γλαφυρός ('elegant') and δεινός ('forceful')].¹⁴

It seems possible that the theory of three characters of style, although accepted by the Roman critics of the 1st cent. BC,¹⁵ proved insufficient to subsume the style of Demosthenes, which became increasingly popular in theoretical treatises of the 1st cent. BC. Therefore, this weakness detected in Dionysius' essay *On Demosthenes* may have led Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* (Περὶ Ἰδεῶν) or even [Demetrius'] *On the Style* to form systems of twenty and four types-characters of style respectively.¹⁶

Clarity as a virtue of narrative in rhetoric and historiography

Clarity emerges also as a virtue of narrative; according to several theories of style narrative is characterised mainly by three virtues (σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης, i.e. clarity with brevity and persuasiveness). This particular group of virtues is mentioned by Anaximenes (see *Rh. Al.* 30.5 = 1438a4–8: σαφῶς, συντόμως, πιστῶς),¹⁷ who discusses the type of assembly speech, that of the ambassadorial report; the passage runs: 'for these reasons, in a case that we present an embassy report we should give a detailed account of how everything happened; when we present the speech ourselves and we are narrating something that happened in the past, or describing the present situation or even we are forecasting the future, we have to do each of those things clearly, and in a brief and convincing way. We have to be clear in order that the audience may grasp the facts that we are stating, brief in order that they may remember what we say, convincing in order that our audience may not reject our narrative before we have supported our report with proofs and justifications. Clarity of exposition will be achieved from the facts and from the language [used]. From the facts, if we do not present them in a transposed order, but present first the things that were done or are being done or are going to be done first, and arrange the rest of them in sequence, and if we do not abandon the exposition of a matter, which we have

¹³ For more see Atherton (1988) 411.

¹⁴ Cic. *Orat.* 20ff., Quint. 12.10.58ff. with Innes (1985) 261–62.

¹⁵ E.g. *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero *Orator*.

¹⁶ Cf. Wooten (1989) 587–88; my argument, based on Wooten's conclusions (see above, 588), may support a dating of [Demetrius'] treatise after the 1st cent. BC.

¹⁷ See also Quintilian (4.2.31–32), who attributes them to Isocrates; see also Volkman (1885) 153.

attempted to describe, and proclaim to describe another matter. From the facts, in such a way as to make our exposition clear. From the language, if we designate the facts as far as possible by the words appropriate to the things, and by those in common use, and if we do not place them in a transposed order but always set the words connected next to one another. By taking these precautions we shall make our exposition clear’.

In a later period the anonymous rhetorical treatise known as the Anonymous Seguerianus *Τέχνη Ρητορική* was composed. This work, though of unknown date, seems to borrow from material of the 1st cent. AD. The anonymous author commenting on narrative refers to its three virtues (clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness) and has an extensive discussion of obscurity; he concludes that the purpose of clarity can be attained once we know and shun the techniques of its opposite.¹⁸

In particular, obscurity according to Anonymous Seguerianus occurs in the subject matter or in the style and takes many forms. Obscurity of subject matter may be encountered in a number of cases: first, when the subject is not common knowledge, as, for example, in dialectic and geometry; second, in case we confuse the order of events and opt for dull repetitions; third, when we omit necessary points; and finally, when we introduce irrelevant material.

On the other hand, the language of tropes, use of unintelligible, obsolete, or ambiguous terms, also use of complicated forms of composition with long periods and allegorical expressions create obscurity in style as do word formations and ‘articulations’ (i.e. διάρθρωσις). The anonymous author goes further, arguing that obscurity may be caused by digressions, passages or parts of embedded narrative, which break up the order of narrative and result in the omission of necessary items. The idea is to use all these devices when our purpose is to lead the judge astray. In such cases we should concentrate not on the diction but on confounding the order of events (88 Dilts-Kennedy): ποιήσεις δὲ ἀσάφειαν καὶ ἐὰν τὰς ἀκολουθίας διαλύσης ἀλόγοις διηγήμασι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερβαίνης, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τάξιν τιθῆς. οὕτως δὲ αὐτὰ τις ποιήσει τὸν δικαστὴν ἀπατῆσαι βουλόμενος τῇ ἀνακολουθίᾳ.¹⁹ This final statement resembles Quintilian’s reference (see 4.1.40–41) to the use of obscurity, when he discusses the different types of cause which require different types of prooemium; in court cases, when the litigant considers how to give instructions to the judges, he uses five types of Cause (*honestum, humile, dubium uel anceps, admirabile, obscurum*,²⁰ id est ἔνδοξον, ἄδοξον, ἀμφίδοξον, παράδοξον, δυσπαρακολούθητον [...]). Quintilian uses the term δυσπαρακολούθητον (‘hard to follow’) to translate *obscurum*, and his δυσπαρακολούθητον and Anonymous Seguerianus’ ἀνακολουθία seem to be identical.²¹

The discussion of obscurity and its effects on the judges or various types of audience seems related to the advice of Hermogenes (chs 155–225) on clarity and

¹⁸ See Kustas (1973) 77, and n. 2 and 3; see text edited by Dilts, in Dilts-Kennedy (1997) §§ 40–142.

¹⁹ (‘You may produce obscurity if you interrupt the logical sequence with ill-sorted narrative, and extent some things too long, while put others beyond their proper place; if one wishes to confuse the juror by lack of coherence, he may compose in this way’).

²⁰ (‘honorouable, mean, doubtful or ambivalent, paradoxical, and obscure’).

²¹ See above for Anaximenes’ view (in ch. 25) on obscurity caused by transposition of words, an additional difficulty for the reader to catch the meaning (δυσανάγνωστα).

especially its subtype which is called distinctness (εὐκρίνεια); distinctness is produced by the orator once he decides to determine which subjects of the case the judges should consider first and which of them they should consider second, and to make that clear to them.²² Thus, distinctness is also closely associated to the clear arrangement of the material prepared to be described before the judges. Further down in the same treatise, Hermogenes proposes the technique of enumeration for producing distinctness; enumeration constitutes a method of arrangement initiated by forecasting statements which make clear what arguments or points the orator is going to use and in what order he is going to present them. The technique of enumeration was not unknown in classical oratory, since Aeschines, Demosthenes and other orators use it in their attempt to produce either real clarity or at least a kind of surface clarity.²³

However, the term εὐπαρακολούθητον accompanied by its preconditions is also found in prose in the works of later Greek historians of the Hellenistic period such as Polybius and Diodorus of Sicily; in these cases εὐπαρακολούθητος as a feature of narrative arises as a result of clarity.

Polybius writing his historical work in the 2nd cent. BC tends to believe that narrative has to follow a chronological order as the easiest way for the writer to set it forth and for the readers to follow it (II.40.5)²⁴, while elsewhere he states that the methods of arranging events in chronological order, separating the account of each war, and recapitulating the contemporary occurrences given in the previous Book of his history, would make narrative easy to follow and leave the desired impression on the readers (IV.28.6)²⁵. He supports his own plan to make narrative easy to follow and clear by describing the events of different countries separately, beginning by presenting the events of each year in chronological order (V.31.4–5).²⁶

It is interesting, though, that in some cases (e.g. IV.28.6, VIII.2.10: σαφή [...] καὶ θαυμαστὰ) Polybius makes reference to a conjunction of clear and impressive features of narrative; although critical of the emotional approach to history, in some cases he shows a preference for arousing the wonder of his readers.²⁷ Evidently, the idea of visual representation of history follows the ascertainment that vision lends its cognitive element to any kind of exposition; this is clearly supported by Dionysius of Halicarnassus' own belief that pleasure is produced not only by hearing things said

²² τό τε γὰρ τάξαι, τί πρῶτον καὶ τί δεύτερον ἀπαιτεῖν χρή τοὺς δικάζοντας, εὐκρινείας ὃν μέθοδος οἴμαι τίς ἐστίν.

²³ See for more Wooten (1988).

²⁴ ὑπολαμβάνω δὲ ῥάστην ἐμοί τ' ἂν γενέσθαι τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εὐπαρακολούθητον τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ ποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν [...].

²⁵ διὸ καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα κοινῇ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐξηγησόμεθα, τὰ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὡς εἶπα, προσαναμνησκοντες μόνον τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἐν τῇ προτέρῃ βύβλῳ δεδηλωμένων, ἵνα μὴ μόνον εὐπαρακολούθητος, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταπληκτικὴ γίνηται τοῖς προσέχουσιν ἢ διήγησις.

²⁶ τὸ δ' εὐπαρακολούθητον καὶ σαφὴ γίνεσθαι τὴν διήγησιν οὐδὲν ἀναγκαιότερον ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὀλυμπιάδος ἡγοῦμεθ' εἶναι τοῦ μὴ συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ χωρίζειν καὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὰς καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατόν, μέχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξῆς ὀλυμπιάδας ἐλθόντες κατ' ἔτος ἀρξώμεθα γράφειν τὰς κατάλληλα γενομένας πράξεις.

²⁷ For a distinction between vividness and clarity see Hermogenes' approach (*Περὶ Ἰδεῶν* 1.3.63ff. Rabe): ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐναργῆ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντά πως, οὐ μὴν καθαρὰ διὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ σαφηνισμοῦ τινος δεῖ, [...] ('these expressions or expressions of this kind are vivid and give the style a certain Grandeur; however, they are not pure. Thus, with many of these expressions there is a need for clarification [...]').

but also by seeing things being done.²⁸ Following this idea of Dionysius, we can speak of a kind of illusion that history, by visualising events, presents the past in so lively a manner as to be revealed before the eyes of readers. However, the theoretical background of later historiography, displaying a preference for ἡδονή and τερπνόν, comes into contrast with Thucydides' rejection of μυθῶδες (1.22.4); Duris of Samos and Timaios are well known as representative historians of so-called tragic history, whereas Duris himself appears to criticise Theopompus' and Ephorus' lack of pleasure which characterises their works²⁹.

Consequently, this debate on the distinction or similarities between history and tragedy permeates later historiography and influences authors like Polybius. In book II.56.11ff.³⁰ we come across Polybius' theory of history and its difference from tragedy; he argues that the object of tragedy and history is quite the opposite, making it evident that tragedy purports to thrill and charm (ἐκπλήξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι) the audience for the moment with the verisimilitude of the words put into the characters' mouths, while history's end is to teach and persuade (διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι) the serious students (φιλομαθοῦντας) through the true events and speeches described; a further distinction between tragedy and history brings forth the issue that tragedy uses probability and even untrue statements aiming at spectators' deception, whereas history's crystal clear end is the use of truthful statements to benefit the serious students. In addition, it is worth noting that charm as an end of tragedy is limited only to the present time (κατὰ τὸ παρόν), history profits people for ever (εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον); the analogy of the last point is with Thucydides' claim for his history's everlasting results (Thuc. I.22.4: κτήμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται).³¹

Diodorus of Sicily, a historian of the 1st cent. BC, precludes his historical books with theoretical prooemia, where he explains the principles on which his work is founded. Diodorus in his first theoretical prooemium (in book I) proclaims that he purports to give a history not δυσπερίληπτος ('hard to treat synoptically') and δυσμνημόνευτος ('hard to remember') but εὐχρηστοτάτην [...] τοῖς φιλιαναγνωστοῦσιν ('particularly useful to the people who are fond of reading') (see I.3.1–6). He

²⁸ See *Ant. Rom.* XI.1.3: ἡδεταί γὰρ ἡ διάνοια παντὸς ἀνθρώπου χειραγωγουμένη διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκούουσα τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ὁρῶσα.; cf. also Arist. *Poet.* 1448b11: τὸ γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι [...] καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας ('so, it is an instinct of human beings, since childhood, to engage in mimesis [...] and through mimesis he develops his first learning'), and 15: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον [...] ('that is the reason people feel joy looking at images, because by contemplating them they understand and infer what each element means'); cf. also Walker (1993) 356–57.

²⁹ Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 176: Δοῦρις μὲν οὖν ὁ Σάμιος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν αὐτοῦ Ἱστοριῶν οὕτω φησὶν· «Ἐφορος δὲ καὶ Θεόπομπος [...] οὐτε γὰρ μιμήσεως μετέλαβον οὐδεμιᾶς οὐτε ἡδονῆς ἐν τῷ φράσαι, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ γράφειν μόνον ἐπεμελήθησαν» ('Duris of Samos, in the first book of his Histories states the following: Ephorus and Theopompus [...] did not at all partake either of mimesis or of pleasure in their expression, but simply took care of writing'); on Duris see Kebric (1977).

³⁰ τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγωδίας οὐ ταυτόν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλήξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρόν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας, ἐπειδὴ περ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ἢ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τάληθες διὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν φιλομαθοῦντων.

³¹ See Walker (1993) 356–57.

continues (I.3.8) arguing that the historical work which keeps within the limits of a single narrative and contains a connected account of events facilitates the reading and contains such retrieval of the past in a form that is perfectly easy to follow (I.3.8)³². Diodorus after the criticism of his predecessors maintains that his own work containing the events and acts of the whole world is composed in such a way that benefits the readers; his text is easy to follow, uninterrupted, and useful.

In the prooemium of book XVI (see XVI.1.1–3), he sets up three features for his historical work and his narrative; he first mentions self-existence or self-sufficiency (πράξεις αὐτοτελείς), then easy to remember and clear (εὐμνημόνευτον καὶ σαφῆ), and finally continuity, achieving a well-rounded perfection (τὸ τῆς διηγήσεως συνεχές- ἀπηρτισμένην τὴν τῶν πράξεων ἔχουσιν ἀπαγγελίαν); his purpose – among other things – is not to interrupt the interest of the attentive reader as incomplete narrations do: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡμιτελεῖς πράξεις οὐκ ἔχουσαι συνεχές ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τὸ πέρασ μεσολαβοῦσι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν φιλαναγνωστοῦντων. We can conclude from the prooemium of book XVI that Diodorus regards the reader-oriented virtue of presenting single-subject historical expositions with fullness (πράξεις αὐτοτελείς) as very important; in book XVI, in a single book, the achievements of a monarch, Philip II, are given, for the sake of fullness of a single-subject exposition.³³

Thus, the logical arrangement of narrative is pursued by Diodorus; he tries to combine the seasonal chronological exposition of Thucydides (the so-called ‘synchronistic’ history) with Ephorus’ and Theopompus’ exposition κατὰ γένος, unified in theme and topically arranged. In the prooemium of book V (see V.1), Diodorus makes special reference to οἰκονομία (‘skilful disposition and arrangement’),³⁴ while castigating other historians for their failure to arrange their historical material in a clear and logical order, receiving the approbation of their readers; he then criticises Timaios for his untimely and lengthy censures given as digressions within his narrative.

On the other hand, Polybius (XXXVIII.5–6) criticises Ephorus’ and Theopompus’ exposition κατὰ γένος in his attempt to defend his preference for ‘synchronistic’ exposition. Nevertheless, again the feature of continuity and a well-rounded perfection of exposition (ζητεῖν δὲ τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας τὸ συνεχές καὶ τὸ τέλος ἰμεῖρην ἀκοῦσαι τῆς προθέσεως) with the pleasure and benefit of attentive readers (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν καὶ τὴν ὠφέλειαν οὕτω μᾶλλον συνεκτρέχειν τοῖς προσέχουσιν) are strongly emphasised.³⁵

Diodorus’ respect to readers of his work appears in the account of Asia and the satrapies, where he claims that his narrative is presented in a clear way and easy to follow by the readers, placed before their eyes, since he includes details on topography and distances (XVIII.1.5)³⁶; elsewhere, his implemented plan to advance the causes of a war before the events makes his narration clearer (XVIII.8.1). Going back in time when he narrates the Lamian War helps him to make a series of events

³² ἢ δ’ ἐν μιᾷς συντάξεως περιγραφῇ πραγματεία τὸ τῶν πράξεων εἰρόμενον ἔχουσα τὴν μὲν ἀνάγνωσιν ἐτοίμην παρέχεται, τὴν δ’ ἀνάληψιν ἔχει παντελῶς εὐπαρακολούθητον.

³³ For more see Drews (1963) 250–52.

³⁴ Cf. Oldfather (1939) 96, n.1.

³⁵ See also Meister (1971).

³⁶ οὕτως γὰρ μάλιστα εὐπαρακολούθητος τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἡ διήγησις ἔσται, πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τεθείσης τῆς ὅλης τοποθεσίας καὶ τῶν διαστημάτων.

clearer (XVIII.19.1); the same principle of going back in time is used in the case of Agathocles of Syracuse, in order to present his historical exposition in a clear way (XIX.2.1).

In another theoretical digression, Diodorus (XX.1.5) notes that ‘the principle of keeping the indispensable composition well-placed has been already uphold, while the coherence of the overall description makes the reading pleasing and clear’³⁷, which constitutes a direct reference to the rhetorical works discussing the virtues and vices of narrative; in those works a speaker of a forensic speech (here analogically the writer) has to present his version of events in a clear, concise, plausible, and charming way.³⁸

Conclusions

Clarity as a virtue of style achieves a position of priority in rhetorical theories and models. In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, clarity is found in combination with ornamentation and propriety, while it is included in the rhetorical theory formed by Theophrastus, the Stoics, Epicureans and later Peripatetic theorists like [Demetrius] and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Based on the ideas of Aristotle, Theophrastus, the Stoics and Epicureans, we may conclude that a standard list of virtues was gradually formed, including clarity combined with purity (Hellenism or Latinity), ornamentation combined with appropriateness.³⁹

Later rhetorical theory discusses clarity in an extensive way, bestowing it with pride, and includes it in the category of the necessary qualities of style. Thus, the importance of clarity as a virtue of style may have imposed the idea of words’ subordination to sense found in later theories of style. Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ theory makes a clear distinction between πραγματικὸς τόπος and the λεκτικὸς τόπος,⁴⁰ whereas elsewhere in his work (*Isoc.* 12, lines 18–19) Dionysius concludes that by nature it is the meaning which enjoys priority not the style,⁴¹ invoking the assent of Quintilian (see 8. *Proem.* 20–22)⁴².

Clarity together with brevity and persuasiveness (i.e. σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης) appears also as virtues of narrative in theories formed by Anaximenes, but also in the later period by the Anonymous Seguerianus *Τέχνη Ρητορική* or even Quintilian, who discusses the use of obscurity. Quintilian in an audience-oriented account uses the term δυσπαρακολούθητον (‘hard to follow’) by which he translates *obscurum*, while Anonymous Seguerianus prefers the term ἀνακολουθία with the same meaning. Thus, εὐπαρακολούθητος as a feature of narrative springs from clarity;

³⁷ τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν σύνθεσιν ἔχον εὐκαίρως τετήρηται καὶ τῷ συμφυεῖ τῆς ὅλης περιγραφῆς ἐπιτερεπῆ καὶ σαφῆ παράστησι τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν.

³⁸ See Quint. 4.2.31; Cic. *Orat.* 122, *Part. or.* 32, which completes the list of virtues with ‘suavitas’.

³⁹ See *Rhet. Her.* 4.17ff.; Cic. *De or.* 3.37ff.; Quint. 8.1.1ff.; cf. Atherton (1988) 394.

⁴⁰ See Dion. Hal. *Comp.* ch.1: Διττῆς γὰρ οὐσης ἀσκήσεως περὶ πάντας ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τῆς περὶ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὧν ἡ μὲν τοῦ πραγματικοῦ τόπου μᾶλλον ἐφάπτεσθαι δόξειεν ἄν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ λεκτικοῦ [...] (‘In all the kinds of discourse we need to examine two things: the ideas and the words; it would be proved that the first of these is concerned mainly with subject-matter, while the latter with expression’). See also Rhys Roberts (1902) 35 n. 2.

⁴¹ βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἔπεσθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα (‘it is by nature that the word has to be subordinated to sense and not the sense to word’).

⁴² *Curam ergo uerborum, rerum uolo esse sollicitudinem* (‘What I want is care for the words, but deep concern for the subject-matter’).

and this idea permeates the works of Greek historians of the Hellenistic period such as Polybius and Diodorus of Sicily.

According to Polybius (II.40.5) narrative has to follow a chronological order to make it easiest for the writer to set it forth and for the readers to follow it; specific methods of arranging events in chronological order include separating the account of each war and recapitulating the contemporary occurrences given beforehand.

Diodorus in his theoretical prooemia (for example in books I, XVI), represents his work as a type of history not *δυσπερίληπτος* ('hard to treat synoptically') and *δυσμνημόνευτος* ('hard to remember') but *εὐχρηστοτάτην* [...] *τοῖς φιλιαναγνωστοῦσιν* ('particularly useful [...] to the people who are fond of reading') (see I.3.1–6). He argues for a historical work (I.3.8) with single-subject narrative, well-connected accounts of events and an historical exposition that is easy to follow, uninterrupted, and useful. He also projects his preference for the virtues of self-existence or self-sufficiency (*πράξεις αὐτοτελεῖς*), which may be easy to remember and clear (*εὐμνημόνευτον καὶ σαφῆ*), and finally for continuity, achieving a well-rounded perfection (see XVI.1.1-3).

However, clarity may be associated with vividness as features of narrative (Polybius IV.28.6, VIII. 2.10) forming a theoretical background for later historiography with preference given to *ἡδονή* and *τερπνόν*. Dionysius of Halicarnassus' idea that pleasure is produced not only by hearing things said but also by seeing things being done imposes a kind of historical exposition insisting on visualising events and presenting the past in a lively manner before the eyes of readers.

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Variatio in Gargilius Martialis' Medicinae ex holeribus et pomis

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Abstract

Quintus Gargilius Martialis was a Roman writer who wrote – inter alia – a concise guide as a compilation on gardening. 60 chapters are saved from this project, entitled *Medicinae ex (h)oleribus et pomis* ('Medicines from vegetables and fruits'). It includes both instructions for growing fruit trees and vegetables, as well as information on their healing properties, together with some medical prescriptions. The sources of the work, which he essentially refines and redrafts, are Pliny's *Historia Naturalis* ('Natural History'), and Dioscorides' and Galen's *Materia Medica* ('Medical Material'). Gargilius Martialis adds elements of his own empirical knowledge to the already existing information, mixed with popular beliefs and even magical practices. His aim was not only to write a scientific textbook, probably intended for medical school students, but also a popular and practical reading for any *paterfamilias* who wanted to plant a vegetable or a tree, but also to know how to cure a member of his family from a simple disease. For this reason the book is written in rhythmic prose, full of rhetorical devices, especially impressive metaphors. Even more striking is the *variatio* of the vocabulary, in an effort to satisfy both potential readers of a scientific view and ordinary readers of a book that nevertheless raises literary claims: use of precise technical terminology from botanical, medical pharmaceutical vocabulary, awkward periphrasis, Hellenisms and Latinisms in an effort to render difficult terms, replacing of familiar terms with new ones by transcription, translation or adaptation, introduction of a peculiar spelling, use of words of popular language, even jargon, creating new terms, some of which were adopted by later writers, while others remained *hapax legomena*. Similar processes also feature in other authors of compilations, which are examined in a more general context of this kind of literary and scientific production.

Quintus Gargilius Martialis¹ was a Roman writer who wrote a compilation on horticulture. Probably born around AD 200 in Auzia, Mauretania (modern-day Morocco), he belonged to the equestrian class and served as a tribune of a cohort. He died in Mauretania during a local Berber uprising in AD 260. We do not know whether he was a physician or not. What we do know is that he owned a farm in Africa. Moreover, he was admired for completing Virgil's *Georgica*.²

¹ For more details on his work, see Mazzini (1977a) 99–121; Tapper (1980); Riddle (1984); 408–29; Mazzini (1988²); Prioreschi (1998) 510–13. Editions by Rose (1870) 113–60 and especially Maire (2002), with introduction, rich commentary, translation and bibliography, and Maire (2007), providing a new translation. New edition of the agricultural fragments by Zainaldin (2020). For a general survey of similar texts, see Mantzilas (2015) 187–213. I have used parts of this article for the present contribution.

² Servius, *In Vergilii Georgicon commentarii*. 4.148.

Considerable fragments of Gargilius Martialis' *Medicinae ex (h)oleribus et pomis*³ have come down to us in 60 chapters, dealing with the cultivation of fruit trees and vegetables and also their medicinal properties affecting certain organs or parts of the human body. The chapters, written in rhythmical prose full of rhetorical devices, are divided into two groups: 1–39 *De oleribus* (vegetables) and 40–60 *De pomis* (fruits). The chapters⁴ are the following:

A) *De oleribus*: I. *De raphano* (horseradish), II. *De apio* (celery), III. *De ruta* (common rue), IIII. *De coliandro* (coriander), V. *De malua* (common mallow), VI. *De cucurbita* (colocynth), VII. *De artiplice* (orach, garden spinach), VIII. *De lapatio* (sorrel), VIII. *De blito* (purple amaranth), X. *De beta* (chard), XI. *De lactuca* (lettuce), XII. *De intibo* (chicory, endive), XIII. *De nasturcio* (nasturtium), XIII. *De eruca* (rocket, arugula), XV. *De pepone* (water-melon), XVI. *De cucumere* (cucumber), XVII. *De carduo* (thistle), XVIII. *De allio* (garlic), XVIII. *De papauere* (papaver), XX. *De satureia* (satureja), XXI. *De porro* (leek), XXII. *De ocimo* (basilic), XXIII. *De nepeta* (nepeta), XXIII. *De menta* (mint), XXV. *De feniculo* (fennel), XXVI. *De holisatro* (alisanders, horse parsley, smyrnium), XXVII. *De cepa* (onion), XXVIII. *De anetho* (dill), XXVIII. *De sinapi* (mustard), XXX. *De cauliculo* (cawlfloer), XXXI. *De asparago* (asparagus), XXXII. *De armoracia* (wild radish, white charlock), XXXIII. *De pastinaca* (carrot), XXXIII. *De napo* (turnip), XXXV. *De rapo* (celery), XXXVI. *De thymo* (thyme), XXXVII. *De oregano* (oregano), XXXVIII. *De cerefolio* (chervil, French parsley), XXXVIII. *De serpyllo* (wild thyme).

B) *De pomis*: XL. *De piro* (pear), XLI. *De malo granato* (pomegranate), XLII. *De malo* (apple), XLIII. *De cydonio* (quince), XLIII. *De persico* (peach), XLV. *De citrio* (citron), XLVI. *De pruno* (plum), XLVII. *De mespylo* (medlar), XLVIII. *De zizypho* (jujube), XLVIII. *De fico* (fig), L. *De sorbo* (rowan), LI. *De siliqua* (carob), LII. *De cerasio* (cherry), LIII. *De amygdalo* (almond), LIII. *De abellana* (hazelnut), LV. *De pistachio* (peanut), LVI. *De castanea* (chestnut), LVII. *De nuce* (walnut), LVIII. *De pinea* (pine cone), LVIII. *De myxis* (Assyrian plum, lasura), LX. *De spomelidibus* (sorbus).

Gargilius Martialis' text is mainly based on *Historia Naturalis* of Pliny the Elder (books 19, 20 and 23), and *Materia Medica* of Dioscorides and Galen, although it also contains his personal experience and empirical knowledge, simplifications, popular beliefs and magic practices, excluding every theoretical consideration or arguments from the medical schools in Rome⁵ but not a specific portion of the terminology used by them. There are also some receptions from Celsus and Columella. It is possible that it was written as a manual for the students of medical schools, under the reign of

³ The work formed together with the Roman agronomists part of the Florentine Codex Marcianus but had already been removed from this collection before the codex was completely lost in the 16th century. Parts of it are preserved in Palladius' books of the months under the headings *De hortis* (or *De oleribus*) and *De pomis*.

⁴ We follow Maire's (2002) edition.

⁵ For the medical schools in Rome, see Mudry and Pigeaud (1991).

Alexander Severus –⁶ Gargilius Martialis is quoted as an authority for the private life and habits of this emperor.⁷

Gargilius Martialis had also written technical treatises on rural economy (*De hortis*)⁸ and veterinary science (*De boum* or *Curae boum ex corpore Gargili Martialis*),⁹ from which 23 fragments survive, probably written by another person.¹⁰ A hypothesis considered that his lost work *De hortis* was in fact two parts of a domestic encyclopaedia, destined to the would-be *paterfamilias*, so that he could effectively treat both his family and servants but also his garden's trees. Moreover two fragments, one on herbs and fruits,¹¹ which probably belonged to his work called *Dynamidia*, and a second, exclusively on fruits,¹² are now also considered as pseudepigrapha.¹³ Their conventional names are *De Oleribus Martialis* and *De arboribus pomiferis* or *De Pomis ex Martiale*.¹⁴ Last but not least Gargilius Martialis might be the writer of the Pseudo-Dioscorides' *De herbis femininis*, which was the Latin translation of *Materia Medica* of Dioscorides.¹⁵

Medicinae ex (h)oleribus et pomis is certainly not a technical treatise addressed to specialists; on the contrary it has a practical and didactic purpose, even though the striking vocabulary variation is not compatible with a school manual, which ought to be easier to memorise.¹⁶ This work influenced other writers, the first one being Palladius, writer of *Opus agriculturae* (or *De Re Rustica*),¹⁷ a 14-part treatise on farming that gives detailed monthly instructions for the typical activities of a year on a Roman farm. Written in a simple language, it is a practical manual for every (rich) household, showing also some literary merit. The second writer was Anthimus, a Byzantine doctor exiled in Italy, where he lived at the royal court, after having been accused of treason. He wrote soon after in AD 511, in the form of a letter¹⁸ to

⁶ According to Mazzini (1982–84) 75–90.

⁷ *Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Alexander Severus* 37.10. According to this information drawn from the pseudo-author of the *Historia Augusta* (Aelius Lampridius), he lived in the 3rd cent. AD (SHA *Alex.Sev.* 37.9).

⁸ Mazzini (1977b); Maire (2002) XVI–XVIII.

⁹ Maire (2002) XVIII–XX. They are now considered forgeries on linguistic grounds.

¹⁰ See Langslow (2000) 63.

¹¹ Maire (2002) XXI–XXIII.

¹² Maire (2002).XXIII. It has survived in a Neapolitan fragment of the 6th century.

¹³ See Mazzini (1977a) 111–13, who proved that they were falsely attributed to Gargilius; Rose (1963²) 131–50.

¹⁴ The first two have been given by Maire, the third by Rose.

¹⁵ Maire (2002) XIV, XX–XXI.

¹⁶ See Maire (1997) 316.

¹⁷ Rutilius Taurus Aemilianus Palladius, usually called just Palladius, lived in the fourth century AD. Most of the book is in prose, with part 14 *De Insitione* ('On Fruit Trees') written in elegiac verse, influenced by Virgil and Columella. His work, surviving in many manuscripts, gained popularity between the ninth and fifteenth centuries, as translations in German, English and Catalan show. He was a specialist in agriculture having personal experience, since he possessed estates in Italy and Sardinia. A fifteenth part, with medical-veterinarian content, often substitutes in editions of *De Insitione*, the latter considered as a separate work on tree culture; see Svennung (1935); Rodgers (1975).

¹⁸ A series of didactic medical letters (*Epistulae medicinales*) survive, either in the form of prefaces (to Scribonius Largus, the *Medicina Plinii*, or Marcellus), or as separate treatises, theoretical or practical (e.g. Anthimus and Vindicianus).

Theodoric the Great, king of the Ostrogoths, a short Latin treatise¹⁹ on dietetics, entitled *De observatione ciborum (ad Theodoricum regem Francorum epistula)*, a half-medical textbook, half-cook book, also recalling Apicius. We find receptions or mentions of Gargilius Martialis in Macer Floridus (pseudonym of Odon de Meung), in *Carmen de uiribus herbarum* (eleventh century), in Ibn al-Āwwâm (twelfth century), in the new alphabetical version of the Latin Dioscorides, in the so-called *Dynamidia*, in Ibn-Hedijadi and in many treatises related to psychotherapy.

Gargilius Martialis starts with the general characteristics, following a Theophrastian classification, and continues with the exposition of the therapeutic proprieties of each part of a herb, condiment, fruit or vegetable, ending with a recipe (containing mainly wine or honey), a procedure not always followed. The unevenness of his work²⁰ and the absence of a *praefatio* show unfinished redaction, lack of complete sources or even his tendency towards variety.²¹ This variety is expressed by the diversity of the sources he used but also by his unique way of effecting their compilation and reformulation:²² the writer refuses to translate his sources; he remains faithful not to their letter but to their spirit.

Moreover, Gargilius Martialis provides a phenomenal variety of synonyms (e.g. *virtus*, *substantia*, *natura*, and *effectus*, all describing the medical effects of a plant). This synonymic alternation contains, indiscriminately, accurate technical terms (see the alteration of words and phrases denoting the act of drinking a medicine such as *propinare*, *potare*, *bibere*, *potionem praesumere*, *in potionem sumere*, *in potione dare*, *potandus offertur*, *in potione perducere*, *in potione miscere*, *in potione uti* etc.) but also paraphrases and/or periphrases (e.g. *menstrua feminarum incitare*; *menstrua feminis provocare*; *menstrua impellit*, which mean 'induce menses', or *stomacho inutilis / contrarius / adversus*, which translate the Greek *κακοστόμαχος*; on the contrary *ευστόμαχος* is translated by both a neologism *eustomachus* and various periphrases: *stomacho accomodatus / utilis / prodesse / oportunos / convenire*; see Maire (2002) XLVII) used for describing terms that are difficult to translate into Latin.²³ His unique style stands out for the exoticisms (unexpected words and structures, e.g. *genitale semen (genitura)*, *suspiriosus (asthmaticus)*, *potator (potor)*, *xerocollyrium*, *oxyporium* etc.), terminology (Gargilius uses both technical vocabulary and common expressions, e.g. *theriacis* and *contra insidias venenorum*). He also uses various poetic expressions such as *puerperis*, *anima linquitur* etc.), substitution of well-known terms (e.g. *ingerere* instead of *in cibo sumere*), introduction of new spellings (e.g. *querela* instead of *quaerela*), and rich (even striking) metaphors (e.g. from military terminology: *pugnare contra*, *resistere*, *necare*, *expugnare*, *perimere et expellere*, *calamitas cogere*, *interimere*, *defendere*). For more examples that make the narration vivid, see Maire (2002) L–LI), for the Greek and Latin words and/or

¹⁹ The book is of great interest for the picture it gives of the eating and drinking habits of the Germanic people, and for the peculiar nature of the author's language (or rather idiom) which he had learnt as an adult entirely from the speech of the people; see Weber (1924); Liechtenhan (1963); Deroux (1991) 407–16; Grant (1996).

²⁰ For general and specific characteristics of Gargilius Martialis' work, see Maire (1997) *passim*, who provides plenty of examples.

²¹ Maire (1997) 308–309.

²² Maire (2002) XXXII–XXXIII.

²³ Maire (2002) XXXV.

expressions used alongside each other (Gargilius uses indiscriminately both Latin and Greek terms, e.g. *pilula* and *catapotium*, *distillatio* and *catarrus*, *favus* and *ceria*, *impetigines* and *lichenae* etc.) but also for the sobriety of the syntax.²⁴ It must be noted that there is a large percentage of vulgarisms such as diminutives (e.g. *auricula* (*auris*), *pustella* (*pustula*), *cauliculi* (*caules*), *flosculus* (*flos*) and so on), compound verbs (e.g. *effundere*, *confundere*, *infundere* used instead of the simple *fundere*), pleonasms (e.g. *feminarum menstruis*, *magis accendat*, *pugnat contra*, *febrium ardores* etc.), strange expressions and words and structures belonging to Vulgar Latin (e.g. *fervor* instead of *calor*, *ardor* instead of *febris* etc. In this category belong also terms ending in *-ura* (*strictura*, *tritura*, *tensura*, *temperatura*) which are absent from Classical Latin).²⁵ Words of Greek origin (hellenisms, e.g. *dysenteria*, *stypticus*, *peripneumonicis*, *condyloma*; words ending in *-on* or *-es*, such as *amygdalon picron*, *diacerasion*, *diacodion*, *diapeganon*, *diaprasion*, *diacalaminthes*; words ending in *-ice*, e.g. *stomatice*, *oporice*, *hedrice*, see Maire (2002) XLVIII–XLIX) are also omnipresent, belonging to the botanical, pathological and pharmacological terminology.²⁶ In order to insert these pleonasms into the Latin vocabulary, Gargilius uses transliteration, translation or adaptation of preexisting terms. Sometimes, instead of borrowing terms, he prefers to invent neologisms (e.g. *conditura*, *causticus*, *alectorius*, *eustomachus*, *diureticus*, *catharticus*, *thermanticus*, *catarrus*, *eustomachus* and so on; see Maire (2002) XLIII–XLIV): some of them were adopted by later writers but some others remained *hapax legomena*. His goal is to find the proper terminology which will satisfy not only the *lecteurs avertis* of a scientific treatise but also the readers of a book having certain literary claims.

All medical or pseudo-medical treatises of this type belong to the genre of concise guides ('abrévés'), being in reality elaborated summaries, in the form of compilations aiming to resume (the integrality of) previous knowledge from various writers, even from school manuals and glossaries. The adaptation of the intellectual patrimony for practical use but also in order to preserve this knowledge and transmit it to the future is an important concern in late Antiquity and encompasses all sciences. Moreover, the compilers tried to adapt this knowledge to the Roman mentality, so that it could be accepted more easily and absorbed by the unknowing public. That is why – with the exception of the African writers²⁷ – they mix Greek sources with Latin ones, which were more familiar to the Romans. Their divergence from the original texts is linguistic, bibliographical and ethical: linguistic because they create a new medical bilingual idiom, bibliographical because they also refer to Latin writings, and ethical, because they discuss taboo matters, such as virginity, menstruation, homosexuality, the foetus as a living being, satyriasis, etc. In fact these specific writers are elaborators of the foreign medical grammarology, giving it new perspectives, being addressed to a new public in a different era, under a different political situation and within a Christian and not a Pagan society. In addition to that, we observe a frequent omission of phrases (mostly of historical or doxographical content) or whole parts of the surviving Greek texts, interventions, suppressions, alterations, modifications and

²⁴ Maire (2002) XXXVI.

²⁵ Maire (2002) XXXVII–XLI.

²⁶ Maire (2002) XLI–L.

²⁷ Moreover, in treatises originating from Africa we find also various Punic and Semitic elements.

reorganisations of the material, according to the doctrine and the personal experience (or inexperience) of the compiler. This procedure is based on the notions of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* ('imitation' and 'emulation'), in an effort to create something similar to the original but better than it.

That is why we cannot talk about translations but about translated new versions or literal renderings that do not correspond exactly to the original, mixing elements from other writers but also mirroring the personal beliefs and knowledge of the compiler/adaptor who also desires to give a sense of originality by adding his own, personal flavour. We should deal with these texts not as translations *stricto sensu* but as sources of knowledge about the Greek originals. Interpretation and rearrangement of the Greek original were central to its Latin rendition, which was more than just a Latin paraphrase.

Books describing the medical art in general have an objective character, which is technical, functional and utilitarian. The fact that this medical knowledge comes mainly from Greece makes it inevitable for compilers to use Greek terminology, hellenisms that were well known at least among doctors and the upper classes of Roman society. It is true though that the level of knowledge of Greek (or even Latin) varies considerably from one writer to another, a common phenomenon of the era, due to the fluidity of language in all degrees, among genres, sub-genres and writers. In most cases, the treatises are used as an aide-memoire, a short summary, for doctors, students or individuals. Therefore, they have a pedagogical aspect, which is consistent with the usage of simple language (except for technical terminology).

The writers initially had to overcome their anti-Greek prejudice and moral resistance towards the arts from Greece, and to cope with the insufficient means that Latin, the language of farmers and soldiers, had to offer, in order to create such a demanding technical language as the medical one.²⁸ Under the Empire, which became philhellenic, things became better, and the dream of having a common Greco-Latin medical language, a *mélange* used to explain the eclectic diversity of Latin medicine, became the aim of translators. In fact, what emerged was a mixture of Greek concepts, Latin approximations and semi-Latinised terms. There had been an invasion of Greek terms, which were easily assimilated, because they were never considered as exotic.

From a stylistic point of view, all the compilers look for ways of making their *breviloquia* as interesting as possible, especially when they are addressed to the general public. This is the reason why they sometimes use poetic phrases, pleonasm, emphasis in expression and popular jargon. Moreover, they apply *variatio sermonis*: by using equivalent, synonymic²⁹ words (sometimes absolute) and phrases in abundance, alternating simple expressions with periphrastic turns of phrase, they break monotony, exploiting all the possibilities that the Latin language gives them to apply absolute synonymy or translatability. Of course this is also a result of the diversity of sources that the Roman writer has to unify, and is also due to the various

²⁸ Concerning technical medical language, see de Saint-Denis (1943) 55–79; Baader (1970) 1–19; Mazzini (1978) 543–56; de Meo (1983); André (1986) 1–18; Mazzini (1991) 175–85; Pocetti et al. (1999) 350–76; Sconocchia (2004) 493–544; Maire (2014). For Latin technical vocabulary in general, see Fruyt's bibliography (http://www.dhell.paris-sorbonne.fr/formation_des_mots:9._les_vocabulaires_techniques).

²⁹ Langslow (2000) 16–17.

geographical, socio-political and socio-linguistic factors affecting him. Thus, variety in vocabulary, having many different words translating a Greek one, is a common phenomenon (e.g. the terms *morbis*, *causa*, *calamitas*, *vitium*, *querela*, *passio*, which translate the Greek ἀσθένεια or πόνος).

From a theoretical point of view, there were various translational approaches: there was a clear distinction between translating word for word (*verbum pro verbo*) and translating in a way which communicated style and effect, i.e. sense for sense translation, which was more an interpretative strategy.³⁰ Moreover, translators tried to produce work that was aesthetically pleasing and – more or less – creative but also precise, since technical terminology was implied.

The major difficulty for the adapters was exactly that: to find a similar word or expression, in order to translate a Greek term with a Latin one.³¹ Their aim is to create technical terms which refer unambiguously to a class, a subclass, or an individual item in the technical classification, an aim not always attained, because of the polysemy of their terminology, which is incomplete, fragmentary and variable from author to author.³² In other words, the constitution of a uniform scientific language by the Latin medical writers was never accomplished, the main reason being the heterogeneity of their writings, from scientific treatise to encyclopaedia and from popular reading to pseudo-medical magic incantations, using different levels of vocabulary and idioms.³³ The ideal would be that each work provided a special language for pharmacology, anatomy and surgery respectively, but that is seldom the case: most of the treatises are more interested in applied science (*ars*) – identifying medicine with therapy – than the theoretical branch of it (*scientia*), depending always on the user they are destined for.

Term-formation or simply word-formation involves the use of proper names, semantic extension, especially of non-technical words in technical usage, compounding and suffix derivation, the formation of lexicalised phrases (phrasal terms), Greek- and Latin- based neologisms, and the use of abbreviations and formulae.³⁴ These new features created such a special technical language for the speakers of the same profession, namely the doctors, that it can justify the term ‘Medical Latin’, a sociolect, being a variety of Standard Latin, with overlaps and influences between them. This new idiom was not generally understood in the

³⁰ Some of the key terms used (under Cicero’s influence) are: *vertere*, *mutare*, *transferre*, and (*latine*) *exprimere*.

³¹ The bibliography on the translating procedure and problems of creating or adapting medical language is extensive; see e.g. André (1963) 47–67; Bendz (1964) 13–57; Vázquez-Buján (1984a) 152–63 (with bibliography, p. 161, n. 1), who analyses the problem of the origin of the Latin translations of Hippocrates (on *De conceptu*, *Aphorismi*), whether they belong to one person or a group belonging to the same cultural centre, like a medical school. They contain errors both in understanding and in translating, and confusion of terms, showing that they were not written by a doctor; Vázquez-Buján (1984b) 641–80; Vázquez-Buján (1988) 167–78; Mazzini (1989); Mazzini (1991) 175–86; Mudry (1991) 257–70; Boscherini (1993); Önerfors & Haase (1993) 227–392; Mazzini (1997) 97–111, 121–71.

³² On the problem of finding the ideal term, see Langslow (2000) 6ff.

³³ Magic, perhaps to be compared to faith healing, was a regular feature of the manuals. Magico-medical spells and inscriptions, as on amulets, frequently personify and apostrophise the ailment. As recipients of this tradition, Greek and Roman medical writers offered magical, verbal therapies along with theoretical and empirical approaches. See Heim (1892) 463–576.

³⁴ See Langslow (2000) ix.

linguistic community as a whole, despite many efforts at 'popularisation' of knowledge.³⁵

Often the translation is vague or rough: corresponding to a Greek term are found in Latin a noun with a genitive, two nouns, a noun and an adjective, two adjectives, a participle, a relative, that is mostly an explanation and not a translation, a definition, a circumlocution and so on.³⁶ Greek terminology might be more elaborated, while the Latin one was deficient and poor. In this case, the writers of such treatises had to apply a non-technical generic term in order to explain a unique Greek term, which is paradoxically more frequent and well-known than the Latin derivations, which are often confusing as they differ from one author to another. There are sometimes even in the same author three or more versions of the same word (a Greek, one or two Latin and a popular). Their effort to enrich Latin terminology led to the creation of neologisms, and we are uncertain whether they were actually used in the doctor's technical jargon or whether they are just inventions of the authors, which were not really applied. They are usually formed in two ways: a) with morphological patterns, being words whose parts (prefix, radical, suffix) are constructed analogically to the Greek equivalent, and b) with semantic patterns, either by using an existent word, with no medical connotation, giving it a new meaning, analogically to a Greek word that has these two meanings, or by using two – at first sight – irrelevant words that stem from an equivalent to the Greek Latin word.³⁷ There are of course cases where the new Latin term has nothing to do with the Greek one, having no direct or indirect etymological connection.

In conclusion, Gargilius Martialis belongs to a large group of writers, who wrote theoretical treatises related, either directly or indirectly, to medicine and botany. With the aim of writing a textbook which would be, at the same time, both scientific and popular, he demonstrates a striking variety (*variatio*) of vocabulary, terminology, means of expression, rhetorical devices, and subject, making his handbook useful for practical reading, while showing various literary merits.

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³⁵ Paraphrasing Langslow (2000) 13.

³⁶ See examples of all these cases in Bendz (1964) 13ff.

³⁷ For these procedures, see Fraisse (2002) LXII–LXIV.

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Text und Metatext in Sosipatras Vita

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Abstract

The present work deals with the Philometor-Episode from Sosipatra's biography, which in turn is contained in Eunapius' *Lives of Philosophers and Sophists (Vitae Sophistarum)*. Based on a recently published article that pointed to crucial connections between the episode and the *Phaedrus*, the present study reveals further allusions to this Platonic dialogue and aims to discuss the function of these allusions within Sosipatra's biography. After a detailed analysis of the episode's structure as well as of some rhetorical elements contained in it, it turns out that the function of these implicit references to the *Phaedrus* corresponds with the *skopos* of Eunapius' entire biographical work: i.e. to stress some advantages of dealing with Neoplatonic philosophy and, more specifically, the advantages of a theurgic-philosophical way of living. Additionally, the current study also discusses aspects of Hermias' late antique commentary of the *Phaedrus* in order to exemplify some of the connotations this dialogue evoked within Neoplatonic philosophical circles. Assuming these connotations when reading Sosipatra's biography, a second level of understanding emerges, which does not stand for itself but, on the contrary, when applied back to the text it can provide a more specific, that is a philosophical understanding of the Philometor-Episode; at least insofar as the recipients of Eunapius' *Lives* shared a similar conception of the *Phaedrus* to the one described in Hermias' late antique commentary.

1. Einleitung

Wie aus dem Titel hervorgeht, werde ich mich in diesem Beitrag¹ mit der Biographie der neuplatonischen Philosophin Sosipatra befassen, und zwar mit Aspekten der rhetorischen Darstellung ihrer Vita. Diese befindet sich in der Biographiensammlung *Vitae Sophistarum* (kurz: *VS*) des Eunapios aus Sardes. Dabei werde ich mich auf die letzte Passage ihrer Biographie konzentrieren, die sogenannte Philometor-Episode. Durch eine genauere Untersuchung der Struktur und der rhetorischen Darstellung dieser Passage werde ich versuchen, folgende Fragestellung zu beantworten: *Inwiefern lassen sich Bezüge zum platonischen Phaidros in der Philometor-Episode feststellen und welche Auswirkung können diese Bezüge unter Berücksichtigung des Skopos der VS auf das Verständnis der Episode haben?*

Sosipatras Vita hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten in der Forschung zunehmend an Aufmerksamkeit gewonnen. Vornehmlich wurde ihre Biographie für Untersuchungen zu (spät)antiken Frauengestalten und zur Theurgie herangezogen, wobei speziell die

¹ Für ihre aufmerksame Lektüre und für ihre Anmerkungen zum Aufsatz bin ich Margarete und Triantafyllos Regopoulos sowie Sophie Kornprobst von Herzen dankbar. Außerdem möchte ich Dr. K. Stefou für die zahlreichen und anregenden Diskussionen im Rahmen des Workshops „Mapping the Rhetoric of Science Writing in Antiquity and Beyond“ danken.

Philometor-Episode zur Erforschung spätantiker magischer Praktiken verwendet wurde.² Die Philometor-Episode wurde außerdem, aufgrund ihrer Eros-Thematik, insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer romanhaften Darstellung untersucht, wobei etliche Parallelen zum griechischen und zum römischen Liebesroman aufgezeigt wurden.³ Im vorliegenden Beitrag jedoch soll weniger der Bezug der Episode zum Liebesroman, als vielmehr der philosophische Gehalt im Vordergrund stehen. Dazu werde ich einen im Jahr 2004 erschienenen Beitrag zur Rolle des *Phaidros* für die Interpretation des Ausgangs der Philometor-Episode besonders berücksichtigen.

Zunächst sollen einige Vorbemerkungen zur Funktion der gesamten Biographiensammlung sowie zu zwei für die Philometor-Episode grundlegende Begriffe vorausgeschickt werden, die das Verständnis der späteren Analyse erleichtern sollen. Um die Vita der Sosipatra untersuchen zu können, soll also zunächst (Kap. 2.1) der Skopos der in den *VS* enthaltenen Philosophenviten behandelt werden. In Kapitel 2.2. wird der Begriff der Theurgie erläutert, damit die darauffolgende Zusammenfassung der Vita besser verstanden wird. Dabei beansprucht das Kapitel jedoch nicht, eine umfassende Erläuterung des Begriffs zu geben, sondern soll lediglich eine einleitende Erklärung der für diese Arbeit relevanten Aspekte der Theurgie darstellen. Dies wird sowohl für das Verständnis von Sosipatras Vita hilfreich sein als auch eine spätere Gegenüberstellung der Theurgie mit der Magie ermöglichen. Außerdem wird dadurch – vor dem Hintergrund der Vorbemerkungen zum Skopos der *VS* (Kap. 2.1.) – auch ersichtlich, dass Eunapios mit der Darstellung von Sosipatras Vita, also durch die Textform der Biographik, eine Form von Wissensvermittlung betreibt; ein Wissen, das sich vornehmlich auf eine bestimmte (theurgische) Lebensweise bezieht, die – der philosophischen Lehrtradition Jamblichs zufolge – für das Erlangen philosophischer Erkenntnisse unabdingbar ist.⁴

Um die Philometor-Episode besser in den Gesamtkontext einordnen zu können, werde ich im darauffolgenden Kapitel (2.3.) die für die Fragestellung relevanten Stellen von Sosipatras Vita bis zur Philometor-Episode zusammenfassen. Auf die Zusammenfassung wird in Kap. 2.4. der Begriff der Goetie (eine Form der Magie)⁵ insoweit erläutert werden, wie es für die spätere Analyse nötig sein wird. Anschließend soll die Goetie mit der Theurgie verglichen werden, um den Unterschied zwischen den zwei möglicherweise ähnlich erscheinenden Praktiken darzustellen. Dieser Unterschied wird in der späteren Beschäftigung mit der Philometor-Episode eine entscheidende Rolle spielen.

Im Anschluss daran wird anhand bestimmter Textstellen die Struktur der Episode aufgezeigt werden (Kap. 3.1). Innerhalb der Struktur soll der Fokus auf einige Bezüge

² Zu Sosipatras Vita in Beiträgen zur Theurgie und zur Goetie sowie zur (spät)antiken Darstellung von philosophisch (bzw. christlich) herausragenden Frauen seien hier exemplarisch folgende Untersuchungen erwähnt:

Zur Theurgie: Athanassiadi (1992) 59–60; Addey (2016).

Zur Goetie: Winkler (1991) 223; 226.

Zur (spät)antiken Darstellung herausragender Frauen: Tanaseanu-Döbler (2013) 123–47; Urbano (2013) 245–72; Denzey Lewis (2014) 274–97.

³ S. dazu Becker (2013) 313.

⁴ S. dazu S. 125–26 in dieser Arbeit.

⁵ In dieser Arbeit werden Begriffe wie Magie und Zauberei auf die Bedeutung der Goetie (γοητεία) beschränkt, wie sie in Kap. 2.4. dargestellt wird.

zum platonischen *Phaidros* gerichtet werden, um diese später – vor dem Hintergrund der bereits erfassten Struktur der Episode und auf der Grundlage des Skopos der *VS* – zu deuten (Kap. 3.2.). In einem abschließenden Kapitel (Kap. 4.) sollen schließlich die Ergebnisse meiner Arbeit zusammengefasst werden.

2. Einbettung in den Kontext

2.1. Eunapios' Philosophenbiographien und ihre Funktion

Die *VS* des Eunapios aus Sardes, wahrscheinlich um 400 n. Chr. verfasst,⁶ sind eine Biographiensammlung, die das Leben von herausragenden Philosophen⁷, Sophisten und Iatrosophisten (Medizinern)⁸ aus der Zeit des 3. und 4. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. darstellt.⁹

Der Skopos der *VS* wird einerseits durch die Auswahlkriterien¹⁰, nach denen Eunapios verfährt, indem er lediglich bestimmte Lebenssituationen ausgewählter Persönlichkeiten der besagten Zeitspanne herausgreift, und andererseits in der Programmatik zu Beginn des Proömiums deutlich.

Bei der Auswahl der porträtierten Philosophin und Philosophen fällt zunächst auf, dass sie größtenteils – wie auch Eunapios selbst –¹¹ der philosophischen Lehrtradition Jamblichs angehören.¹² Die *Viten* sind dabei nicht nur chronologisch aneinandergereiht, sondern ihre Abfolge ergibt sich durch die entsprechenden Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnisse.¹³ Durch den fließenden Übergang der *Viten* wird eine kontinuierliche und in sich feste philosophische Tradition vermittelt, deren langer zeitlicher Bestand bei der Leserschaft der *VS* Vertrauen erwecken soll.¹⁴

⁶ Becker (2013) 31.

⁷ Eunapios schreibt an mehreren Stellen, dass es sich bei den Biographien um herausragende Männer handle. Vgl. *οἱ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν βίαι* (Eunapius, *VS* II.1.1.), *ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν κατάλογοι* (ebd. VI.6.6.). Sospitras ist die einzige Frau, deren *Vita* in den *VS* beschrieben wird.

Diese Arbeit basiert auf den griechischen Text folgender Ausgabe: Giangrande (1956).

⁸ Die Aufteilung übernehme ich von Becker, da die Bezeichnung „Iatrosophist“ in den *VS* nicht vorkommt. Der Terminus „Iatrosophist“ bezeichne „die Kompetenzmischung einer medizinischen und einer rhetorisch-philosophischen Tätigkeit“ (s. Becker [2013] 533).

⁹ Becker (2013) 144. Alle drei Bereiche (Philosophie, Rhetorik, Medizin) scheint Eunapios, ausgehend von seiner im Werk verstreuten selbstreferenziellen Darlegungen, gut beherrscht zu haben (ebd. 25–29).

¹⁰ Zu den Auswahlkriterien vgl. ebd. 39–40.

¹¹ Becker (2013) 26.

¹² In den *VS* ist „eine selektive Darstellung und Gewichtung erkennbar, die sich an dem Kriterium orientiert, wie potentielle Biographiesubjekte gegenüber dem Jamblich-Kreis eingestellt sind. Eunapios verfolgt gewissermaßen seine eigene „intellectual lineage“ zurück“ (Becker [2013] 36).

So finden einige bedeutende Philosophen des 3. und 4. Jh., die aber nicht dieser „intellectual lineage“ angehören, in den *VS* keine Erwähnung, wodurch Eunapios' Positionierung deutlich wird. Es fällt zum Beispiel auf, dass Eunapios zwar Sospitras *Vita* in extenso beschreibt, während die ihm sicherlich bekannte Philosophin Hypatia verschwiegen wird. Dies erklärt Becker folgendermaßen: „Nach allem, was über das Wirken dieser Philosophin [Hypatia] bekannt ist, hat sie jedoch eher einen Gelehrtenplatonismus mit theurgischen Elementen in der Tradition Plotins und des Prophyrios vertreten, dem das vordringliche Interesse des Eunapios nicht galt“ (Becker [2013] 37).

¹³ Iles Johnston (2012) 108: „One purpose of Eunapius' narration, overall, is to trace the chain of teacher-student relationships by which Iamblichus' ideas were transmitted to later generations of Neoplatonists, down to Eunapius himself“.

¹⁴ Stenger schreibt dazu „Indem der Autor sein Leitbild an die Abfolge von Lehrern und Schülern anknüpft, versieht er es mit der Legitimation der Kontinuität. Er stellt sein Ideal in eine Reihe mit

Wenn man nun den Blick auf die Ereignisse richtet, für deren Schilderung sich Eunapios entschieden hat, fällt auf, dass sie die Nähe der dargestellten Philosophen zum Göttlichen hervorheben und die große Anerkennung unterstreichen, die die porträtierten Philosophen innerhalb der Gesellschaft genossen.¹⁵ Die Nähe zum Göttlichen sowie die breite Anerkennung, die ihnen aufgrund ihrer philosophischen Fähigkeiten widerfährt, erzeugen bei diesen Viten einen werbenden Charakter für die philosophische Lehrtradition Jamblichs.¹⁶

Neben diesen Aspekten, die auf ähnliche Art und Weise in allen Viten vorkommen, fallen weitere Gemeinsamkeiten bei den behandelnden Philosophen auf: ähnliche soziale Herkunft, gleichartige äußere Erscheinung¹⁷ und öfter wiederholte Situationen (Weissagungen, theurgische Praktiken).¹⁸

Diese Gemeinsamkeiten rufen laut Stenger „den Eindruck von Statik hervor, sodass das Einzelschicksal in einem allgemeinen Konzept aufgeht“.¹⁹ Es entstehe ein Leitbild, so Stenger,²⁰ das die doch unterschiedlichen Lebensläufe durch ihre Gemeinsamkeiten vereine und bei den Lesern als nachahmenswert in Erinnerung bleiben solle.

Auch Eunapios selbst deutet im Proömium auf den Skopos der VS hin, indem er auf die Wirkmächtigkeit von Literatur hinweist.²¹ Er misst sich hierbei in seiner Funktion als Autor an Xenophon aus Athen, dem er eine bedeutende Rolle für die Philosophenbiographik zuschreibt.²² Eunapios schreibt über Xenophon, dass er mittels seiner Schriften, in denen er weiterlebe, der Philosophie einen guten Ruf verliehen habe.²³ Dennoch distanziert er sich von Xenophon indem er anmerkt, dass er nicht beabsichtige über Nebensächlichkeiten aus dem Leben der vortrefflichen Persönlichkeiten zu schreiben, sondern über ihre Leistungen.²⁴

Neben der Funktion der VS als protreptische Schrift für die Beschäftigung mit der Philosophie nennt Eunapios auch einen heuristischen Grund für sein schriftstellerisches Unterfangen: Er sei vor den Toren der Wahrheit niedergekniet,²⁵ um eine möglichst gute Einsicht in die Ereignisse zu bekommen, die er in seinen Biographien beschreiben möchte. Sein Streben nach Wahrheit unterstreicht Eunapios anschaulich, indem er sich mit einem (im platonischen Sinne) Liebenden vergleicht,²⁶

namhaften Vorläufern, damit etwas von deren allgemein anerkannten Glanz darauf abfällt“ ([2009] 233).

¹⁵ Zum Bezug der porträtierten Philosophen zum Göttlichen vgl. Becker (2013) 56. Zur Intention einer Nachahmung s. Stenger (2009) 233.

¹⁶ Vgl. Becker (2013) 25.

¹⁷ Zum Motiv des der geistigen Reife entsprechenden körperlichen Wachstums s. Bieler (1935) 38. Zur Schönheit als Motiv der Göttlichkeit oder der Gottgefälligkeit s. ebd. 51.

¹⁸ Stenger (2009) 230. Zur Theurgie als Merkmal eines θεῖος ἀνὴρ vgl. Fowden (1982) 38.

¹⁹ Ebd. 233.

²⁰ Ebd. 234.

²¹ Ebd. 146.

²² Becker macht darauf aufmerksam, dass Xenophon aus Athen besonders in der Kaiserzeit und in der Spätantike primär als sokratischer Philosoph galt (Becker [2013] 144–45).

²³ Eunap., VS I.1.1.

²⁴ Ebd., I.1.2.: ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐκ εἰς τὰ πάρεργα τῶν σπουδαίων ὁ λόγος φέρει τὴν γραφὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἔργα.

²⁵ Ebd., II.2.5.: ἀληθείας πρόθυρα καὶ πύλας προσκυνήσαντα.

²⁶ Ebd., II.2.2.

der zum wahrhaft Schönen strebt.²⁷ Zudem bedient sich Eunapios des platonischen Eros-Bildes in Bezug auf seine Leserschaft: Der Gewinn aus dem dargestellten Paraklausithyron, in dem Eunapios sein Flehen um Hilfe vor den Toren der (personifizierten) Wahrheit darstellt, sollte nämlich nicht nur ihm zu Nutze kommen, sondern auch denen, die es hören möchten, bzw. die imstande sind hin zum Schönsten zu folgen.²⁸

Eunapios räumt also ein, dass nicht alle Rezipienten imstande sein werden, bestimmte Inhalte der *VS* zu durchdringen. Zugleich geht er aber auch von einem anderen Lesertypus aus, der das „kryptische, metonymische Indizienfeld“²⁹ der *VS* zu verstehen weiß. Steinrück geht auf die Schwierigkeit ein, den genaueren Sinn an manchen Stellen der *VS* zu erfassen. Er schreibt, dass sowohl die Produktion als auch die Rezeption von Literatur zur Zeit des Eunapios „mit einem zweiten, nicht versteckten, aber hervorschimrenden Sinn rechnet“. Die Leser müssen sich, so Steinrück, bei einer Emphasis-Lektüre³⁰ „auf das Sammeln der spärlichen Indizien beschränken, die als Argumente dienen können“³¹. Nach Becker handelt es sich bei den Adressaten der *VS* um pagane Intellektuelle, die entweder aus Eunapios' engeren philosophischen Kreisen stammen oder sich anderweitig mit den philosophischen Inhalten der von Eunapios vertretenen neuplatonischen Lehrtradition befassen.³²

2.2. Theurgie

Bevor ich in die Philometor-Episode einsteige, soll vorab noch der Begriff der Theurgie erläutert werden, da er für das Verständnis der Philometor-Episode und für deren spätere Analyse und Interpretation vorauszusetzen ist.

²⁷ Becker (2013) 164–65: „Wie schon bei Platon, ist auch bei Eunapios der Eros auf das Schöne gerichtet und als Streben (ἐπιθυμία) auf das Gute und Schöne gedacht. Die Liebe erscheint demnach wie bei Platon als Drang nach der Vereinigung mit dem, worauf sie gerichtet ist. Die Schau der Geliebten und ihrer Schönheit steht bei Eunapios für das Ganze und Unverhüllte, für das Offenliegen des Erkenntnisgegenstandes, der im Falle des eunapischen Gedankengangs die *συνεχῆς καὶ περιγεγραμμένη εἰς ἀκρίβειαν ἱστορία* ist“.

²⁸ Eunap., *VS* II.2.5.: *κἀγὼ πρὸς ταύτην ἐξώρμησα τὴν γραφήν, [...] ἀλλ', εἰς ὅσον οἶόν τε ἦν ἀληθείας πρόθυρα καὶ πύλας προσκυνήσαντα, παραδοῦναι τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ἢ βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ἢ δυναμένοις ἀκολουθεῖν πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον.*

Becker (2013) 166 schreibt dazu: „Eunapios evoziert, betrachtet man die motivliche Verquickung von philosophisch-erotischer Terminologie in unmittelbar vorangehenden Kontext, das Bild eines Paraklausithyron vor den Toren der Wahrheit. Zentralmerkmal des Paraklausithyron, wie er v.a. in der römischen Liebeselegie vorkommt, ist die Trennung von der Geliebten durch die Tür, deren Raumabtrennende Funktion gegenüber ihrer raumöffnenden hervorgehoben wird“.

Steinrück (2004) 43 versteht diese Passage folgendermaßen: „Eunap öffnet seinem Leser nicht die Tür zur Wahrheit, aber, so sagt er, die Leser, die willens sind und vor allem im Stande, können bis zum Schönsten – und das heißt [...] im platonischen Zusammenhang „bis zur Wahrheit hinter der Tür folgen“. [...] Eunap präsentiert seinen Text also von Anfang an etwas geheimnistuerisch als kryptisches, metonymisches Indizienfeld“.

²⁹ Steinrück (2004) 43 (s. o.).

³⁰ Zur Bedeutung des Tropus der Emphasis, wie sie Steinrück hier verwendet, vgl. Lausberg (1960) 298, Lemma: *emphasis* (§578).

³¹ Steinrück (2004) 45. Ein derartiges „Sammeln von Indizien“ wird auch zum großen Teil die Aufgabe des 3. Kapitels dieser Arbeit sein.

³² Becker (2013) 36: „Eunapios schreibt für pagane Intellektuelle in seinem engsten Umfeld, für philosophisch, rhetorisch und medizinisch Interessierte gleichermaßen und nicht zuletzt für seine eigenen Schüler und weitere Chrysanthios-Verehrer“.

Wie bereits erwähnt,³³ war Eunapios ein Anhänger der neuplatonischen Philosophie in der Auslegung Jamblichs – einer Auslegung, der die Mehrheit der porträtierten Philosophen, so auch Sosipatra, angehörte. Ein signifikantes Merkmal dieser neuplatonischen Lehre besteht darin, dass sie die Theurgie als eine Methode des philosophischen Erkenntnisprozesses in sich aufgenommen hat; eine Methode, die für die Erkenntnisfindung, laut Jamblich,³⁴ nicht nur als hilfreich, sondern sogar als notwendig galt.³⁵

Dementsprechend bedeutsam ist die Theurgie auch im Lebenslauf der Philosophin Sosipatra.

Eine hinreichende und allgemein gültige Definition der Theurgie abzugeben, gestaltet sich schwierig, zumal selbst unter den Philosophen, die sich mit der Theurgie beschäftigten, kein Konsens in Bezug auf ihr Wesen und auf ihre Notwendigkeit als Mittel zur Erkenntnisführung bestand.³⁶ Außerdem war die Theurgie durch ihren mystischen Charakter³⁷ ein Phänomen, das, laut Jamblich, nicht allein durch Berichte, sondern viel mehr durch das eigene Erleben verstanden werden konnte.³⁸

Addey schreibt über den Begriff der Theurgie, dass er eine bestimmte, mit rituellen Praktiken verbundene Lebensweise beschreibt, die wiederum auf „ethical and intellectual practices“ beruhe.³⁹ Unter diesen „intellectual practices“ ist eine philosophische Betätigung im Sinne eines begrifflichen Erkenntnisprozesses zu verstehen, die laut Jamblich für einen Theurgen zwar nicht ausreichend, aber doch unerlässlich ist.⁴⁰ Ziel der Theurgie, so Addey, sei „der Kontakt, die Assimilation und am Ende die Vereinigung mit dem Göttlichen“⁴¹, also der Aufstieg (ἀναγωγή) der Seele⁴² hin zum Einen, das in seinem Wesen gut ist⁴³. Dieses Eine ist ewig, vollkommen und in ihm koexistieren die Prinzipien der Ordnung an sich (αὐτὴ ἢ

³³ S. 121 in dieser Arbeit.

³⁴ Über die Theurgie ist uns das Jamblich zugeschriebene Werk *De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum* überliefert, das zwischen 300 und 304 n.Chr. verfasst wurde. Jamblich geht in *De Mysteriis* auf Fragen des Philosophen Porphyrios ein, die sich auf die Theurgie beziehen (Für eine Einleitung sowie eine deutsche Übersetzung des Werkes s. Hopfner [1922]).

³⁵ Jamblichus, *De Mysteriis* II 11 (96, 17 – 97, 2.). Für diese Arbeit habe ich mich auf folgende Ausgabe von *De Mysteriis* gestützt: Des Places (2003⁴).

³⁶ Vgl. Shaw (1985) 2–4.

³⁷ Vgl. dazu Iambl., *Myst.* I 11 (87, 6–8): Τῶν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐκάστοτε ἐπιτελουμένων τὰ μὲν ἀπόρρητόν τινα καὶ κρείττονα λόγου τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει. „Denn von den [Dingen], die bei den heiligen [Riten] jeweils vollführt werden, haben manche einen unsagbaren Grund, der der Vernunft überlegen ist“. Alle Übersetzungen in dieser Arbeit stammen von mir.

³⁸ Addey (2016) 24.

³⁹ Addey (2016) 3: „Although its meaning is controversial, the term, first attested in the fragmentary Chaldean Oracles (dated to the mid to late second century A.D.), designates a set of ritual practices coupled with a way of life based on ethical and intellectual practices. The aim of theurgy was contact with, assimilation to and, ultimately, union with, the divine“.

⁴⁰ Iambl., *Myst.* II 11 (98, 8–10): Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ γινῶναι παραγίγνεται ποτε ἢ δραστικῆ ἔνωσις, οὐ μὴν ἔχει γε πρὸς αὐτὴν ταυτότητα. „Aber die wirkende Vereinigung [mit dem Göttlichen] trifft niemals ohne die Erkenntnis ein, ist aber auch nicht mit ihr [i. e. mit der Erkenntnis] identisch“.

Zudem auch bei Addey (2016) 26: „Jamblichus maintains that the theurgist *had* to be a philosopher“.

⁴¹ Addey (2016) 3.

⁴² Ebd. 25.

⁴³ Iambl., *Myst.* I 5 (15, 5–11). Im Gegensatz zu den Göttern, die von ihrem Wesen her gut sind, haben die sich in Menschen inkarnierten Seelen lediglich einen Anteil am Guten und am Schönen (ebd. I 5 [15, 12– 16, 5]).

τάξις) und des an sich Schönen (αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος).⁴⁴ Eine Annäherung zum Göttlichen bedeutet demnach eine Annäherung zur „Schau der Wahrheit und der intelligiblen Erkenntnis“ (ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας πάρεστι θεὰ καὶ ἡ τῆς νοεῶς ἐπιστήμη)⁴⁵ und führt den Theurgen zur Glückseligkeit (εὐδαιμονία)⁴⁶.

Doch der Mensch muss für die Teilhabe an solchen Einsichten erst empfänglich werden, indem er sich durch eine theurgische Lebensführung an das Göttliche annähert.⁴⁷ Zu dieser Lebensweise, durch die der Mensch erst eine Verbesserung seiner Empfänglichkeit (ἐπιτηδειότης) für göttliche Eingaben ermöglicht, gehört neben einer begrifflich-philosophischen Betätigung auch die Anwendung bestimmter ritueller Praktiken.⁴⁸

Über diese Praktiken schreibt Jamblich, dass sie als etwas Einflussloses den Unbeeinflussbaren dargebracht werden (ἀπαθῆς πρὸς ἀπαθεῖς προσάγεται).⁴⁹ Ihr Nutzen zielt also auf die Menschen ab, die sie anwenden und nicht auf die Götter. Sie dienen den Menschen als Routine und als stützende Begleitung auf dem Weg zur Vereinigung mit dem Göttlichen.⁵⁰ Die Rituale beeinflussen die Götter nicht, sondern ermöglichen ihnen lediglich, mit jenen Menschen bzw. Theurgen in Kontakt zu treten, die sich ihnen hinreichend durch die Befolgung einer gewissen Lebensweise angenähert haben und mit denen sie sich in einem φιλία-Verhältnis⁵¹ befinden.

Durch diese kurze Darstellung konnte also deutlich werden, dass ein Theurg zugleich ein Philosoph ist. Einerseits, weil eine begrifflich-philosophische Betätigung vorausgesetzt wird, um sich für göttliche Eingaben empfänglich zu machen.⁵² Andererseits, weil seine theurgische Lebensweise auf die Einsicht in das wahrhaft Seiende abzielt. Die theurgischen Rituale sollten dazu verhelfen, die eigene Erkenntnis über die Reichweite des begrifflich Erkennbaren hinaus zu leiten.⁵³ Durch die Lektüre von Biographien, die eine theurgische Lebensweise darstellen, gewinnt

⁴⁴ Ebd. I 7 (22, 9–11).

⁴⁵ Ebd. X 1 (286, 9–10).

⁴⁶ Ebd. X 5 (291, 11–13).

⁴⁷ Addey (2016) 36: „As well as being a philosopher, the theurgist had to purify their soul through the lifelong cultivation of his or her receptivity (through ritual, ethical and intellectual means) in order to attain divine assimilation and provide a pure receptacle for the gods, since theurgy was considered to operate through the will of the gods“.

⁴⁸ Iles Johnston (2012) 114: „In the *De Mysteriis*, Iamblichus emphasizes that the theurgist should use rituals only to prepare himself to be worked upon by the gods, or for certain other tasks that he had to undertake at earlier stages“.

⁴⁹ Iambl., *Myst.* I 11 (38, 10–13).

⁵⁰ Athanassiadi (1993) 120. Athanassiadi bringt folgendes Gleichnis an, um den Nutzen solcher Praktiken zu beschreiben: „They are rafts, so to speak, on which man can traverse more easily the ocean of diversity towards his goal of union with God“ (ebd.).

⁵¹ Zum φιλία-Verhältnis s. Addey (2016) 29.

⁵² Vgl. S. 124 Nr. 40 in dieser Arbeit.

⁵³ Shaw (1985) 1: „For Iamblichus, theurgic rites revealed the vestiges of a divine presence. That presence was ineffable, but what lay beyond man’s intellectual grasp could nevertheless be entered and achieved through ritual action, which is why Iamblichus argued that theurgy transcended all intellectual endeavours“.

also die Leserschaft der *VS* einen Einblick in eine wichtige Voraussetzung für den philosophischen Erkenntnisprozess.⁵⁴

2.3. Zusammenfassung von *Sosipatras Vita*

Sosipatras Vita beginnt mit einer Analepse, indem Eunapios kurz nach Beginn der Biographie auf *Sosipatras* Kindheit zurückblickt: Als sie erst fünf Jahre alt war, kamen zwei ältere Herren, die sich später als Götter (δαίμονες)⁵⁵ erweisen werden, zum Landgut ihres Vaters, brachten den Weinstock in seiner Gegenwart zur Fruchtbildung und riefen bei ihm großes Staunen hervor. Als sie *Sosipatra* erblickten, waren sie von ihrer Schönheit überwältigt und baten ihren Vater um Erlaubnis, sich der Erziehung seiner Tochter anzunehmen.⁵⁶ Sie argumentierten, dass sie mit größerer Berechtigung ihre Fürsorger seien.⁵⁷ Dafür stellten sie die Bedingung, dass der Vater die gesamte Zeit über von seiner Tochter und dem Grundstück fernbleibe. Dieser willigte ein, übergab seine Tochter der Erziehung der beiden Herren und ging fort.

Die zwei Herren weihten *Sosipatra* in die chaldäischen Mysterien ein.⁵⁸ *Sosipatra* stellte dies unter Beweis, als sie ihrem Vater fünf Jahre später seinen Wagensturz, der ihm auf dem Weg zu ihr widerfahren war, dermaßen anschaulich schilderte, als ob sie dabei gewesen wäre. Diese Weissagung rief bei ihrem Vater Staunen hervor und er war sich mittlerweile sicher, dass es sich sowohl bei ihr als auch bei den zwei Herren um Götter bzw. um eine Göttin handelte.⁵⁹

Nachdem die zwei älteren Herren verschwunden waren und *Sosipatra* wieder in die Obhut ihres Vaters kam, stellte sich heraus, dass sich ihr philosophisches

⁵⁴ Zur Funktion der Biographie als Textform zur Vermittlung bestimmter, für die Philosophie notwendiger, Lebensweisen vgl. Taub (2017) 111–29. Taub bemerkt „Their purpose [i.e. of the βίον] was to provide a history of an intellectual tradition, relating the interactions of a teacher and his students, and also to celebrate the achievements of an heroic philosopher whose “life” was meant to serve as a guide for others on how to live, how to benefit from philosophy and how to be more divine“ (ebd. 129).

⁵⁵ Bieler (1935) 37 bemerkt mit Blick auf Pythagoras und Apollonios, dass es verständlich sei, wenn ein θεῖος ἄνθρωπος [im Falle *Sosipatras* eine θεῖα γυνή] von Lehrern unterrichtet werde, die „eine Sphäre des Geheimnisvollen und Wunderbaren umgibt wie Chaldäer und Magier“. Becker (2013) 297 interpretiert das göttliche Wesen der Ausbilder *Sosipatras* als einen literarischen Hinweis darauf, dass die Philosophie göttlichen Ursprungs sei und deswegen nur mithilfe der Götter angemessen betrieben werden könne. Durch beide Bemerkungen wird ersichtlich, dass das göttliche Wesen der zwei Herren literarisch der Hervorhebung von *Sosipatras* Göttlichkeit dienen.

⁵⁶ Eunap., *VS* VI.6.10–12.

⁵⁷ Ebd. VI.6.11.

Zur Verwandtschaft zwischen Göttern und Philosophen schreibt Becker „Die wahre bzw. himmlisch-göttliche Vaterschaft ist nicht nur bei Christen eine Grundüberzeugung“ und weist auf *Jamblichs Vita* hin, in der Eunapios *Jamblich* als θεοῦ παῖς darstellt ([2013] 293).

⁵⁸ „Although the word „Chaldean“ did not exclusively refer to the Oracles and the doctrines they advocated (theurgic doctrines), this was the most common connotation at the time Eunapius was writing, and particularly within a context such as that of his *Lives*, which concerns people such as Maximus and Julian, who were known to practice the theurgy of the Oracles“ (Iles Johnston [2012] 104 Nr. 25).

⁵⁹ Eunap., *VS* VI.7.5. und VI.7.7.

Die Qualität dessen, was ihr Vater als „Gott“ zu erkennen meinte, ist als eine Gottesnähe zu verstehen und nicht als eine tatsächliche Apotheose. Diese Nähe zum Göttlichen lässt sich auf die Einweihung *Sosipatras* in die chaldäischen Mysterien und auf die ihr anerzogene theurgische Lebensführung zurückführen.

Erkenntnisvermögen dermaßen entfaltet hatte, dass sie mit Leichtigkeit das erläuterte, was andere kaum und wenn, dann nur mit Mühe erkannten.⁶⁰

Ihre Vita wird mit ihrer Hochzeit mit Eustathios fortgesetzt. Am Tag ihrer Hochzeit wurden Sosipatra zwei Voraussagungen zuteil, die später, so Eunapios, auch eintrafen. Daraufhin erwähnt Eunapios, dass Sosipatra mit ihren Kindern nach Pergamon zog und dort zusammen mit Aidesios⁶¹ Philosophie unterrichtete. Ihr Unterricht war gut besucht und sie erfuhr hohe Anerkennung von ihren Schülern.⁶²

Philometor, einer der Schüler und ein Verwandter Sosipatras, überwältigt von ihrer Schönheit und ihren Reden, sowie im Wissen, dass sie göttlich ist, verliebt sich in sie (εἰς ἔρωτα ἀφίκετο). Das Laster seiner Liebesgefühle zu ihr zwingt ihn nieder⁶³ und treibt ihn zur Anwendung von Magie, um bei Sosipatra Gegenliebe hervorzurufen.

Sosipatra spürt seinen Verführungsversuch⁶⁴ und bittet ihren Schüler Maximus⁶⁵ herauszufinden, was mit ihr geschieht. Dieser kommt ihrer Bitte nach, indem er mittels theurgischer Praktiken sowohl herausfindet, welche Zauberrituale Philometor anwendet als auch letztere zerstört.⁶⁶ Als Philometor an der Türe vor Sosipatras Haus, in dem ihr Unterricht gewöhnlich stattfindet, auf Maximus trifft, rät dieser Philometor davon ab die Zauberrituale fortzuführen, da diese nun mehr vergebens seien. Philometor stellt seine Verführungskünste ein und verhöhnt seinen ursprünglichen Vorsatz. Die Philometor-Episode, und damit auch Sosipatras Vita, schließt mit einer Versammlung in Sosipatras Haus, wo über die Seele diskutiert wird. Nach einem regen Austausch beginnt Sosipatra das von den Schülern Dargebrachte mit Beweisen nach und nach zu widerlegen und fährt mit einem Vortrag über den Abstieg der Seele sowie über den strafbaren und unsterblichen Seelenteil fort. Doch plötzlich verstummt sie und verkündet bald darauf eine ihr gerade zuteilwerdende Vision: Philometor habe einen Unfall mit seinem Wagen gehabt und schreie laut auf⁶⁷.

2.4. Philometors Verführungsversuche (Goetie)

Mit Blick auf die eben zusammengefasste Vita kann nun Philometors Anwendung von Magie näher behandelt und anschließend mit der Theurgie verglichen werden.

⁶⁰ Ebd. VI.8.2.

Wie bereits im Kapitel über die Theurgie ausgeführt, besteht die theurgische Lebensweise keinesfalls nur aus rituellen Praktiken, sondern bedarf ebenso einer philosophischen Tätigkeit, einer Annäherung zum Göttlichen mittels eines begrifflichen Erkenntnisprozesses (vgl. S. 124–25 dieser Arbeit).

Stilistisch ist hier die Tautologie zu beachten (τοῖς πεπονηκόσι καὶ τεταλαιπωρημένοις) mit der die übermäßige Mühe anderer Menschen hervorgehoben wird und somit zugleich ein Kontrast zu Sosipatras Überlegenheit im Durchdringen von schwierigen philosophischen Inhalten entsteht.

⁶¹ Aidesios war ein Schüler Jamblichs und hat nach dessen Tod eine eigene Schule in Pergamon gegründet (s. Ziegler und Sontheimer [1964] 154 Nr. 1 Lemma: Aidesios).

⁶² Eunap., VS VI.9.2.

⁶³ Ebd. VI.9.3: ἔρωσ δὲ συνηνάγκαζε καὶ κατεβιάζετο.

⁶⁴ Ich übernehme hier Beckers Übersetzung der Vokabel πείρα als „Verführungsversuch“ (Becker [2013] 314).

⁶⁵ Maximus von Ephesos war ein Schüler des Aidesios (zu Aidesios s. Nr. 61 in dieser Arbeit), Lehrer des Kaisers Julian des Apostaten und ein bedeutender Verfechter der Theurgie (s. Ziegler und Sontheimer [1969] 1116 Nr. 4 Lemma: Maximus).

⁶⁶ Eunap., VS, VI.9.6.

⁶⁷ Liddell-Scott-Jones (LSJ) (1961⁹) 1455, s.v. ποτνιαόμαι („cry aloud in horror or indignation“).

Da der Begriff der Magie seit jeher aufgrund der sich wandelnden Grenzen zwischen ihr, der Religion und der Philosophie schwierig zu definieren ist,⁶⁸ werde ich ihn auf die Bedeutung des griechischen Begriffs der Goetie (γοητεία) einschränken; ein Begriff, der auch Philometers Tätigkeiten umfasst, wie aus den jeweiligen Beschreibungen der Theurgie und der Goetie in der philosophischen Abhandlung *De Mysteriis* hervorgeht.

Die Tätigkeit des die Goetie Ausübenden (γόης) besteht aus zwei Komponenten: der *πρᾶξις* (dem praktischen Anteil des Rituals) und dem *λόγος* (dem Aussprechen eines Zauberspruchs, der den symbolischen Gehalt der *πρᾶξις* aufgreift und in die Ausformulierung des Wunsches oder des Fluches aufnimmt).⁶⁹ Beide Elemente finden sich in Philometers Ritual, bei dem er Hölzer verbrennt und diese Handlung mit einem Zauberspruch (*λόγος*) begleitet.⁷⁰

Die Folge dieses Rituals zeigt sich in den Schmerzen, die Sosipatra jedes Mal erleidet, wenn sich Philometor von ihr entfernt.⁷¹ Das Verursachen von Schmerzen bei der zu verzaubernden Person war bei den Liebeszaubern üblich. Faraone schreibt dazu „If Eros is a disease, then erotic magic is a curse“ und bezieht sich damit auf den destruirenden Charakter, der dem Eros gewöhnlich in der antiken und spätantiken Literatur beigemessen wurde.⁷²

Dennoch handelt es sich bei den durch Goetie hervorgerufenen Schmerzen nicht immer ausschließlich um einen Fluch („curse“).⁷³ Im Gegenteil: Durch die Liebeszauber sollten sinnlich wahrnehmbare Anzeichen des Eros (Schmerzen) bei der verzauberten Person hervorgerufen werden, um ihr vorzutäuschen, dass sie in den *γόης* verliebt sei. Dadurch, dass bei den *ἀγωγῆ*-Ritualen der Schmerz nur dann erscheint, wenn sich der *γόης* von der verzauberten Person entfernt, ist diese bemüht, seine Nähe zu suchen, um sich von ihrem Schmerz zu befreien, womit das Ziel des Rituals erreicht wird.⁷⁴

Vergleicht man nun die Goetie mit der Theurgie, lässt sich feststellen, dass sich der wesentliche Unterschied in ihrem jeweiligen Ziel befindet. Während der Theurg durch eine Teilhabe am Göttlichen zur Schau der Wahrheit gelangen will, verfolgt der *γόης* im Falle eines Liebeszaubers das Ziel, Gegenliebe hervorzurufen. Er verbleibt somit im Bereich des Sinnlichen und verursacht eine gewisse Unwahrheit, eine Täuschung.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Über die Schwierigkeit einer Definition vgl. Addey (2016) 32–38.

⁶⁹ Über die Unterteilung des Goetie-Rituals in *πρᾶξις* und *λόγος* s. Faraone (1999) 57.

⁷⁰ Zu Philometers *λόγος* s. Eunap., *VS* VI.9.7. Zu Philometers *πρᾶξις* s. ebd. und VI.9.9.

⁷¹ Ebd. VI.9.4. Zum *Agoge*-Ritual s. Nr. 74 in dieser Arbeit.

⁷² Faraone (1999) 43.

⁷³ Über die Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Liebeszauber und Fluch vgl. Faraone (1999) 51–55.

⁷⁴ Faraone (1999) 175 erklärt die Bedeutung des *Agoge*-Rituals wie folgt: „Derived from the verb *agein*, ‘to lead, to drive,’ this handbook rubric designates an erotic spell that burns or tortures the victim (usually female) and thereby leads or drives her away from her home and to the practitioner (usually male)“.

⁷⁵ Addey (2016) 35: „Iamblichus’ allusion marks a clear reference to the magician (*γόης*), whose practices are contrasted with those of theurg: the former employs falsehood and deceit, producing a certain motion of the soul which draws a phantom-like appearance likely to be disturbed by evil *daimones*“.

3. Zum rhetorischen Aufbau der Philometor-Episode

3.1. Struktur der Philometor-Episode

Unterzieht man nun den Text einer genaueren Analyse, wird deutlich, dass seine Struktur durch eine Aneinanderreihung von Antithesen gekennzeichnet ist. Eine Struktur, durch die Eunapios, so meine These, in Verbindung mit anderen Aspekten der rhetorischen Darstellung, die Rezeption der Philometor-Episode auf eine zweite Interpretationsebene lenkt. Durch diesen Aufbau soll vor allem Sosipatras und Philometors Nähe bzw. Entfernung vom Göttlichen, i.e. von der Erfassung philosophischer Inhalte,⁷⁶ verdeutlicht werden.

Die **erste Antithese** lässt sich bereits am Anfang der Philometor-Episode erkennen. Dazu soll aber zunächst der Kontext, in dem die Episode steht, in Betracht gezogen werden: Unmittelbar vor der Episode schildert Eunapios Sosipatras erfolgreiche philosophische Lehrtätigkeit in Pergamon und schreibt ihr dabei mindestens⁷⁷ dieselbe Fähigkeit als Philosophielehrerin zu wie dem „großen Aidesios“ (μέγας Αιδέσιος).⁷⁸ Außerdem rückt er Sosipatras hohes Ansehen bei den Schülern sowie ihre Nähe zum Göttlichen erneut in den Vordergrund, als er kurz vor Beginn der Philometor-Episode vermerkt, dass es keinen gab, „der die Gottbegeisterung (ένθουσιασμὸν) der Frau nicht fußfällig verehrte und [nicht] hoch achtete“⁷⁹.

Nach dieser Bemerkung zu Sosipatras philosophischem Fortschritt setzt die Philometor-Episode ein, in der Philometor gleich zu Beginn als ein Liebender dargestellt wird, der, von seinen Liebesgefühlen überwältigt, Goetie⁸⁰ anwendet, um bei Sosipatra Gegenliebe zu erzeugen.⁸¹ Dabei entwickeln sich seine Gefühle schnell hin zu einem Zwang, der in einem schädlichen Liebeszauber gegen Sosipatra endet. Dies spiegelt sich auch stilistisch in Eunapios' Darstellung wider:

Φιλομήτωρ γοῦν τις αὐτῆς ἀνεπιὸς ὦν, τοῦ τε κάλλους ἠττηθεῖς καὶ τῶν λόγων, εἰς ἔρωτα ἀφίκετο, καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα εἰδὼς θειοτέρα· ἔρωσ δὲ συνηνάγκαζε καὶ κατεβιάζετο. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀμφὶ ταῦτα ἦν πολὺς, ἡ γυνὴ συνησθάνετο τῆς πείρας.⁸²

„Philometor jedenfalls, ein Verwandter von ihr, verliebte sich in sie, weil er von ihrer Schönheit und von ihren Reden besiegt worden war und weil er um ihre Göttlichkeit wusste; Eros übte einen Zwang [auf ihn] aus und überwältigte ihn. Er befand sich lange zwischen diesen Gefühlen und die Frau [Sosipatra] bemerkte den Verführungsversuch“.

⁷⁶ Zum Begriff des Göttlichen in Sosipatras Vita vgl. Kap. 2.2. dieser Arbeit.

⁷⁷ Laut Becker (2013) 312 schreibt Eunapios Sosipatra wohl einen noch größeren philosophischen Fortschritt als Aidesios zu, da sie durch Eunapios' Wortwahl in den Bereich des Göttlichen versetzt wird: „Das Verb θεραπεύειν kann hier nicht nur „helfend dienen“, sondern auch „(als Göttin) verehren“ bedeuten [...]. Sosipatra wird wiederholt eine Göttin genannt“.

⁷⁸ Zum μέγας Αιδέσιος s. Eunap., VS VI.9.1.

⁷⁹ Ebd. VI.9.2: οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τὴν μὲν ἐν λόγοις ἀκρίβειαν Αιδεσίου <οὐ> περιηγάπα καὶ συνεθαύμαζεν, τὸν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ένθουσιασμὸν προσεκύνει καὶ ἐσεβάζετο.

⁸⁰ Zur Goetie vgl. Kap. 2.4. dieser Arbeit.

⁸¹ Zum Agoge-Ritual vgl. S. 128 dieser Arbeit.

⁸² Eunap., VS VI.9.3.

Die mit einem Polysyndeton verbundene parataktische Aneinanderreihung des sich für Sosipatra immer bedrohlicher entwickelnden Eros bei Philometor heben Philometers Ohnmacht gegenüber seinem Eros hervor.⁸³ Philometers Unfähigkeit, gegen den ihn bezwingenden Eros anzugehen, wird zudem durch den abrupten Übergang von seiner Überwältigung hin zur *πειρα*,⁸⁴ die Sosipatra verspürt, bekräftigt.⁸⁵ Dabei sei auch auf die Stellung des personifizierten Liebesgefühls (*ἔρωος*) als agierendes Subjekt hingewiesen, welches ursächlich für Philometers Überwältigung und somit indirekt auch für die folgende *πειρα* zu sein scheint, während Philometor als syntaktisches Objekt alles nur erleidet.⁸⁶

Erinnert man sich nun an Sosipatras Vita im Allgemeinen⁸⁷ und im Besonderen an die Passage zurück, an die die Philometor-Episode anschließt,⁸⁸ so wird die erste Antithese deutlich: Während Philometers Anlass für die Anwendung von Goetie aus dem Zwang des Eros hervorgeht, von dem er sich nicht lösen kann, wird Sosipatra unmittelbar davor als eine erfolgreiche Philosophielehrerin dargestellt, die eine theurgische Lebensweise führt. Sie erfüllt somit die Voraussetzung für ein *φιλία*-Verhältnis⁸⁹ mit dem Göttlichen und gewinnt dadurch göttliche Inspiration (*ἐνθουσιασμός*). Dieser *ἐνθουσιασμός*⁹⁰ verhilft ihr zum Skopos der Theurgie, nämlich der transzendentalen Schau der Wahrheit, während sich Philometers Ziel (die Erzeugung von Gegenliebe durch Anwendung von Goetie) auf den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Bereich beschränkt.⁹¹ Sosipatra hingegen bleibt nicht auf der Ebene des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren stehen, als sie die Wirkung von Philometers Liebeszauber spürt: Anstatt den durch den Liebeszauber verursachten Schmerzen nachzugeben, bittet sie nämlich ihren Schüler Maximus, die Gründe für ihr Leid (*πάθος*) herauszufinden.⁹²

Die **zweite Antithese** zwischen Sosipatra und Philometor lässt sich in VI.9.8. verorten. Nachdem Maximus Sosipatra von ihren Schmerzen befreit und sie nach ihrem Wohlbefinden gefragt hat, stellt er erstaunt fest, dass sie bereits durch göttliche Inspiration in Erfahrung gebracht hat, wer für ihr Leid verantwortlich ist.⁹³ Maximus staunt über die Göttlichkeit (*θειότης*)⁹⁴ und die Einsichtsfähigkeit Sosipatras. Als er ihr Haus gerade verlässt, trifft er auf Philometor.⁹⁵ Anders als Sosipatra hat aber

⁸³ Der Eros übte (zunächst) einen Zwang aus (*ἔρωος δὲ συνηνάγκαζε*). [Der Eros] überwältigte Philometor (*καὶ κατεβιάζετο*). Letzterer befand sich lange (überwältigt wie er war und unfähig sich dagegen zu wehren) zwischen diese Gefühle (*καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀμφὶ ταῦτα ἦν πολὺς*). Sosipatra verspürte den Verführungsversuch (*καὶ ἡ γυνὴ συνησθάνετο τῆς πείρας*).

⁸⁴ Zur Übersetzung von *πειρα* als „Verführungsversuch“, vgl. S. 127 Nr. 64 in dieser Arbeit.

⁸⁵ S.o. Nr. 83 in dieser Arbeit.

⁸⁶ In der Passage „*ἔρωος δὲ συνηνάγκαζε καὶ κατεβιάζετο*“ ist Philometor als syntaktisches Objekt anzunehmen.

⁸⁷ S. dazu die Zusammenfassung von Sosipatras Vita (Kap. 2.3. dieser Arbeit).

⁸⁸ Vgl. S. 129 in dieser Arbeit.

⁸⁹ Zum *φιλία*-Verhältnis s. S. 125 in dieser Arbeit.

⁹⁰ Vgl. Eunap., VS VI.9.3.

⁹¹ Vgl. dazu Kap. 2.4. in dieser Arbeit.

⁹² Eunap., VS VI.9.4.

⁹³ Ebd. VI.9.7.

⁹⁴ Vgl. *θειότητος* in ebd. VI.9.8.

⁹⁵ Laut Becker (2013) 319 handelt es sich um Sosipatras Haus, wo der häusliche Philosophieunterricht stattfand.

Philometor vom Scheitern seiner Verführungsversuche zunächst noch nichts mitbekommen. Er erfährt erst davon, als ihn Maximus damit konfrontiert. Die Antithese besteht also zunächst in der Unkenntnis Philometors über das Scheitern seiner Verführungsversuche, während Sosipatra zuvor (schon vor der Benachrichtigung durch Maximus) herausfindet, dass Philometor für ihre Schmerzen verantwortlich ist.

An dieser Stelle lohnt es sich, einen genaueren Blick in den Text zu werfen:

Και ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ἀκούσας, ἐξῆι μεγαλαυχότερος γεγονώς, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν γυναῖκα δὲ **θειότητος** ἀσφαλῶς πεπειραμένος. ὁ δὲ Φιλομήτωρ **φαιδρὸς** ἀπάντα περὶ θύρας αὐτῷ μετὰ πολλῶν ἐταίρων εἰσιῶν.⁹⁶

„Und nachdem er [Maximus] dies hörte, ging er noch stolzer hinaus, weil er die Göttlichkeit der Frau mit Sicherheit erfahren hatte. Philometor aber, fröhlich gestimmt, traf ihn vor der Tür, als er gerade zusammen mit mehreren Kommilitonen hineinging“.

Bei dieser Passage soll zunächst die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Bezeichnung Philometors als φαιδρὸς gerichtet werden, da mir diese Wortwahl nicht zufällig zu sein scheint. Zwar stellt das Adjektiv φαιδρὸς an sich keine Besonderheit im spätantiken Sprachgebrauch dar, aber innerhalb der gesamten VS kommt es lediglich an dieser Stelle vor und stellt somit ein ἄπαξ λεγόμενον innerhalb der VS dar.⁹⁷ Im Zuge dieser Arbeit soll geprüft werden, inwiefern Eunapios mit dieser Wortwahl auf den platonischen *Phaidros* im Allgemeinen und im Besonderen auf das absteigende Seelengefährt in der Palinodie anspielt. Durch eine Akzentverschiebung (φαιδρὸς/Φαῖδρος) ruft Eunapios, so meine These, den platonischen *Phaidros* in Erinnerung, um die Rezipienten der VS darauf vorzubereiten, wie die spätere Entwicklung Philometors und seine Funktion innerhalb der Vita zu verstehen ist.⁹⁸

Die **dritte Antithese** zwischen Sosipatra und Philometor zeichnet sich am Ende der Vita durch Philometors Wagenunfall ab. Auch hier wird der Bezug zum platonischen *Phaidros* deutlich.

Laut Harich-Schwarzbauer handelt es sich nämlich bei Philometors Wagenunfall nicht um einen für Sosipatras Vita nebensächlichen Beitrag, sondern um eine Parallele zum Abstieg des Seelenwagens, wie er im platonischen *Phaidros*-Dialog beschrieben wird.⁹⁹ Aber auch aus dem Proömium lässt sich herleiten, dass es sich bei der Philometor-Episode wohl nicht um eine Nebensächlichkeit handelt, da, wie bereits erwähnt, Eunapios dort angibt, nur über Wesentliches schreiben zu wollen.¹⁰⁰ Harich-Schwarzbauer begründet ihre These, indem sie zunächst auf den Kontext hinweist, in den Eunapios den Wagenunfall setzt: Sosipatra hält gerade einen Vortrag über den

⁹⁶ Eunap., VS VI.9.8.

⁹⁷ An dieser Stelle sollte angemerkt werden, dass φαιδρὸς zwar innerhalb der ganzen VS ein ἄπαξ λεγόμενον darstellt, jedoch nicht in Eunapios' gesamten Œuvre. Unter Heranziehung der elektronischen Datenbank *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG) lässt sich feststellen, dass dieses Wort in Eunapios' *Historien* zweimal auftaucht.

⁹⁸ Vgl. Kap. 3.2. in dieser Arbeit.

⁹⁹ Harich-Schwarzbauer (2009) 67–69.

¹⁰⁰ S. dazu S. 122 dieser Arbeit.

Abstieg der Seele. Dann aber schweigt sie plötzlich und verkündet daraufhin die Vision von Philometers Wagenunfall, die ihr in diesem Moment zuteilwird. Harich-Schwarzbauer bemerkt, dass

„die Absenz Philometers gerade anlässlich einer zentralen Debatte der iamblichischen Neuplatoniker, der *κάθοδος* [*ψυχῆς*] und ein zeitgleiches Scheitern mit dem Wagen (*ὄχημα*) für etwas anderes steht. Es steht für das Versagen und die Unfähigkeit Philometers angesichts höherer Lehrinhalte“¹⁰¹.

Diese Unfähigkeit Philometers wird in der dritten Antithese der theurgisch-philosophischen Nähe Sosipatras zum Göttlichen (durch die sie imstande ist, eine Vision über Philometers Unfall zu bekommen) gegenübergestellt.¹⁰²

3.2. Philometor als *φαιδρὸς* und der platonische *Phaidros*

Blicken wir nun wieder zurück auf Eunapios' Beschreibung des Philometor als *φαιδρὸς*.¹⁰³ Vor dem Hintergrund, dass es sich hierbei um ein *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* innerhalb der *VS* handelt,¹⁰⁴ sind folgende Aspekte zu berücksichtigen: Zum einen die Stelle, an der die Bezeichnung *φαιδρὸς* auftritt und zum anderen die Person, die als *φαιδρὸς* bezeichnet wird, also Philometor. Was die Stelle angeht, so wurde in der Darlegung der Struktur gezeigt, dass Eunapios jeden Auftritt des im Bereich des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren verbliebenen Philometers kontrastiv der nach der Wahrheit strebenden Sosipatra gegenüberstellt.

Im Falle der zweiten Antithese wird diese Gegenüberstellung ebenfalls in Eunapios' Wortwahl sichtbar: Unmittelbar nachdem Sosipatras Göttlichkeit (*θειότης*) hervorgehoben wird, stellt Eunapios Philometor als *φαιδρὸς* dar.¹⁰⁵ Auf den ersten Blick scheint sich Philometers fröhliches Gemüt (*φαιδρότης*) lediglich auf seine Ahnungslosigkeit bezüglich des Scheiterns seiner Verführungsversuche zu beziehen. An dieser Stelle, soll die in Kap. 3.1. vorgestellte These erneut aufgegriffen werden: inwiefern lässt sich bei Philometers Bezeichnung als *φαιδρὸς* auch ein Hinweis auf den platonischen *Phaidros* erkennen?¹⁰⁶

Wie bereits erwähnt, lassen sich einige Bezüge auf den *Phaidros* in den *VS* finden.¹⁰⁷ Demzufolge ist davon auszugehen, dass besagter platonischer Dialog Eunapios während der Verfassung seiner Biographiensammlung durchgehend präsent war. Doch nicht nur Eunapios, sondern auch ein Teil der Rezipienten der *VS* dürften, angeregt durch Eunapios' Hinweise, die Verbindungen zum *Phaidros* erkannt haben. Dies dürfte insbesondere für diejenigen gelten, die durch die Lektüre des Werks, wie

¹⁰¹ Harich-Schwarzbauer (2009) 68.

¹⁰² S. dazu Kap. 2.2.

¹⁰³ Vgl. S. 131 in dieser Arbeit.

¹⁰⁴ S. ebd.

¹⁰⁵ S. ebd. Zur Bedeutung der Göttlichkeit bei der Theurgin Sosipatra vgl. Kap. 2.2. in dieser Arbeit.

¹⁰⁶ Vgl. S. 129–31 in dieser Arbeit.

¹⁰⁷ Vgl. dazu exemplarisch den Bezug der *VS* zum *Phaidros* im Proömium (Kap. 2.1. in dieser Arbeit) und bei Philometers Wagenunfall laut Harich-Schwarzbauers Interpretation (Kap. 3.1. in dieser Arbeit).

Eunapios im Proömium schreibt, „imstande sind, bis hin zum höchsten Grad der Schönheit zu folgen“¹⁰⁸.

Es kann also festgehalten werden, dass der *Phaidros*-Dialog einem Teil der Adressaten, angeregt durch Eunapios' Andeutungen, sowie Eunapios selbst präsent war. Eine solche Andeutung auf besagten Dialog lässt sich, nach der Interpretation von Harich-Schwarzbauer, auch in der Schilderung von Philometers Unfall erkennen: Der Wagenunfall weise, so Harich-Schwarzbauer, auf den Abstieg des Seelengefährt im platonischen *Phaidros* hin.¹⁰⁹

Betrachtet man nun Philometers Bezeichnung als φαίδρῶς vor dem Hintergrund seines späteren Wagenunfalls und im Wissen, dass es sich bei dieser Bezeichnung um ein ἄπαξ λεγόμενον innerhalb der gesamten *VS* handelt, kann man vermuten, dass diese Wortwahl nicht zufällig getroffen wurde. Es liegt nahe anzunehmen, dass durch eine Akzentverschiebung beim Adjektiv φαίδρῶς, der platonische *Phaidros* in Erinnerung gerufen werden sollte. Somit wurden die Leser darauf vorbereitet, wie der spätere Wagenunfall Philometers zu lesen und verstehen sei: nämlich analog zum Abstieg des Seelengefährt, wie Harich-Schwarzbauer in ihrem Beitrag zeigte.

Möchte man nun eine Antwort auf die Frage finden, welche Konnotationen das Adjektiv φαίδρῶς in den philosophischen Kreisen zu Eunapios' Zeit hatte, so bietet der *Phaidros*-Kommentar des Hermeias von Alexandrien eine mögliche Antwort. Hermeias lebte zwar erst nach Eunapios, aber die in seinem Kommentar festgehaltene Interpretation des *Phaidros* spiegelt zu einem großen Teil die Lesart und die Auffassung seines Lehrers Syrian wider, der wiederum ein Zeitgenosse von Eunapios war.¹¹⁰ Harvey fügt hinzu, dass der Kommentar die *Phaidros*-Auffassung eines Großteils der neuplatonischen Tradition widerspiegelt.¹¹¹

Bernard vermerkt, dass in Hermeias' Kommentar die Dialogperson „Phaidros in Analogie zum unteren Bereich des Eros (innerhalb der Wahrnehmung) gebracht wird, während Sokrates analog zum oberen Bereich des Eros (innerhalb des noetischen Erkennens) verstanden wird. [...] Phaidros soll danach mit Sokrates' Hilfe zum wahren Wissen hinaufgeführt werden, um schließlich in der letzten Stufe selbst den Bereich der Wissenschaften zu übersteigen und das Schöne selbst zu erkennen“¹¹². Die Auffassung, dass Sokrates' Dialogpartner Phaidros für den niederen Bereich des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren steht, bekräftigt Hermeias indem er den Namen Phaidros vom Verb φαίνομαι und dem Nomen ἔρως ableitet.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Eunap., *VS* II.2.5. Die Widergabe des Superlativs κάλλιστον mit „höchster Grad der Schönheit“ habe ich von Becker ([2013] 80) übernommen.

¹⁰⁹ Vgl. S. 131 in dieser Arbeit.

¹¹⁰ Vgl. Bernard (1997) 4 und 10–12.

¹¹¹ Yunis (2011) 28: „The commentary compiled by Hermias of Alexandria (5th c. CE), the student of Syrianus (c. 360–c. 435 CE) and fellow student of Proclus, is the only extant Neoplatonic commentary on the *Phaedrus* and contains within it much of the inherited Neoplatonic tradition on the dialogue up to that point“.

¹¹² Bernard (1997) 26.

¹¹³ Vgl. Bernard (1997) 51. Laut Bernard handelt es sich jedoch bei dieser Etymologie nicht um eine Ableitung im Sinne der modernen historischen Sprachwissenschaft, sondern Hermeias analysiert die Begriffe „auf der Basis platonischer Dialektik gemäß der philosophisch wahren (ἔννομος) Sachbedeutung eines Wortes“ (ebd. 53).

Blicken wir nun auf die oben gestellte Frage zurück: Inwiefern kann man davon ausgehen, dass Philometers Bezeichnung als φαίδρος bei den Adressaten der *VS* bestimmte Konnotationen hervorrief?

Ausgehend von der im Kommentar des Hermeias vertretenen Interpretation dürfte Philometers Bezeichnung als φαίδρος mit der dem Phaidros zugeschriebenen Eigenschaft des Verbleibens im Bereich des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren in Zusammenhang gebracht worden sein. Diese Aussage kann allerdings nur insofern zutreffen, als Eunapios und die Rezipienten der *VS* die im Kommentar des Hermeias vertretene Lesart und Auffassung des platonischen *Phaidros* teilten.¹¹⁴

Zusammenfassend lässt sich die Lektüre der Philometor-Episode nicht von einer gleichzeitigen Erinnerung an den *Phaidros* trennen. Es entsteht eine zweite Leseebene und infolgedessen auch ein Metatext der Philometor-Episode: der Rezipient, angeregt durch Eunapios' Hinweisen, erinnert sich während der Lektüre nicht lediglich an den *Phaidros*, sondern wendet aus diesem Dialog Inhalte und deren Bedeutungen wieder zurück auf die Philometor-Episode an, um diese zu verstehen. Geht man von Hermeias' Kommentar aus, so verändert diese zweite Leseebene die Auffassung der Bezeichnung Philometers als φαίδρος insofern, als damit nicht mehr lediglich Philometers fröhliches Gemüt, sondern auch der Verbleib seiner Seele in der niederen Ebene des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren verstanden wird. Geht man von diesem Zusammenhang (i.e. zwischen Philometers φαίδροτης und seinem Unvermögen höhere philosophische Inhalte zu erfassen) aus, so wird die zweite Antithese zwischen Sosipatra und Philometor nochmal bekräftigt: Sosipatras Göttlichkeit (θειότης) wird dem Unvermögen Philometers philosophische Inhalte zu erfassen (s. φαίδρός) gegenübergestellt.

Aus der Analyse des Aufbaus der Philometor-Episode wurden insgesamt drei Antithesen deutlich. Die Untersuchung der Antithesen zeigte auf, dass Philometers Auftritte kontrastiv zu Sosipatras theurgisch-philosophischem Fortschritt dargestellt werden. Vor dem Hintergrund des in Kapitel 2.4. dargestellten Unterschieds zwischen Theurgie und Goetie wurde sichtbar, dass durch jeden dieser Kontraste und insbesondere mit Blick auf den Wagenunfall am Ende der Philometor-Episode Sosipatras Nähe zum Göttlichen hervorgehoben wird. Diese Hervorhebung Sosipatras als Philosophin ist wiederum dem Skopos der *VS* zuträglich: nämlich der Darstellung nachahmenswerter Persönlichkeiten aus der philosophischen Lehrtradition Jamblichs, um für diese Lehrtradition zu werben.¹¹⁵

4. Ergebnisse

In diesem Beitrag habe ich versucht zu zeigen, dass Eunapios durch die Struktur der Philometor-Episode und durch seine Wortwahl die Rezeption der *Vita Sosipatras* in eine bestimmte Richtung lenkt, die dem Skopos der *VS* dienlich ist.

Im ersten Kapitel wurde gezeigt, dass der Skopos des Werks darin besteht, nachahmenswerte Persönlichkeiten darzustellen. Die Mehrheit der porträtierten

¹¹⁴ Inwiefern Eunapios und seine Adressaten, die im Kommentar des Hermeias enthaltene Auffassung des *Phaidros* in allen Gesichtspunkten teilten, kann nicht genau beantwortet werden. Dennoch ist mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit davon auszugehen, dass unter ihnen kein großer Dissens über die Auffassung des *Phaidros* herrschte (vgl. S. 133 Nr. 110 in dieser Arbeit).

¹¹⁵ Vgl. Kap. 2.1. dieser Arbeit.

Philosophen gehört der philosophischen Lehrtradition Jamblichs an und die Darstellung ihrer Lebensweise erzeugt für diese Lehrtradition einen werbenden Charakter. Außerdem wurde festgehalten, dass zumindest ein Teil der Adressaten der *VS* mit grundlegenden philosophischen Inhalten vertraut war. Dies erlaubte es später, davon auszugehen, dass der *Phaidros* diesen Adressaten wahrscheinlich bekannt war.

In Kapitel 2.2. wurde gezeigt, dass ein signifikantes Merkmal der neuplatonischen Philosophie in der Auslegung Jamblichs, der Eunapios anhing, darin besteht, dass die Theurgie als notwendig für den Erkenntnisprozess erachtet wird. Die Theurgen streben nach einer Vereinigung mit dem Göttlichen, also einer Teilhabe an intelligibel wahrnehmbarer Erkenntnis.¹¹⁶ Sosipatra ließ sich demnach aufgrund ihrer theurgischen Lebensführung und den zahlreichen Verweisen auf ihre Nähe zum Göttlichen gut in diese Lehrtradition einordnen.

Aus der Zusammenfassung von *Sosipatras Vita* (Kap. 2.3.) wurde ersichtlich, dass sie den Skopos der *VS* erfüllt: Sie kommt der theurgischen Vereinigung mit dem Göttlichen, insbesondere nach ihrer Einweihung in die chaldäischen Mysterien, sehr nahe, hat also einen hohen Grad der Empfänglichkeit erreicht und ist imstande, schwierige philosophische Inhalte zu durchdringen und Ereignisse wahrzusagen.

Im Anschluss daran wurde in Kapitel 2.4. der Unterschied zwischen Theurgie und Goetie aufgezeigt. Somit konnten Philometers magische Rituale von Maximus' theurgischen Praktiken klar voneinander getrennt werden.

Vor diesem Hintergrund stieg ich dann in die Philometor-Episode ein und zeigte die insgesamt drei Antithesen zwischen Philometor und Sosipatra auf. So wurde der Verbleib Philometers auf dem Bereich des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren schon zu Beginn der Philometor-Episode ersichtlich.¹¹⁷ In der zweiten Antithese wird Philometor der Göttlichkeit (θειότης) Sosipatras gegenübergestellt, indem er als φαῖδρος charakterisiert wird. Diese Wortwahl, die innerhalb der *VS* ein ἅπαξ λεγόμενον darstellt, kann die Funktion haben, durch ihre Zweideutigkeit, die durch eine Akzentverschiebung entsteht, an den platonischen *Phaidros* zu erinnern. Dieser Hinweis auf den *Phaidros* kann als ein Hinweis darauf verstanden werden, wie das Ende der *Vita* (i.e. Philometers Wagenunfall) interpretiert werden soll: nämlich, wie Harich-Schwarzbauer mit Blick auf den platonischen *Phaidros* bemerkt, als Philometers „Unfähigkeit angesichts höherer Inhalte“¹¹⁸. Aus dieser Unfähigkeit Philometers sowie aus Sosipatras göttlichen Eingabe über Philometers Wagenunfall besteht die dritte Antithese.

Zusammenfassend kann festgestellt werden, dass Eunapios durch seine rhetorische Darstellung der Philometor-Episode mehrmals auf den platonischen *Phaidros* hindeutet. Somit ist der *Phaidros* zumindest einem Teil der Adressaten der *VS* stets präsent. Diese Adressaten dürften Philometor (im Falle seiner Bezeichnung als φαῖδρος sowie bei seinem späteren Wagenunfall) mit Konnotationen aus dem *Phaidros* in Verbindung gebracht haben. Dadurch entsteht eine zweite Leseebene, die den Inhalt des Textes erweitert. Philometers Bezeichnung als φαῖδρος steht dann nicht mehr lediglich für sein fröhliches Gemüt, sondern auch für den Verbleib seiner Seele in der niederen Ebene des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren. Dadurch wird der Kontrast zu

¹¹⁶ S. Kapitel 2.2. in dieser Arbeit.

¹¹⁷ Zur ersten Antithese s. S. 129–30 in dieser Arbeit.

¹¹⁸ Vgl. S. 132 in dieser Arbeit.

Sosipatra als θεία γυνή, also als eine dem Göttlichen nahestehenden Philosophin unterstrichen, womit der Skopos der VS (i.e. die Darstellung herausragender und nachahmenswerter PhilosophInnen der Lehrtradition Jamblichs) auch in der Philometor-Episode erkennbar wird.

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